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Paul M. Cunningham
his month I will brief-
ly discuss SSIT Pillar 4, 
which is dedicated to 
Societal Impact of 
Tech nology. Pillar 4 
focuses on highlighting and support-
ing the development of technologies 
that incorporate the principles of safe-
ty, security, and privacy by design.
This is an ambitious objective which 
requires consideration of both major 
themes as well as a number of major 
technological areas. Major themes 
include privacy, security, safety, ethi-
cal, legal, and political implications 
of current and emerging technologies 
and applying lessons learned from the 
past based on the often unintended 
and unanticipated implications of tech-
nological innovation and adoption.
Major technological areas that 
the SSIT community must address 
include:
 ■ Data-driven technologies (e.g., 
big data analysis, Internet of 
Things (IoT), personalization, 
social networks);
 ■ Cloud-based technologies (e.g., 
cloud-based computing, cloud-
based transactions);
 ■ Smart and autonomous sys-
tems (e.g., smart homes and 
devices, semi-autonomous and 
autonomous vehicles, surgical 
and medical robots, non-human 
intelligence);
 ■ Human-centered technologies 
(e.g., HCI, ergonomics);
 ■ Human enhancing technologies 
(e.g., augmented and virtual real-
ity, genetics and neurology, cyber-
physical systems).
It is clear that addressing this 
breadth and depth of technologi-
cal complexity requires a human-
values-based impact assessment. 
This can only be achieved through 
cross-disciplinary and interdisci -
plinary collaboration between engi-
neers, technologists and scientists, 
medical practitioners and legal 
scholars, philosophers and ethicists. 
In the light of this requirement, Pil-
lar 4 will prior itize multi -stake-
holder collaboration across IEEE 
societies, as well as engagement 
with non-IEEE stakeholders across 
the public, private, education and 
research, and societal sectors. This 
is essential to develop ethical based 
technological, standards, and pol-
icy-related approaches to mitigate 
and ameliorate some of the iden-
tified safety, security, and privacy 
issues identified. 
We hope you will be encouraged 
to prepare paper, panel and work-
shop submissions to the Call for 
Papers for IEEE ISTAS 2018 (Wash-
ington, DC, November 13–14), 
which will be addressing many of 
these issues.
Call for Volunteers
I invite you to help SSIT continue 
to make a difference in an arena of 
enormous complexity. Other volun-
teer opportunities include: 
 ■ Serving your local community 
through an existing or new 
SSIT Chapter.
 ■ Contributing to the work of SSIT’s 
committees (including our Stan-
dards committee).
 ■ Volunteering to host SSIT Distin-
guished Lecturers.
 ■ Submitting articles or review sub-
missions to IEEE Technology 
and Society Magazine.
 ■ Reviewing submissions to IEEE 
ISTAS, Norbert Weiner, IEEE Eth-
ics, IST-Africa Week, and other 
SSIT supported conferences.
 ■ Supporting activities of the IEEE 
SSIT IST-Africa SIGHT in IST-Afri-
ca Partner Countries.
 ■ Representing SSIT on IEEE com-
mittees (TAB, BoD, Standards, 
Future Directions Initiative).
 ■ Serving on the SSIT Board of 
Governors.
If any of these opportunities 
are of potential interest or if you 
would like to recommend someone, 
please contact me (Subject: Volun-
teer for IEEE SSIT – <name>) and I will 
direct you to the responsible team. If 
you have not received a response to 
T
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t can be glibly assert-
ed that technology 
makes accomplish-
ing various activities 
easier. But it is not 
always obvious for whom it makes it 
easier to accomplish what. For exam-
ple, the Internet has had a profound 
impact on academic publishing, and 
the transition from printed paper to 
digital format has ostensibly made 
it “easier” for academics to put their 
work in the public domain and, if 
they can actually get attention in a 
social-media sound-bite distracted 
world, reach a wider audience than 
ever before. However, if this transition 
coincides — by luck or judgement — 
with other societal changes, then 
it can also make it easier for some 
enterprises to deploy business mod-
els that enable them to accomplish 
their objectives. In an ideal world, this 
would create a “win-win-win” scenar-
io: a win for the academics, a win for 
the enterprises, and a win for society.
Thinking first of some ongoing 
societal changes, it is widely recog-
nized that information and commu-
nication technology, the knowledge 
economy, the digital economy, etc., 
are profoundly important econom-
ic drivers, and that a well-educated 
population, as well as being a benefit 
in and of itself, is a prerequisite for 
nation states to compete in a supra-
national market for electronic goods 
and services. For such reasons, then, 
a country such as the United King-
dom (U.K.) sets itself a target for 50% 
of its 18-year olds to go to University 
to study for a higher degree.
Leaving aside the thorny issue of 
who is actually “paying” to achieve 
this target, which involves a consid-
erable expansion of the sector,1 one 
consequence of more students2 is 
that more academics are required to 
teach undergraduates3 and to “train” 
postgraduates. That could be seen as 
a beneficial outcome: after all, this is a 
sign surely of a well-educated popula-
tion. On the other hand, it also means 
more academics seeking funding for 
their research, more academics and 
their students seeking publication 
of their research — and more proto-
academics pursuing careers. There-
fore the expansion has had (arguably) 
some less beneficial outcomes: for 
example, a subtle change in the nature 
of a Ph.D. that makes it more adver-
sarial between supervisor and student 
1Hint: the answer includes the students and the 
academics themselves; but not some of the pri-
mary beneficiaries of a well-educated workforce 
for whom tax avoidance on a, literally, industrial 
scale is routine.
2Together with legislation that practically obliges 
academic institutions to compete with each other 
to attract students, another consequence is an 
inexorable rise in the proportion of university 
budgets being spent on marketing and adminis-
tration in relation to the actual teaching budget.
3At least until the technology of the massive 
open online course (MOOC) renders all but one 
of the teachers redundant.
(rather than a co-production of super-
visor and student against a research 
question), and a diminution of the 
difficult transition from  absorber of 
knowledge to creator of new knowl-
edge,4 the cornerstone of any Ph.D. 
judgement. Most unfortunately, the 
academics themselves have been vic-
tims of their own success, and have 
produced new academics in greater 
numbers than are needed to service 
this increase in demand, and to sup-
ply their own replacement. This has 
created an excessive pool of well-qual-
ified and cheap labor, employable on 
short-term temporary or even “zero 
hours” contracts.
Another consequence of this ex -
pansion has been the corresponding 
enlargement (and indeed self-empow-
erment) of management and admin-
istration. In particular, there is an 
increased use of metrics for measur-
ing academic contribution, and being 
used in appointment and promotion 
panels.5 Such metrics include the 
Publish or Impoverish
Academic Publishing and 
the Platform Economy
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/MTS.2018.2826058
Date of publication: 31 May 2018
I
4The pressure on completion rates shifts the bur-
den of risk from student to supervisor, and pro-
vides less experience of “training for failure” — not 
every experiment will prove its null hypothesis, but 
that’s not what one might believe if one only read 
Ph.D. theses.
5This has been referred to as the “McKinseyisation 
of academia” — i.e., everything can be measured, 
and if it can be measured then it can be managed. 
See also [9].
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h-index (a correlation of  productivity 
and impact via paper and citation 
count), despite this index being pri-
marily correlated with network central-
ity (i.e., popularity) [10] rather than a 
reliable measure of academic quality6; 
and journal impact factor, although 
similarly it has been argued that the fig-
ure alone is no guarantee of academic 
merit [2]. Both metrics are, of course, 
open to manipulation, and impact 
factor can even induce a state of scien-
tific delusion: if some researchers are 
asked by peer reviewers for “one more 
experiment” before their paper can 
appear in one of the “top” journals, 
then they know what the outcome of 
that experiment must be7 [4].
The expansion and its metrication 
creates a near perfect storm when 
it coincides with the “publish-or-per-
ish” mentality and the imposition of 
national evaluation exercises, such as 
the U.K.’s Research Evaluation Frame-
work (REF). For example, REF2014 
was used to evaluate about 130 U.K. 
universities employing approximately 
200 000 academics, each of whom 
had to submit four publications they 
had produced in a six-year period. For 
the sake of argument, assume that 
these are all journal publications, 
supposing that non-journal publica-
tions are balanced out by four being 
the minimum number.
The gathering storm metastasises 
into the perfect one when one throws 
in the grand larceny masquerading 
as a public good otherwise known as 
Open Access. Multiply the number 
of academics by the number of their 
papers and the average fee charged 
for open access, and the Fermi equa-
tion/back-of-an-envelope calculation 
reveals a huge number — and this is 
in the U.K. alone. And this money is 
paid to publish the work of people that 
have already been paid to produce it…
It is at this point that the techno-
logical and business models under-
pinning the transition from print to 
electronic format in academic pub-
lishing find themselves perfectly 
positioned to exploit it. While many 
publishers do work very effectively 
with their journals, some publishing 
houses have used their historically-
acquired position as guarantors of sci-
entific quality and neutrality together 
with the new technology to create a 
platform economy [8], [12]. More-
over, the raw material is provided 
for free; the labor to convert the 
raw material into finished product 
is provided for free (i.e., editors, peer 
reviewers, etc.); distribution, advertis-
ing and promotion are provided for 
free; and even the growth of the mar-
ket is provided for free — which is pre-
cisely where this editorial started, with 
the expansion of higher education.
In a platform economy, this exploi-
tation is precisely what can be expect-
ed when both the ownership of the 
means of production and the means 
of coordination are privately owned. 
The only “winner” in the fallout from 
where technological advancement 
underpinning the transition in aca-
demic publishing clashes with soci-
etal changes is the enterprise.
This is not to suggest that central-
ization is the preferred alternative: the 
system of editorial and peer-review, 
for all its limitations,8 has been cru-
cial to the academic community, both 
in access control and quality control, 
as well as in self-governance and self-
correction. The vast sums of money 
spent on open access should instead 
be invested in non-profit NGOs like 
the IEEE to foster the development 
of completely decentralized knowl-
edge commons [5], [6] — using the 
same technology to create an open, 
democratic platform community, 
not a platform economy that enables 
some enterprises to accomplish their 
objective of maximizing profit by 
what some might argue is a form of 
legaliz ed profiteering.
Author Information
Jeremy Pitt is Professor of Intelligent 
and Self-Organizing Systems at 
Imperial College London, U.K. Email: 
j.pitt@imperial.ac.uk.
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Book Reviews
Michael L. Black
nterest from academ-
ics in the humanities 
and social sciences 
in studying the cul-
tural dimensions of 
computing can be traced back at 
least as far as the early 1980s. As 
personal computers became increas-
ingly common in homes, offices, 
schools, and universities, scholars 
like Jay David Bolter, Lucy Such-
mann, and Sherry Turkle began 
the work of adapting the research 
methodologies of their respective 
disciplines to study computing in 
these new contexts. Personal com-
puting devices and the myriad of 
cultural activities we juggle through 
them have since become more and 
more complicated; however, at the 
same time user-friendly approach-
es to design encourage us to take 
this complexity for granted. Indeed, 
as Eszter Hargittai and Christian 
Sandvig note in their introduction 
to Digital Research Confidential: 
The Secrets of Studying Behavior 
Online, there is now often little insti-
tutional reward for writing about 
how the broad integration of com-
puting affects academic research 
about culture and behavior. In this 
respect, their collection serves as 
an effective argument for the value 
of sustaining in-depth conversations 
on the effects that constantly chang-
ing technological conditions have 
on research methods. It is also an 
engaging introduction to the wide 
range of research in these fields 
being conducted digitally.
Not to be confused with the “digi-
tal humanities” — a field largely 
devoted to studying and preserving 
pre-twentieth century texts due to 
the copyright’s influence over digiti-
zation efforts — the “digital media 
studies” represented in Hargittai and 
Sandvig’s collection focuses on con-
temporary and often digitally created 
cultural activities. This interdisciplin-
ary research area involves scholars 
from a variety of disciplines includ-
ing, but not limited to, literature and 
language, writing studies, history, 
anthropology, sociology, communi-
cations, information science, and 
computer science. Representing 
every methodological approach in 
this incredibly diverse field in a sin-
gle volume would be an impossible 
task. Hargittai and Sandvig have wise-
ly chosen to limit their collection by 
focusing primarily on scholars whose 
work involves Web 2.0 technologies. 
This decision gives each of the essays 
in the book some common ground 
while still allowing the collection to 
highlight the breadth of subjects cov-
ered by digital media studies. The 
collection discusses projects involv-
ing the Internet Archive’s Wayback 
Machine, YouTube, Twitter, comput-
er-aided drafting software, Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk system, Wikipedia, 
Flickr, homemade webcrawlers, and 
Second Life.
Hargittai and Sandvig’s excellent 
introduction is able to synthesize 
the wide-ranging research trends in 
this field around a tension between 
digital media as instrumentation 
and digital media as object of study. 
Digital research in the humanities 
and social sciences is often framed 
in one of two ways: either online 
platforms that offer “a new kind of 
microscope” allowing us to under-
stand an area of offline behavior 
we are already familiar with in a new 
way, or online social activity sharing 
enough similarities to offline behav-
ior that we can comfortably transfer 
our existing assumptions about 
how humans relate to one another 
into these new contexts. Both of 
these approaches assume that theory 
and method can be discussed sepa-
rately. Most research leveraging these 
approaches, in other words, assumes 
either that digital tools add to — but 
don’t disrupt our — core understand-
ings of cultural and behavior or that 
online activities function as relatively 
seamless extensions of offline behav-
ior. Yet as Megan Sapnar Ankerson 
concludes in her essay, each project 
in the collection involves a moment 
when a researcher “could not help 
but notice the ways [their] entire 
engagement with [their] project was 
thoroughly organized through soft-
ware” (p. 47). While the widespread 
acceptance of particular methods 
in the humanities and social sciences 
allows for basic assumptions about 
culture and society shaping them to 
be taken for granted, digital tools 
are often designed with other needs 
in mind. Conducting social research 
Digital Research Confidential
Digital Research Confidential: The Secrets of Studying Behavior Online. 
By Eszter Hargittai and Christian Sandvig. M.I.T. Press, 2015. 
I
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/MTS.2018.2839218 
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in digital contexts, which is to say 
through software, requires us to 
revisit and re-evaluate them against 
the affordances and constraints of 
the tools we use. Digital Research 
Confidential thus makes a strong 
argument for both the practical and 
analytical value of software and 
data carpentry in the humanities 
and social sciences. 
The ten essays that follow the 
introductory chapter can be roughly 
divided into four categories. The first 
two essays following the introduction 
explore how database construction 
shapes archival research practices. 
Megan Sapnar Ankerson shares her 
experience working with the Inter-
net Archive’s Wayback Machine. 
Initially taking the project’s slogan 
to “surf the web as it was” at face 
value, Ankerson eventually realized 
that some sites were reproduced in 
a form that had never existed in the 
first place due to the way that the 
project’s webcrawler tried to fill in 
gaps in content by selecting tempo-
rarily adjacent versions of files with 
the same name. Turning to debates 
taking place among web develop-
ers in the late 1990s, Ankerson is 
eventually able to connect the pat-
terns of missing content resulting 
from the Internet Archive’s retrieval 
algorithm to discussions about the 
norms of “good” web design. She 
concludes by observing that the Way-
back Machine’s algorithms are them-
selves a part of these debates in the 
sense that what they capture, recre-
ate, or wholly ignore reflect beliefs 
held by its creators about what the 
web would become. In the chapter 
that follows, Vírág Molnár and Aron 
Hsiao discuss a project on tracing 
the evolution of flash mobs using 
recordings published on  YouTube. 
In addition to sharing some of their 
results, Molnár and Hsiao discuss 
how they documented their retrieval 
process in the interest of reproduc-
ibility, both so they could update 
their work later but also so that others 
might have a model to follow in simi-
lar projects. Yet when revisiting their 
results after the initial capture period, 
they discovered that YouTube’s search 
interface had been altered, leaving 
them unable to reproduce their pro-
cedures. Like Ankerson, Molnár and 
Hsiao’s essay demonstrates how digi-
tal research methodologies are influ-
enced even before a project begins by 
technical decisions that researchers 
ultimately have no control over. While 
neither essay attempts to dissuade 
researchers from using pub -
lic databases, they both 
point to a need to address 
the fact that decisions made 
in the name of efficiency or 
usability often have conse-
quences for researchers that 
are not anticipated by soft-
ware designers.
Three essays in the col-
lection discuss ethnographic 
methods, each demonstrat-
ing that close observation 
of the social use of technol-
ogy requires creative adaptation to 
the various ways that technology is 
incorporated into our personal and 
working lives. The first, by danah 
boyd, discusses her work in docu-
menting the roles that social media 
play in the lives of teenagers; how-
ever, boyd’s essay rarely mentions 
technology. As she explains, her inter-
viewing techniques reflect the ways 
that technology flitters in and out 
of their lives. While the Internet 
re mains a significant conduit for 
teenage social behavior, she notes 
that it is rarely a focus of the narra-
tives they tell about their lives. 
For anyone already familiar with 
boyd’s work, this observation is not 
new, but the chapter offers important 
insights as to how she learned to 
adapt her ethnographic interest in 
computing to study a group that does 
not spend much time thinking about 
it. Technology also appears, at least 
initially, to exist at the margins of 
Paul M. Leonardi’s essay on observ-
ing automobile engineers. Leon-
ardi recounts his time conducting 
field research within a private com-
pany, offering a wealth of practical 
advice for every step of the process 
from explaining the idea of software 
as data in an Institutional Review 
Board proposal, to gaining the trust 
of management while on site. More 
importantly for the aims of Hargittai 
and Sandvig, Leonardi’s work dem-
onstrates the importance of incor-
porating a technological awareness 
into his observational method, as 
Leonardi is able to discover many 
of the disagreements he documents 
between engineers result from the 
way their software resolves conflicts 
when trying to integrate components 
designed by different groups before 
an impact test. Finally, Amy Bruck-
man, Kurt Luther, and Casey Fiesler’s 
essay examines the role of Insti-
tutional Review Boards in universi-
ties, placing many of the same ideas 
raised in these two earlier essays 
into a historical context, showing 
how the social norms of online envi-
ronments often diverge from the pri-
vacy and protection needs of offline 
social contexts.
Crowdsourcing has already proved 
effective in a number of research 
contexts, but as a pair of essays here 
show, the patterns of engagement 
it affords may conflict with some 
There is now often little 
institutional reward for writing 
about how the broad integration 
of computing affects academic 
research about culture and behavior.
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best practices of survey design and 
academic division of labor. Eric Gil-
bert and Karrie Karahalios’ essay 
on developing a Twitter interface 
based on theories of “social ties” 
explores the difficult task of balanc-
ing the expectations of social science 
research against the feedback from 
user testing. Despite succeeding from 
a technological perspective, a ques-
tion of representativeness lingers 
over the project, as start-up style beta 
testing is not necessarily compatible 
with norms of sample selection in the 
social sciences. Following their essay, 
Aaron Shaw’s narrative of incorporat-
ing crowdsourcing into a large-scale 
content analysis project discusses 
the problem of user error in research 
software and expands into a broader 
reflection on how academic labor 
is valued. But this decision comes 
with its own time-consuming prob-
lems. Whereas professionally trained 
research assistants often disagree 
over interpretation, Shaw notes that 
disagreements in crowd-sourcing are 
often also the result of usability issues 
in the project’s software interfaces 
and documentation. Shaw’s account 
of addressing miscommunications 
between himself and software engi-
neers on the importance of collecting 
data in specific ways will ring true to 
anyone who has participated in com-
plex collaborations and is a must read 
for anyone considering one, regard-
less of their role.
The collection also includes a trio 
of essays on doing social research 
using “big data” retrieved from online 
sources. In their conversationally 
styled essay, Michelle Shumate and 
Matthew S. Weber offer two comple-
mentary, detailed defenses of soft-
ware carpentry through a discussion 
of programming web-crawling tools. 
Their essay offers a look at the same 
issues raised by those before them 
in the collection but from the other 
side of the interface. While the labor 
of programming may not yet be 
institutionally rewarded in 
the humanities and social 
sciences, Shumate and 
Web er offer a strong argu-
ment for the ways that it 
can enrich those products 
of research that are. Brent 
Hecht and Darren Gergle 
extend discussion of this 
topic by examining how dis-
parate data sources often 
make very different assump-
tions about metadata and 
its presentation within a 
database. Their essay raises 
important questions about 
the bias of certainty present in re -
search involving big data. Similarly, 
Brooke Foucault Welles’ discusses 
how larger data sets can actually 
create a greater degree of uncer-
tainty by examining how seemingly 
familiar concepts like “friendship” 
are understood via comparatively 
narrow observational contexts. In 
addition to offering detailed looks at 
the labor behind large-scale data col-
lection and preparation, these three 
essays show that close involvement in 
the algorithmic processes performing 
it will lead to increased confidence in 
the theories derived from it.
Digital Research Confidential’s 
breadth, in short, is ambitious and 
representative of the way that digital 
media research in the humanities 
and social sciences is often pep-
pered across academic departments 
on most campuses rather than cen-
tralized under a single umbrella. 
Readers will likely find that not all 
subjects or methods offer insights 
applicable to their own research. 
For instance, someone interested in 
combing through digital archives may 
not find the lengthy discussions on 
gaining trust during interviews as con-
siderations of how databases preju-
dice our sense of historical memory. 
If Hargittai and Sandvig have aimed 
the book at fostering conversations 
among seasoned practitioners in the 
fields represented about the long-
term effects of recent developments 
in Internet-based technologies on 
their home disciplines, then in that 
regard it succeeds wonderfully even 
if every reader will take away some-
thing different from it. Nonetheless, 
each chapter is generally written in 
a manner beneficial to specialists 
and non-specialists alike, making the 
collection also an excellent choice 
for an upper-level classroom, schol-
ars already wrestling with similar 
problems themselves, or technologi-
cal professionals looking to better 
understand the computationally-driv-
en research of their humanist and/or 
social scientist collaborators.
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Programmed Inequality
Programmed Inequality: How Britain Discarded Women Technologists  
and Lost Its Edge in Computing. 
By Marie Hicks. London, U.K.: M.I.T. Press, 2017, 239 pages.
Jenna P. Carpenter
ur awareness and 
understanding of 
the key role that 
women played in 
codebreaking and 
computing efforts during World War 
II has grown significantly over the 
last decade. While some stories, 
like that of pioneer computer pro-
grammer Grace Murray Hopper, 
have been known for some time, a 
more extensive story of women’s 
impact has been painted in the last 
five to ten years by documentaries 
like Top Secret Rosies: The Female 
“Computers” of WWI [1], popular 
movies such as The Imitation 
Game [2], and books, including 
Margot Shetterly’s recent Hidden 
Figures [3]. Marie Hicks’ book, Pro-
grammed Inequality adds to this 
narrative by telling the story of the 
critical role that women “comput-
ers” played in Britain from World 
War II through the 1970s. However, 
Hicks seeks to go farther, recording 
not only the impact of women on 
the rise (and fall) of the computing 
industry in the U.K., but showing 
how the fortunes (or more accurate-
ly, the lack thereof) of women in the 
computing workforce were inter-
twined with Britain’s inability to 
capitalize on the worldwide lead 
they enjoyed in computing at the 
end of WWII. Hicks also argues that 
this story is relevant today, 
given burgeoning U.S. com-
puting workforce needs, 
positioned aga inst the 
shortage of qualified com-
puting workers. Indeed, like 
Britain, the U.S. worker 
shortage is exacerbated by 
the outmigration of women 
from the computing work-
force that started at the 
end of WWII and accelerat-
ed in the early 2000s with 
the rise of the computing gamer 
culture [4].
How does Hicks’s story go? 
Starting in the late 1800s, human 
“computers” (the term was originally 
coined to describe women who did 
mathematical computations by 
hand), were employed to support 
weather applications and astronomi-
cal research. Their calculations were 
done by hand and, later, with the 
aid of a series of desktop (electro)-
mechanical machines (the prede-
cessors of what we today think of as 
“computers”). Computing was actu-
ally viewed as a viable career path 
in the late 1800 and early 1900s for 
young women who showed math-
ematical talent. Around the 1920s 
in the U.S., the number of women 
entering college had grown to the 
point that people feared there would 
soon be too few slots for men, so a 
quota system was implemented to 
keep women out of fields like math-
ematics and science. But computing 
with the aid of desktop machines, 
even large floor-standing models 
like the IBM tabulator, were viewed 
as “secretarial work” — low-skilled, 
rote, minimally-valued. Therefore 
computing continued to be consid-
ered suitable work for women into 
the 1930s. Even the manufacture 
of computing machines at IBM in 
Britain was dominated by female 
employees, so much so that IBM 
measured its production in the 
U.K. in “girl hours,” instead of the 
more common “man hours” until 
the 1960’s. Layered on all of this 
was the gendered expectation that 
women’s primary goal in life was 
to marry and have children. Work-
ing was a temporary diversion for 
young women in their late teens, 
early twenties. When women mar-
ried, they were expected to drop out 
of the workforce. After all, their 
O
The term “Computers” was 
originally coined to describe 
women who did mathematical 
computations by hand.
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husbands should be able to finan-
cially support them. A workforce 
culture built on these assumptions 
meant that women’s pay was kept 
low and opportunities for promotion 
or positions in management were all 
but non-existent. 
World War II dramatically chal-
lenged the artificial rules about the 
suitability of women in the work-
place. With vast sectors of male 
workers siphoned off to the military 
by the draft, countries like Britain had 
no choice but to open the doors of 
the workplace to women. Hicks notes 
that by 1942, Britain was relying so 
heavily on women in the workforce 
that it was forced to open up all jobs 
to women, including the heretofore 
male bastions of engineering and 
welding. While employers surpris-
ingly found women perfectly capable 
of doing such work, they still treated 
only the most talented women equal 
to their average male counterpart. 
Yet industries in the U.K. went so 
far as to reorganize how work was 
done and how training took place, in 
order to make it easier for women to 
participate. After all, as Hicks points 
out, 1.1 million women (80% of sin-
gle women 41% of wives and wid-
ows, 13% of mothers with children 
under 14) were hired in 1942 in the 
British armed forces and munitions 
industries alone. The numbers only 
increased as the war dragged on. 
Over 10 000 women worked at the 
famous Bletchley Park, mostly young, 
single, white, and middle class. These 
women worked on decoding German 
communications, much of it using 
British Colossus computers. The Co -
lossus preceded the creation of the 
U.S. ENIAC computer at the University 
of Pennsylvania, which means Britain 
led the world in the development of 
the modern computer. Despite the 
centrality of their work to the war 
efforts, women at Bletchley Park 
were not promoted into positions 
that reflected their newfound skills, 
the type of work they performed, or 
their future potential. Even severe 
wartime manpower shortages were 
not enough to completely override 
the gendered work culture in the U.K. 
Underage and inexperienced teen-
age boys, for example, were recruited 
and trained to be maintenance engi-
neers for the computers at Bletchley, 
bypassing the older, experienced 
women. Indeed, the overarching mes-
sage of Hicks’ book is the length 
to which Britain went to maintain its 
gendered work rules and culture, 
no matter how damaging 
the consequences. Hicks 
illustrates how these same 
gendered rules were one of 
the key sources of the coun-
try’s computing workforce 
woes in the latter half of the 
20th century.
The complete secrecy — 
long after hostilities end -
ed — of wartime activities 
at Bletchley Park and similar instal-
lations in both Britain and the U.S. 
meant that the accomplishments 
and skills of women in the war-
time computing effort were never 
acknowledged or made public. This 
fueled for many more decades the 
faux storyline that women were not 
interested in, nor capable of per-
forming computing and related tech-
nical tasks. At the end of WWII, only 
several hundred of the thousands of 
women at Bletchley were allowed to 
transition over to the then-coveted 
government Civil Service computing 
jobs, the first of what would grow 
to be Britain’s enormous postwar, 
largely female computing workforce. 
At odds with reality, however, the 
women’s computing work inside the 
Civil Service system was regarded 
as low level and subordinate to 
the “real work,” instead of square-
ly at the core, of postwar computing. 
The roles women were allowed to fill 
were seen as separate and beneath 
the work in which their male cowork-
ers engaged. Consequently, the Civil 
Service system in Britain was, for 
decades, among the worst perpetu-
ators of the unequal categorization 
of men’s and women’s comput-
ing work. Campaigns for equal pay 
and other opportunities for women 
arose time and again in postwar 
Britain, yet the country repeatedly 
managed to dodge any real change. 
Between the end of WWII and 1946, 
married women were prohibited out-
right from working in Civil Service 
jobs (due to the so-called “marriage 
bar”), even though other industries 
began to relax such rules since they 
had been ignored during the WWII. 
The 1946 Equal Pay Report removed 
the marriage bar, yet still assumed 
that the number of women in the 
workforce would be inconsequen-
tial and only allowed under certain 
restrictive circumstances, certainly 
not a key part the nation’s postwar 
economy. Because women in Britain 
had few opportunities for advance-
ment or interesting work after WWII, 
many who had worked during the 
war years left the workforce volun-
tarily after they married. 
After repeal of the marriage 
bar in 1946, the British Civil Ser-
vice created a substandard system 
called “machine grades” for wom-
en’s computing work, in a delib-
erate effort to limit women’s pay 
and advancement opportunities. 
Women’s work still largely con-
sisted of working with machines, 
perpetually viewed as low-skilled 
secretarial work and therefore 
A quota system was implemented 
to keep women out of fields like 
mathematics and science.
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appropriate for women but beneath 
men. The “machine grades” suc-
ceeded in devaluing women’s work, 
pay, and computing careers in the 
U.K. for decades. The creation of 
the “machine grades” also success-
fully convinced the British people 
that computing was a low-level 
occupation that required no real 
education or skills. By the time the 
British government realized that 
computing was revolutionizing how 
work was done in the latter part of 
the 20th century, it was too late. No 
one believed the new government 
propaganda that computing was a 
high-level job offering a lifetime of 
career opportunities. 
After WWII, the British govern-
ment took over about one-fifth of 
the country’s private industries and 
continued to enforce wartime prac-
tices such as rationing. The social-
ist agenda of the British government 
during the post-WWII period did not 
encompass equal pay for women. 
Although this issue was revisited 
multiple times in the ensuing years, 
the perpetual argument was two-
fold. First women did not need to 
make as much as men (who had to 
support a family). After all, a single 
woman only had to take care of her-
self and a married woman had her 
husband’s salary on which she could 
rely. The second argument against 
equal pay was that the government 
could not afford to pay women the 
same salaries that they paid men. 
Neither of these arguments was 
accurate. Many families needed the 
extra income that a working woman 
provided. In fact, Hicks points out 
that the government spent far more 
than needed to fund equal pay for 
women on social programs aimed 
at accomplishing the same results 
that equal pay would have achieved. 
The British Civil Service worked to 
implement major cost reductions 
during this time, but believed that 
keeping inflation in check could be 
accomplished by hiring cheaper 
women workers and by transferring 
much of their work from humans to 
computers. Therefore, Britain was 
vested in keeping women’s pay arti-
ficially low as a matter of national 
economic policy and they devoted 
enormous resources over several 
decades toward that goal. Britain 
failed to foresee that their comput-
ing needs, in terms of both equip-
ment and trained workers, would 
mushroom and consequ ently so 
would the financial resources re -
quired to maintain them. 
In the end, neither artifi-
cially depressing women’s 
wages nor relying on com-
puters as a cost reduction 
measure was a viable eco -
nomic strategy.
In the 1960s and 1970s 
the British government 
sought to rebuild its war-
time dominance in the com-
puting sector to restore its 
position as a global power. 
As noted above, this plan neces-
sitated a gender power shift in com-
puting, from viewing computing as 
low-wage, unskilled secretarial. or 
“machine grade” work performed by 
women, to seeing it as high pay and 
prestigious work performed by men. 
In Britain’s effort to rebrand com-
puting as “high value men’s work” 
they booted out their qualified and 
experienced workforce of women 
and tried to replace them with inex-
perienced and largely uninterested 
men. The fact that the government’s 
efforts here were a flop necessitated 
increasing government microman-
agement of the private British com-
puting industry. Their inability to 
attract a sufficiently large male com-
puting workforce (and, of course, 
now that computing was important 
work, women could no longer be 
allowed to engage in it) meant that 
Britain’s enormous Civil Service 
sector needed powerful supercom-
puters that could be “controlled” 
by a small number of high level, 
trained male executives. Note that 
this obsession with supercomputers 
took place while the rest of the world 
was focused on the emergence of 
the personal computer or PC. But 
the British government insisted on 
dictating the future direction of the 
U.K.’s computing industries, shoring 
them up with government funds and 
eventually forcing a merger into a 
single computing company capable 
of designing and building the colos-
sal supercomputers to run the coun-
try. Hicks meticulously details the 
story of Britain’s intertwined desire 
for world power status in computing 
with its economic woes as well as 
its stubborn adherence to a strongly 
gendered workplace. She also dem-
onstrates why this approach caused 
Britain to fail, sealing the demise 
of both its reemergence as a world 
power and its dominance of world-
wide computing. Instead of being 
a fix for Britain’s economic and poli-
tical power woes, computing and 
the changes it ushered in simply 
exacerbated the inherent problems 
embedded in both systems. Only in 
the late 1980s did the British govern-
ment finally engage in efforts to spe-
cifically recruit women into formerly 
male computing jobs. They hoped to 
alleviate the decades-long comput-
ing worker shortages and outflow of 
even minimally trained men to the 
more lucrative private sector. Yet 
“Machine grades” succeeded 
in devaluing women’s work, pay, 
and computing careers in the  
U.K. for decades.
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these efforts to re-engage women 
in the British computing workforce 
failed by the end of the 1980’s and 
never recovered. This loss of what 
once was an enormous female Civil 
Service computing workforce finally 
succumbed to decades of intention-
al discrimination.
How is this story relevant today? 
Hicks rightly notes that the number 
of college-aged women pursuing a 
career in computing has plummeted 
in the last 15 years in the U.S. [4]. 
But the problems start long before 
women get to college. By the time 
U.S. children are in second grade, 
research shows that they all know 
math is for boys and reading is for 
girls. By the time children reach high 
school, boys outnumber girls a stun-
ning four-to-one among Advanced 
Placement or AP Computer Science 
test takers. In 2014 three U.S. states 
(Mississippi, Montana, and Wyo-
ming) had zero girls take (not pass, 
just take) the AP Computer Science 
exam. Zero [4]. Efforts to attract girls 
to computing starting in elementary 
school in the U.S. are numerous to 
be sure, from coding organizations 
girls like Girls Who Code and Black 
Girls Code to recognition efforts 
such as NCWIT Aspiration Awards 
programs to K12 robot competi-
tions like FIRST and Vex Robotics. 
It will be some time before we can 
truly assess the long-term impact 
of such efforts. Programs to recruit 
and retain college women in com-
puting-related majors have been 
around for decades, as well. There 
are some success stories at insti-
tutions such as Harvey Mudd Col-
lege, where more than half of the 
computer science graduates in 2016 
were women [5], but these stories 
are the exception, not the rule. Com-
puter science programs in college 
rank among the lowest in terms 
of percentage of women majors, 
often hovering not far above the 
single digits. Like postwar Britain, 
the computing workforce needs 
in the U.S. are huge and 
growing rapidly, with an 
estimated 1 million more 
computing jobs than quali-
fied applicants by 2020 [6]. 
Combine all of this with the 
fact that women now out-
number men in college two-
to-one [7], and it’s not hard 
to see that U.S. is already 
riding a tsunami fueled by 
the shortage of qualified 
computing workers. It’s just 
that the bulk of the water 
hasn’t obliterated the shore-
line ... yet. Given that the 
bachelor’s degree college 
graduates of 2020 arrived 
on U.S. college campuses in fall of 
2016, we will have to increasingly 
rely on alternate training, such as 
coding camps, two-year programs, 
retraining of older workers and, yes, 
successfully cracking our own gen-
dered computing norms in the U.S., 
to survive. The country with the best 
trained and largest computing work-
force will likely rule the world in the 
not-too-distant future. We daily see 
increasing threats and damage by 
hackers on critical industries and 
infrastructure dotting the daily news. 
As a female professional who works 
hard to attract and retain women in 
STEM careers, I certainly hope that 
we can pull it out in the end. But I am 
afraid that it is already too late and 
Hicks’ warning will simply go unheed-
ed. Because, like postwar Britain, our 
cultural gender norms about who 
can and wants to do computing in 
the U.S. have actually grown more 
restrictive over the decades (just look 
back at those AP Computer Science 
test takers!), hurling us in the oppo-
site direction of where we need to go, 
driving women away from comput-
ing fields at the very time we desper-
ately need to be drawing throngs of 
women toward careers in computing 
with open arms.
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Girls Coming to Tech
Girls Coming to Tech! A History of American Engineering Education for Women. 
By Amy Sue Bix. M.I.T. Press, 2014.
Renée M. Blackburn
istories of Science 
and Technology in 
the twentieth century 
often deal with impor-
tant figures, almost 
certainly male, and their contribu-
tions to their field and to society. 
These histories detail the signifi-
cance of their education and the 
ways in which they used their skills 
to start major companies, create new 
technologies, or contribute to patri-
otic efforts in wartime. In Girls Com-
ing to Tech!: A History of American 
Engineering Education for Women, 
Amy Sue Bix expands on the growing 
literature of women in STEM. Specifi-
cally, the book explores engineering 
education through the lens of gender 
from the late 1800s through most of 
the twentieth century. 
The text comprises seven chap-
ters, each highlighting the measures 
taken by institutions and individu-
als to eventually reach engineering 
coeducation. Chapter 1 focuses on 
the few women who first entered 
institutions in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Chap-
ters 2 and 3 indicate the important 
role that World War II played in shift-
ing social and institutional norms 
around women’s engineering educa-
tion. Not only did universities accept 
more women into engineering, so 
did the federal government and 
industry, particularly through part-
nerships that blurred gender bound-
aries temporarily for the war effort. 
Chapters four through six offer case 
studies of post-World War II wom-
en’s engineering life at Georgia 
Tech, Caltech, and M.I.T., respective-
ly. Each university approached coed-
ucation from a different angle, with 
varying cultural norms attached to 
women’s femininity and how those 
views fit into the heavily mascu-
line traditions already in place at 
each institution. And finally, chap-
ter seven details the ways in which 
campus culture and views around 
coeducation changed in the late twen-
tieth century.
Bix, Professor of History at Iowa 
State University, uses the larger nar-
ratives of American history, mostly 
in the twentieth century, to explain 
the way in which engineering edu-
cation for women was viewed and 
decided by universities, industry, 
and the federal government. In one 
of the more prominent examples, 
Bix, at various points, details the 
impact of World War II on expand-
ing women’s entrance into engineer-
ing programs and women’s general 
acceptance at technical institutions 
and in male-dominated environ-
ments. She describes the stereo-
types that plagued women who 
wished to pursue engineering: they 
only wanted to find a husband, they 
would quit work once they were mar-
ried or had children, they were not 
smart enough to grasp the science 
or math, or they were only suited to 
engineering programs that already 
possessed feminine qualities. 
Bix expertly draws out the threads 
of masculinity and femininity that 
guided many of the actions taken by 
actors throughout the story. Not only 
were engineering programs averse 
to women entering the “masculine” 
field of engineering, but when they 
did, programs often sought to play 
on what they saw as women’s inher-
ent feminine characteristics. In one 
example, Purdue created a new pro-
gram called “Housing” for women 
after World War II, which married 
the already feminine Home Eco-
nomics with Engineering, “based 
on assumptions that female stu-
dents were natural authorities on 
the home.” This worked both ways, 
of course, as Purdue hoped not only 
to appeal to women interested in 
engineering and who did not wish 
to enter the engineering school, but 
also appealed to a growing num-
ber of men who were interested in 
majoring in home economics.
Throughout the text, Bix also 
draws on the “invasion” metaphor, 
wherein male students, faculty, and 
administration saw female students 
as “invading” campuses when they 
first arrived. This metaphor is par-
ticularly effective to convey the way 
H
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both men and women felt about 
women’s place on college cam-
puses. Male students often worried, 
unnecessarily, that the introduction 
of women to classrooms and cam-
puses would both diminish the stan-
dards set for their education and 
distract them from their work. At 
the same time, they held a double 
standard against female students 
for being both “distracting” and yet 
undateable. On the other hand, 
women felt isolated and alone. They 
were often singled out and treated 
inappropriately — with preferential 
treatment, harassed by classmates 
and faculty, or ignored or spoken 
over in meetings or group settings.
One of the lessons of this text is 
that women’s entrance and engage-
ment with engineering was not a 
linear progression. Some engineer-
ing programs, like those at RPI, Pur-
due, and Columbia, expanded their 
programs and allowed women to 
enter engineering programs or uni-
versities at various points in time 
before World War II. At the same 
time, these universities also guided 
women toward gendered course 
structures, offering courses in sub-
jects such as “domestic arts,” which 
they assumed women wanted and 
needed. University administrations’ 
motivations for admitting and edu-
cating women students remained 
firmly entrenched in gendered no -
tions of women’s and men’s places 
in society, and even college educat-
ed women were assumed to be in 
need of domestic skills only. The few 
women who did enter and graduate, 
however, were often still met with 
the same “masculine” mentality that 
they experienced while at university.
During World War II, a rush of 
women entered into  engineering 
programs across the United States, 
compared to previous years. Though 
many of the women who had en -
tered wartime programs such as 
the Curtiss-Wright Cadettes, did not 
stick with engineering after the war 
ended, they created a more hos-
pitable climate for women seeking 
engineering degrees. Engineering 
programs during World War II helped 
to blur the strict gender lines that 
previously kept women from easily 
pursuing engineering degrees, but 
did not allow women full access 
to the same education system that 
their male engineering counterparts 
experienced. The double standard 
of engineering education continued 
when programs were specifically 
designed for women.
Bix devotes three chapters to 
specific case study institutions and 
their varied reactions to coeduca-
tion. Chapter 4, “Coeducation via 
Lawsuit: Georgia Tech,” and Chap-
ter 5, “Coeducation for Social Life: 
Caltech,” approach coeducation 
from the students’ point of view. 
Male students recognized the need 
for coeducation to create a better 
social world at Caltech. However, the 
male students and faculty treated 
the incoming women as outsiders 
and objectified them based on their 
appearance and perceived abilities. 
The third case study institution in 
Chapter 6, “A Special Case: Women 
at M.I.T.,” was coeducational in the 
nineteenth century, though women’s 
large-scale enrollment did not occur 
until the mid-twentieth century. How-
ever, while other institutions were 
debating whether to allow women 
in, M.I.T. debated whether to begin 
excluding women. In the mid-1950s, 
M.I.T. commissioned a committee 
on coeducation, and many on the 
committee argued for making M.I.T. 
male-only as they saw some women 
students in their courses struggling 
to succeed. But the larger problems 
that women dealt with at M.I.T., 
such as lack of adequate housing, 
added to their difficult experiences 
and continued to aid the cause that 
women did not belong in the mascu-
line technical world of M.I.T.. 
In all three cases, the women 
at tech schools faced double stan-
dards. They were welcomed through 
new admissions initiatives target-
ing them, but upon entering were 
often treated as sexual objects or 
intellectually inferior by their male 
peers and faculty and provided with 
inferior services like housing, mak-
ing their transition to university 
life more difficult. They hoped that 
once they reached a “critical mass” 
of women students, the invasion 
rhetoric and resistance to their pres-
ence would fade as women gained 
more respect.
Beyond the three major case stud-
ies found in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, Bix 
provides multiple examples from 
universities across the United States, 
including of schools like Cornell, 
University of Michigan, University of 
Minnesota, and University of Colora-
do. Her book is well-researched and 
her conclusions reverberate beyond 
the university and into the role that 
women play in the workplace, espe-
cially in technical positions, and in 
the ways that science, math, and 
engineering are taught to girls at 
young ages. This book is more than 
a history of women’s struggles in 
gaining a university-level engineering 
education, it is also a history of the 
changing societal notions of what 
technical education is and should be 
and how that education should be 
accessed, taught, and used.
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Shoshana Eilon
n 2012, when Ryan 
and Amy Green learn­
ed that their baby 
son Joel’s rare can­
cer was terminal, 
they were devastated. Searching 
for a way to explore his feelings, 
Ryan, an indie video game devel­
oper, found solace in the most 
appropriate creative outlet he knew: 
making a video game. 
Ryan Green created a video game 
called “That Dragon, Cancer,” a game 
that is at once a poetic exploration of 
a father’s relationship with his son, an 
interactive painting, and a vivid win­
dow into the mind of grieving parents.
Green also recruited his wife 
and sons into the process of docu­
menting their daily lives for a film, 
Thank you for Playing, about the 
video game’s development. In cre­
ating the documentary and the 
game, Ryan had to decide where 
to draw the line in sharing his fam­
ily’s experiences of raising 
a dying child. From having 
his sons reenact difficult 
conversations, to record­
ing Joel’s giggle, to pains­
takingly photographing 
every detail of the hospital, 
Ryan’s life became con­
sumed by the complicated 
process of creating a digi­
tal world that mirrors his 
own, even as he continued 
to care for his son.
Combining footage from both 
Ryan’s real and animated worlds, 
Thank You for Playing examines 
how we process grief through technol­
ogy in the twenty­first century, and 
the implications of documenting 
profound human experiences in a 
new artistic medium: the video game.
“That Dragon, Cancer,” the video 
game, was developed by Ryan and 
Amy Green and Josh Larson along 
with five others at their studio, Numi­
nous Games. It was released in Jan­
uary 2016. As the Numinous team 
describe it: “‘That Dragon, Cancer’ is 
a video game developer’s love letter 
to his son; an immersive, narrative 
video game to inspire love for oth­
ers; a memorial for hundreds who 
have fought cancer. It is a poetic and 
playful interactive retelling of Joel 
Green’s 4­year fight against cancer, 
and an autobiographical memoir of 
how parents Ryan and Amy embrace 
hope in the face of death.”
I
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That Dragon, Cancer
Video Game as Art Form
Developed by parents of a 
terminally ill child, “That Dragon, 
Cancer” facilitates emotional 
connection and spiritual 
awakening.
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The directors of the “Thank You for 
Playing” documentary were David Osit 
and Malika Zouhali­Worrall. In a state­
ment, they noted: “Ryan and Amy’s 
video game, ‘That Dragon, Cancer’ 
comes at a time when video games 
and interactive media are emerg­
ing as a wildly innovative art form. And 
yet simultaneously, society is ques­
tioning our dependence on technol­
ogy more than ever: it seems to be 
bringing us at once closer together 
and yet further apart. [As Directors,] we 
are fascinated by this tension, which is 
why we set out to make this film.
“From the moment we first heard 
about “That Dragon, Cancer,” we 
immediately wanted to know more 
about why Ryan and Amy had cho­
sen a video game — a medium so 
often associated with explosions 
and violence — to convey one of the 
most emotional and spiritually­chal­
lenging experiences a family can go 
through. Once we saw for ourselves 
how many people were profoundly 
moved by the game, and how play­
ing it often facilitated more, rather 
than less, social interaction, we were 
hooked and knew we had to keep fol­
lowing this story. The fact that a video 
game was capable of awakening this 
sort of empathy to allow players to 
join Ryan and Amy on their journey 
astounded us, and we soon realized 
that Ryan isn’t only a video game 
developer, he’s also an artist — and 
programming is his paintbrush.
“Thank You for Playing explores 
the very personal experiences of a 
family battling cancer, and the beauty 
and hope that can be found in the 
artistic process, while also examin­
ing the age­old question of where 
the boundaries lie in representing 
difficult emotional experiences in 
art. Ultimately, we hope [Thank You 
for Playing] the film will challenge 
 people to reexamine their own assump­
tions about bereavement, technology, 
video games, and art.”
The “That Dragon, Cancer” game 
can be found at thatdragoncancer 
.com. Thank You for Playing ap ­
peared at the Tribeca Film Festival in 
2015, and is available for download at 
http://www.thankyouforplayingfilm 
.com/watch/.
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president’s message  (continued from page 1)
a previous offer to volunteer, please 
accept my sincere apologies and 
contact me again so I can assist you. 
Call for Donations,  
Gifts, and Bequests
SSIT’s 2018 fundraising campaign is 
focused on securing the level of 
resources required to scale activities 
over the coming years. Funds will be 
invested in further strengthening 
and expanding volunteer activities. 
Options to financially support SSIT 
volunteer activities include:
 ■ Donate to SSIT online https://
ieeefoundation.org/ieee_ssit.
 ■ Mail a check payable to the 
“IEEE Foundation – SSIT Fund” 
to: IEEE Foundation, 445 Hoes 
Lane, Piscataway, NJ 08854, 
U.S.A.
 ■ Asking your employer to match 
your personal donation.
 ■ Donate in honor or memory of 
someone who has touched your 
life or others.
 ■ Direct a gift to the “IEEE Foun­
dation – SSIT Fund” from your 
donor advised fund, foundation 
or family office.
 ■ Providing a legacy Remember 
SSIT in your will.
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nergy infrastructure 
is critical to the fu ­
ture of any rapidly 
emerging economy. 
Unprecedented rates 
of growth in the global south have 
quickly raised the stakes for finding 
plentiful, low­cost energy technolo­
gy options to keep pace with devel­
opment needs. This demand has 
been a significant factor but is not 
the only one driving a global resur­
gence in the deployment of large 
energy in frastructure, and in par­
ticular, the hydroelectric dam. Nev­
ertheless, the increasing number 
of dam projects deployed in deve­
loping countries over the last two 
de cades that perform poorly regard­
ing their economy, the environment, 
human rights, inequality and wealth 
distribution, as well as public sup­
port, all illustrate a seeming discon­
nect between planners, stakeholders, 
and our technological energy solu­
tions of choice.
The literature generally focuses 
on a techno­managerial assess­
ment of large­scale energy projects, 
highlighting issues of technical and 
economic performance, environmen­
tal risk, and the impacts of social 
displacement. Beyond economistic 
and technocratic analyses of impact 
and mitigation, we argue that truly 
comprehensive energy project as ­
sessment should consider the con­
temporary and historical global 
contexts within which such devel­
opments are embedded. That is, we 
argue for examining the processes 
that give rise to energy projects, 
alongside consequences thereof. 
Such an assessment shows that bal­
ancing the need for large energy 
infrastructure with local and contex­
tualized solutions is a major chal­
lenge that, more than technological 
dynamics, may be a challenge of 
cultural dynamics. We posit that ad ­
dressing such seemingly mundane 
issues is the radical solution needed 
for sustainable infrastructure devel­
opment, by exploring global drivers 
of the dam resurgence and discuss­
ing implications for policy.
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Mundane Is the 
New Radical
The Resurgence of 
Energy Megaprojects and 
Implications for the Global South
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Katse Dam in Lesotho, Africa.
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Global Drivers of the  
Large-Scale Energy 
Infrastructure Resurgence
The Great Economic 
 “Convergence”
The economic separation of early 
industrializers from the rest of the 
world during the Industrial Revolution, 
often termed “the great divergence,” 
has characterized our global political 
and economic hegemony for the past 
two centuries [1]–[3]. But now, a histor­
ic change is taking place. A “great con­
vergence” is underway as less devel­
oped countries quickly adopt the 
technology, competence, and policies 
that formerly propelled the developed 
world [4]–[6]. United Nation’s Human 
Development data shows that for the 
first time in over 150 years the com­
bined output of today’s most popu­
lous emerging markets — China, 
India, and Brazil — is equal to the 
combined GDP of all the major indus­
trial powers of the north — Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States — 
representing a major rebalancing of 
global economic power.
In fact, it is projected that China, 
India and Brazil alone will make up 
over 40% of global GDP by 2050 [7, 
p. 13], and the “convergence” is far 
beyond these three [8]. Countries 
such as Mexico, Bangladesh, Tan­
zania, and Yemen and at least forty 
others have registered significant 
growth this decade and other break­
out nations such as Afghanistan and 
Pakistan had some of the fastest 
growth rates in the world over the 
past ten years. On average, non­
oil, non­small developing countries 
have seen GDP per capita increas­
ing at a rate of 3% per year since the 
1990s. Today, the South produces 
about half of world economic output, 
up from a third in 1990 [7, p. 13]. 
While there have been periods of 
rapid growth for individual coun­
tries in the past, seldom in the last 
50 years have we seen episodes 
where so many poor countries have 
simultaneously done well as in the 
decade preceding the recent Global 
Financial Crisis [9].
The evidence is clear, says the UN 
Human Development Report 2013, 
that “the rise of the South is unprec­
edented in its speed and scale. 
Never in history have the living con­
ditions and prospects of so many 
people changed so dramatically and 
so fast. This change represents a 
global rebalancing far greater than 
that experienced during the Indus­
trial Revolution. The Industrial Rev­
olution was a story of perhaps 100 
million people, but this is a story 
about billions of people” [7, p. 11].
This change in economic dynam­
ics over the past decade is due in 
part to the differing experiences of 
Northern and Southern countries 
during and after the Global Finan­
cial Crisis of the 21st century. In the 
past, Northern countries served as 
the major importers of goods from 
Southern countries, such that as 
Northern economies grew or reced­
ed and as demand increased or 
decreased it would have a trickle­
down effect on the export economy 
of less developed countries. The 21st 
century recession that resulted has 
largely upended this relationship.
It is argued that in developed 
countries the crisis stemmed from, 
in part, a constriction of credit flow, 
which followed the burst of the hous­
ing and oil price bubbles caused 
by excessively low interest rate po ­
licies from financial institutions 
[10]. Initially emerging economies 
“dodged the housing crisis that 
froze credit markets in the United 
States and Europe and that threw 
the rich world into the worst down­
turn since the 1930s. They never had 
to bail out their banks or endure the 
high unemployment and stagnant 
growth that historically follow finan­
cial crises” [11]. While the reduced 
spending and reduced demand 
from markets in advanced countries 
did eventually have impact on less 
developed countries, they were able 
to keep growing in the aftermath of 
the crisis, albeit more slowly, unlike 
most advanced economies which 
registered negative growth for many 
years after the crisis.
Economic growth alone does not 
automatically translate into human 
development progress. But Southern 
countries are not just tapping into 
global trade, they are also improv­
ing health, communication, and 
education services, which continue 
to support the growth experienced 
since the 2000s. This contrasts with 
contemporary policies adopted by 
many Northern countries which 
include austerity measures and cut­
ting of social programs post­eco­
nomic crisis. Experts say that it is 
this combination of policies, popu­
lation growth and global economics 
that has allowed the middle class 
in the South to expand so rapidly 
[7]. In fact the UN projects that by 
2030 more than 80% of the world’s 
middle class will reside in develop­
ing countries and account for 70% 
of total consumption expenditure 
globally [7, p. 14].
Global South’s Growing Middle 
and Energy Demand
With this unprecedented improve­
ment in aggregate human develop­
ment scores, we are now seeing an 
increasing demand for basic servic­
es across the globe. Improved water 
and sanitation access along with 
reliable energy services have be ­
come major Millennium and now 
Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). The U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) projects that 
due to population growth, non­Orga­
nization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) econo­
mies will account for more than 
half of the world’s total increase in 
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energy consumption until 2040, at 
which point they will account for two 
thirds of world total [12, p. 1]. In 
contrast, more mature energy­con­
suming and slower growing OECD 
countries will see total energy use 
increase only 18% by 2040.
This is compounded by the fact 
that energy consumption “per per­
son” is also predicted to rise as de ­
veloping countries grow not only bigger 
(more populous) but richer, as men­
tioned in the previous section. As mid­
dle­income groups in these countries 
grow larger, demands for improved 
standards of living, such as for bet­
ter housing and sanitation, increase. 
As demands for housing, appliances, 
and transportation increase, ener­
gy capacity must also increase to 
produce food, infrastructure, goods, 
and services for both domestic and 
foreign markets, leading to higher per 
capita energy consumption. Whereas 
energy use per capita will remain 
flat in OECD countries over the next 
30 years, EIA forecasts more than 
half the increase in global energy con­
sumption will come from non­OECD 
countries across Asia, the Middle 
East, Africa, and Latin America in the 
same time period, even accounting 
for ef ficiency gains [12, p. 8].
We are seeing an increased focus 
on the need for electricity services 
in places where it has not been as 
major a human development focus 
before. Infrastructure has moved 
from being a “simple precondition 
for production and consumption to 
being at the very core of these activi­
ties” [13, p. 2]. This energy “pivot” to 
the South has given rise to a surge 
in large­scale energy infrastructure 
projects to facilitate industrial pro­
ductivity and consumption [14].
Emerging Role of the  
Global South in Climate  
Change  Mitigation
At the same time that energy demand 
grows sharply in the global south, 
there is also currently an increased 
global awareness of climate change 
and an international commitment to 
reducing emissions to limit tempera­
ture to under a 2 °C increase over 
pre­industrial levels. This was recent­
ly affirmed as the Paris Agreement 
was ratified by over 140 countries 
[15]. In the past, world leaders have 
argued that rich, industrialized 
countries created the global warm­
ing problem with their industrial 
emissions and should bear the larg­
er brunt of emissions reduction — 
this has been a well­known sticking 
point in past climate negotiations 
[16], [17].
But climate experts and now even 
officials from developing nations are 
saying “there is no way that global 
warming can be kept below the inter­
national 2 °C goal without dramatic 
limits in future emissions from the 
developing nations [because] under 
a Business As Usual (BAU) scenario, 
most emission growth will come 
from the anticipated increase in fos­
sil fuel use by developing nations” 
[18]. Experts find that approximately 
two­thirds of avoided emissions will 
have to come from the developing 
world to meet the collective goal, 
which means that new targets such 
as the “High Ambition Coalition” 
target of 1.5 °C, which while mak­
ing very sound climate sense, poses 
particular challenges for developing 
nations [18].
Given the threat of global warm­
ing and the yet essential nature of 
electricity to development, low­emis­
sion energy solutions that supply 
massive amounts of power are in 
high demand [19]. This brings us to 
the hydro­electric power dam, our 
large energy infrastructure technol­
ogy of focus.
Southern Investors and New 
Finance for Development Projects
Historically speaking, dams and 
hydroelectric infrastructure have 
always been on the international 
and national development agenda 
for modernization. Such projects 
were generally financed by interna­
tional development cooperation 
agencies and multilateral develop­
ment banks (MDBs). But the World 
Bank eventually came under strong 
fire for its lack of attention to the 
negative impacts of many of these 
projects, particularly regarding 
population displacement. The late 
1990s were “characterized by esca­
lating debates over large dams” [20] 
and fierce discussions over a num­
ber of high profile cases such as 
India’s controversial Sardar Sar­
ovar Dam.
Furthermore, cost overruns are 
ty pical and well­documented in hy ­
dropower finance. A recent Oxford 
study analyzed a sample of large 
dams built between 1934 and 2007 
and found that three of every four 
dams suffer from cost overruns, 
one of every two dams had costs 
that exceeded benefits, and that the 
actual cost of dams is on average 
double their estimated costs [21].
Mounting international pressure 
arose against dams during this peri­
od. The World Bank was eventually 
forced to pull out of the Sardar Sar­
ovar project after an independent 
review in 1993 [22]. The participation 
of MDBs in large­scale dam projects 
quickly subsided. At the World Bank 
alone investments in hydropower 
declined by 90% between 1992 and 
2002 [23]. Consequently, there was 
a noted lull in international mega­
dam funding during the 1990s.
Yet at the same time other events 
were brewing. In the aftermath of the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis, several 
Southern countries began develop­
ing new monetary arrangements for 
lending. Added to the South’s grow­
ing financial reserves coming out 
of the 2009 Global Financial Crisis, 
this has transformed global financi ­
al architecture, such that the South 
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has now become a major source 
of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Most important is that this Southern 
investment is directed back to the 
South [23].
The World Bank, the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) all 
acknowledge the dramatic uptake of 
South­South FDI. In fact it is project­
ed that South­South trade will soon 
overtake trade between developed 
nations [24]. The combined value 
of FDI outflows from Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa (the 
“BRICS” countries) alone skyrock­
eted from U.S.$7 billion in 2000 to 
U.S.$126 billion in 2012, with nearly 
58% being received by other de ­
veloping countries. So though still 
a relatively small volume of total 
direct investment outflow, South­
South FDI is growing at an annual 
rate of 21% [23].
Developing Asia is the largest re ­
cipient of FDI inflow, and accounted 
for nearly 30% of global FDI in 2013. 
China has strengthened its position 
as “one of the leading sources of 
FDI, and its outflows are expected 
to surpass inflows within two years.” 
Flows to African countries have also 
increased significantly. Between 
1992 and 2011, China’s trade with 
Sub­Saharan Africa alone rose from 
U.S.$1 billion to more than U.S.$140 
billion [7], [25]. Africa’s FDI inflow 
increase is sustained in part by grow­
ing intra­African flow, from growing 
consumer markets. The share of 
investment projects originating from 
within Africa increased to 18% in 
2013 from 10% in 2008 [26, p. 19]. 
This intra­regional investment front 
is led by Transnational Corporations 
(TNCs) from South Africa, Kenya, 
and Nigeria.
The rapid growth of Chinese 
outward FDI by both state­owned 
and private Chinese corporations 
was also catalyzed by deregulation. 
The Chinese government has been 
actively encouraging firms to invest 
overseas through its “Going Out” 
policy since 2000 [27]. Then in 2009 
the Law Concerning the Control of 
Outward FDI by the Chinese Minis­
try of Commerce came into force, 
transferring authority to approve 
investment plans to local govern­
ments and greatly simplifying appli­
cation criteria and process. In one 
year Chinese outward to inward FDI 
ratio jumped 10 percentage points 
and from 49% in 2009 to 55.8% 
in 2010 [28, p. 148]. As a result, 
“China significantly expanded its 
resources and energy availability 
base, in addition to gaining a foot­
hold in the global manufacturing 
sector” [28, p. 147]. Many southern 
national and multilateral develop­
ment banks, such as the Asian Infra­
structure Development Bank (AIDB) 
also expanded global development 
financial flows, with banks able to 
craft their own lending policies as 
outward FDI became increasing­
ly deregulated.
Thus national development banks 
and private investors from emerg­
ing economies such as China, Bra­
zil, Thailand, and India have picked 
up the slack in international invest­
ment where MDBs like the World 
Bank left off [23], [29]–[31].
A Critical Culmination:  
The Large Dam Resurgence
All these conditions combined pro­
vide the ingredients for a great re ­
surgence. Increasing energy demand 
in the global south is being partly 
driven by changes in the global 
economy and together with increas­
ing focus on climate change mitiga­
tion commitments from the South 
act as a driver for low­emission 
technologies that deliver massive 
amounts of power — ostensibly in 
the form of projects such as the 
mega­dam. New investment op ­
portunities for such projects have 
emerged from the south, filling the 
gap left by a northern MDBs financ­
ing downturn.
And indeed this is the boom we 
are seeing — globally, between 2005 
and 2011, newly installed hydropow­
er capacity outpaced new generation 
capacity from all other renewables 
combined, driven mostly by hydro­
power development in Asia, led by 
China, where — as discussed ear­
lier — energy security has become 
a significant concern for sustaining 
its economic development [32], [33]. 
Already home to more than half the 
world’s dams, China has built 850 
more since 2000, scores of these 
since 2005. India has added 296 
dams since 2000 and together coun­
tries like Brazil and Peru in the Amazo­
nian basin have built or are planning 
over 400 new dams [34]. Indeed, new 
and resumed construction of mega­
dams is underway across the global 
south, from Latin America to Asia 
and Africa.
Beyond its own borders, China is 
also funding or building more than 
350 dams around the world [27]. 
Emerging as “contender to the power 
of western donors” [29], China is par­
ticipating in at least $9.3 billion of 
hydropower projects across the Afri­
can continent [35]. Companies like 
Sinohydro Corporation and Dong­
fang Electric Corporation financed by 
Chinese banks are investors behind 
the $2.2 billion Gibe III in Ethio­
pia (Africa’s tallest dam), Egypt’s 
$705 million Kajbar Dam, and Gha­
na’s $729 million Bui Dam on the 
Black Volta River. In recent years, 
Chinese investors have been particu­
larly active in neighboring countries 
along transboundary rivers such as 
the Mekong [27]. In Southeast Asia, 
the Three Gorges was completed in 
2006, the Lao Nam Theun was com­
pleted in 2010, while over 40 GW of 
hydropower is now planned in the 
Mekong Basin and in East Malay­
sian Borneo a series of twelve mega­
dams are under development. China 
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is involved in building over 125 dams 
in Southeast Asia, representing 45% 
of all Chinese overseas dams [36]. 
“According to the Lao government’s 
own figures, by the end of 2016 Chi­
nese companies had signed up for 
US$6.7 billion worth of construction 
projects in the country” — some 
30% of the total earmarked for Laos’ 
Mekong basin, making Laos the third­
largest market for China in the Asso­
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) bloc [37].
The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that 
hydropower generation will double 
in China between 2008 and 2035, 
and triple in India and Africa over 
the same period [38]. At least 3700 
major dams, each with a capacity of 
more than 1 MW, are either planned 
or under construction, primarily in 
countries with emerging economies. 
Experts find that “following a period 
of such relative stagnation during 
the past 20 years, the current boom 
in hydropower dam construction is 
truly unprecedented in both scale 
and extent [39, p. 162].”
Compounding Effects of the 
 Contemporary Dam Resurgence
Seeing the mega­dam resurgence 
through this lens of major contem­
porary global dynamics has critical 
implications for understanding the 
impacts of the development trend 
itself. For instance, researchers 
across various fields are noticing 
that not only has the pace of hydro­
power growth been unprecedented, 
but the physical and cultural geogra­
phy of where hydropower deve­
lopment is now happening is also 
un precedented. And this geographic 
factor is causing major compound­
ing effects on the impacts of our 
energy technology solutions.
First, the collective nature of 
these shifts has meant that much 
of this new energy infrastructure is 
being built in tropical and subtropi­
cal zones, where the global south’s 
emerging economy demand is grow­
ing. These zones are also home to 
many of our most critically impor­
tant tropical forests, important for 
their global carbon stores, important 
as sensitive, concentrated zones of 
ecological diversity, and critically 
important for their cultural signifi­
cance as some of the last remaining 
areas of indigenous livelihood in the 
world [40]. Given the nature of where 
the dam resurgence is happening, 
there are enormous human, envi­
ronmental, and cultural costs both 
locally and globally.
New evidence finds that the re ­
surgence of the large­scale infra­
structure projects through new land 
acquisitions in tropical and sub­
tropical zones is directly and simul­
taneously inducing a resurgence of 
population displacement and dispos­
session [19, p. 1]. This is at a time 
when these very indigenous com­
munities are more vulnerable than 
they have ever been to the implica­
tions of displacement due to rampant 
environmental degradation, climate 
change itself, and urban migration. 
In fact some studies suggest that 
besides energy security or regional 
cooperation one of the primary moti­
vations for Chinese investment in 
dams in Southeast Asia outside of 
its borders is “to spare China’s own 
rivers and avoid resettlement” since 
domestically the over­damming of 
Chinese rivers has already displaced 
over 23 million people and signifi­
cantly affected water availability 
[36, p. 313].
This displacement is exacerbated 
by the fact that tropical rivers are 
critical to global food security. In 
tropical rivers of Africa, Asia, and 
South America, rainfall drives a peri­
odic flood pulse fueling fish produc­
tion and delivering nutrition to more 
than 150 million people worldwide 
[41]. The Mekong River Basin alone 
hosts one of the largest inland fish­
eries in the world, and the over 370 
individual dam projects proposed 
for the basin will likely modulate 
this flood pulse, thereby threatening 
food security for already margin­
alized communities. The main tool 
for environmental governance and 
licensing in countries like Laos is 
local environmental impact assess­
ment, which in most cases does not 
provide adequate technical informa­
tion for, and thus has had minimal 
influence on, policy decisions.
China itself has been heavily cri ­
ticized for lax environmental and 
social impact assessment standards 
at home. For instance, over 300 000 
deaths have been reported due 
to dam failure in China, and it is 
believed that the devastating 2008 
Sichuan earthquake was triggered 
by the province’s Zipingpu dam [42]. 
Since 1949, 23 million Chinese citi­
zens had been relocated for dam 
construction, and 6.5 million of 
those since 2000. Meanwhile, the 
Three Gate Gorges dam was decom­
missioned four short years after 
being built due to siltation [43], like 
many others, and data shows that 
dams in China underperform regard 
electricity output, due to increasing 
drought and water scarcity. Brazil 
is also heavily criticized for weak 
licensing regulation for large dams, 
and a poor impact assessment pro­
cess, that was further simplified and 
weakened in 2012 [44]. Hydroelec­
tric power is particularly damaging in 
the Amazon as larger reservoirs are 
needed to compensate for lowland 
topography. For this reason many 
Amazonian dams suffer from chron­
ic siltation, which reduces electric­
ity production, drastically affecting 
river ecology. Furthermore, season­
al flow Amazonian rivers means that 
many dams perform at only partial 
capacity. This lack of transnational 
basin­wide assessment often leads 
to disjointed project development 
with exacerbated impacts [45].
23J U N E  2 0 1 8    ∕      IEEE TEchnology and SocIETy MagazInE
Second, hydropower’s reputation 
as a low carbon energy solution has 
come under major scientific scrutiny 
in recent years. According to the lat­
est science, reservoirs in different 
natural belts are responsible for dif­
ferent levels of emissions. In many 
rocky regions low on vegetation 
and population, such as in Iceland 
and other northern mountainous 
regions, the production of electric­
ity from hydropower with temperate 
reservoirs is a net gain in terms of 
mitigating emissions from electric­
ity production. In Asia, Africa and 
South America however reservoirs 
inundate tropical vegetation that 
decays, releasing masses of meth­
ane and soil carbon that can repre­
sent a net loss for mitigation.
While estimating emissions from 
hydroelectric generation is still an 
evolving field, there is broad consen­
sus among the scientific community 
that methane production is a major 
concern for tropical freshwater res­
ervoirs [46]–[50]. Major emission 
pathways for fresh water storage 
reservoirs include diffusion of dis­
solved gases at the air­water surface, 
methane emission from organic mat­
ter decomposition, and downstream 
dam emissions from degassing at 
turbine and spillway discharge points 
[47], [50]. Research now shows that 
among other variables, the geogra­
phic location of reservoirs has a sig­
nificant impact on the organic matter 
storage, water temperature, and sub­
sequent emissions through these 
mechanisms [50]. For instance, Fearn­
side highlights the example of the 
Curua­Una Dam in Brazil, where mas­
sive emissions from turbines and 
spillways mean annual green­house 
gas (GHG) emissions 3.6 times higher 
than would be emitted by the equiva­
lent amount of diesel generated elec­
tricity, and these emissions levels are 
more than a decade after the dam’s 
reservoir was inundated [51]. Fearn­
side and Pueyo conclude that “emis­
sions from tropical hydropower in 
particular are often vastly underesti­
mated and can exceed those of fossil 
fuel for decades [52, p. 384].”
Third, a major impact of the in ­
creasingly available deregulated 
private finance has led to a prolif­
eration of projects that are largely 
managed outside the realm of inter­
national conditionality or regulato­
ry oversight. In 2013 the World Bank 
reversed its two­decade old decision 
to turn its back on large hydropow­
er investment, citing its improved 
impact assessment guidelines. The 
Word Commission on Dams (WCD) 
was established in 1998 by the World 
Bank and the World Conservation 
Union (IUCN) as an independent, 
multi­stakeholder body to review the 
effectiveness of large dams and to 
develop internationally acceptable cri­
teria and guidelines for their planning 
and operation [53].
After WCD’s establishment, the 
World Bank went from a low of just 
a few million dollars investment in 
dams in 1999 to about $1.8 billion 
in 2014. However this still amounts 
to less than 2% of hydropower proj­
ect investment today, given all of the 
other development finance avenues 
now filling the gap. Instead of act­
ing as a primary investor, the World 
Bank has stated that it now “typi­
cally acts as a ‘convener,’ bringing 
other financiers to the table [54].” 
Research finds that this switch to 
private financing for projects with 
such massive externalities “derisks” 
megaprojects for the private sector. 
“Very often this means privatizing 
profits and outsourcing risks to the 
public [38].”
South­South investment trends 
noted above bode well for region­
al integration and set the stage for 
other forms of South­South cooper­
ation, such as technical assistance 
and capacity development. However, 
the requisite institutional reform to 
regulate such development projects 
has lagged. Much southern develop­
ment financing is not currently tied 
to human­rights progress, environ­
mental impact standards, or demo­
cratic and participatory civil society 
stakeholder engagement. Nationally 
backed development banks such 
as the Brazilian Development Bank, 
China Development Bank, and the 
Development Bank of Southern Afri­
ca, or the Asian International Devel­
opment Bank, the very banks now 
sopping up the hydropower invest­
ment gap we discussed earlier, 
“have abysmal records in terms of 
transparency and in terms of social 
and environmental safeguards [38],” 
and can be looked to for “alternative 
sources of finance that are perceived 
to be faster, come with fewer condi­
tions and are more flexible” [29]. In 
many cases the companies conduct­
ing feasibility studies are also the 
same serving as financiers, builders, 
and regulators of projects, which 
“results in a blurring of lines between 
these role[s]” and raises issues of 
transparency [36, p. 322], [33].
International guidelines have al ­
ways been far from perfect, as the 
World Bank case study showed, but 
the reduced financial involvement 
of international institutions allows 
project developers to ignore interna­
tional concerns, with major implica­
tion since political attention often 
comes to communities most greatly 
affected by environmental risks only 
when larger national or international 
geopolitical forces come into play.
Defining Problems  
and Solutions
We argue that articulation of this 
confluence of global dynamics and 
their subsequent compounding 
effect on impacts helps to explain 
the fuller story of our large energy 
infrastructure resurgence, as well as 
our current dilemma. Local and 
global tensions are growing between 
civil communities and policy makers 
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as decisions affecting resources, 
ecology, inhabitants, and industry 
are quickly being made with little 
public consultation or open analy­
sis of alternatives, socio­ecological 
impacts, or land­use tradeoffs. Yet 
as shown, these are the communi­
ties most heavily affected by dam­
related forest loss, displacement, 
and food insecurity.
Indeed, the activism space around 
hydro­development has become in ­
creasingly violent, with many high­
profile murders and kidnappings 
being reported in the past ten years. 
Ironically, it seems in seeking to 
provide energy, climate, and social 
security, those are the very same 
securities jeopardized and in many 
cases eroded through such infrastruc­
ture projects [55]–[58]. Literature on 
the political economy of energy tran­
sitions suggests that rather than safe­
guarding marginalized communities 
from depravation, large­scale energy 
projects often serve to exacerbate 
existing social tensions and conflict, 
intensifying various manifestations of 
insecurity [55].
Furthermore, large­scale hydro­
power is often proposed as a tool 
for energy security, stimulating local 
economic development, or power 
export revenue through a low­emis­
sion renewable energy technology 
[44]. However recent research finds 
that national plans for greater ener­
gy security often overestimate the 
need for infrastructure and invest­
ment [59]. Rather, exploration of 
numerous contemporary dam con­
flicts, such as the Yacyreta Dam on 
the Parana River, along the border 
of Argentina and Paraguay, the Belo 
Monte dam of Brazil, the Tawang 
dams of Arunachal Pradesh, India, 
and the Mekong Dams of Laos show 
that the use of this win­win low­car­
bon development “narrative” can 
in fact disguise perverse incentives 
of state elites for construction, and 
perpetuate the imbalance of power 
dynamics among local and global 
actors [29], [30], [60]. The modern­
day hydro­resource conflict can be 
framed as a reiteration of resource 
conflicts past and ongoing, proving 
waterscapes to be a new frontier in 
the local resource commodification 
and territorialization conflict [61].
Power dynamics and political eco­
nomy play a key role in determin­
ing the winners and losers among 
different energy pathways, and in 
whose favor the trade­off between 
competing policy objectives weighs. 
In a state­led, investor­driven, donor­
shaped policy context where state 
elites and international actors exer­
cise imbalanced agency relative to 
constituents, the interests of the 
poor and the interests of the environ­
ment can be marginalized [62]. For 
this reason many civil society repre­
sentatives and people from affected 
communities argue that the issue of 
land rights and access to rights must 
now more than ever be a core part of 
development planning, rather than 
sitting on the periphery. As such, the 
literature calls for increased focus 
on cultural politics — the institutions 
and relations of power among state 
and non­state actors that govern 
energy regimes and the outcomes 
they produce [63]–[65].
Returning to our initial discus­
sion of the global resurgence of the 
large dam, if we see the trend toward 
large dams as part of this complex 
sphere, the issue of energy supply 
quickly becomes embedded in more 
imminent issues of rights and inclu­
sion, necessitating critical reflection 
on our global, discursive defini­
tions of “problems” and “solutions.” 
Not addressing these key issues 
can lead to inaccurate, non­strategic 
policy­making and possibly lead to 
the assumption of false dichotomies 
between policy goals such as emis­
sions reduction and poverty reduc­
tion [66]. High­modernist initiatives 
that orient themselves around prob­
lem solving without precedent of 
consensus on the very definition of 
the “problem” being solved run the 
risk of undermining their own objec­
tives by predetermining the ways in 
which the “problem” can be concep­
tualized, discussed, and assessed. 
In ostensibly solving problems of 
energy demand and climate change, 
the hydropower resurgence may per­
petuate even larger problems both 
at the local landscape and for global 
commons [62], [67].
In a World where Novel is 
Normal, Mundane is the  
New Radical
We contribute to the growing body 
of literature on sustainable energy 
transitions by placing the mega­energy 
infrastructure resurgence in the con­
text of the confluence of global 
dynamics that have led to its devel­
opment. From this perspective, we 
posit that truly sustainable energy 
futures will require more radical 
attention to the global dynamics and 
cultural politics that account for the 
power­play among actors, and more 
radical attention to our definitions of 
problems and their solutions, as 
opposed to a focus on technological 
innovations and financing them.
Critical issues such as power sym ­
metry, land rights, representation, 
and participation have persisted for 
centuries, but rarely factor into ener­
gy planning policy in concrete cen­
tral ways. The work ahead is thus to 
create formalized spaces for inclu­
sion of a diversity of actors in the 
planning process, and for the exer­
cise of rights to participate in that 
process. We suggest three ways in 
which local and international energy 
planning processes can be revised.
As Escobar’s framework of cul­
tural politics suggests, [65] first is 
the need to limit cultural dominance 
in the state’s key institutions, espe­
cially those that create and imple­
ment development policy and local 
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institutions that control access to 
rights. Addressing cultural domi­
nance could encompass extensive 
legal reformation; the establishment 
of anti­corruption legislation that 
limits political interference and pro­
motes merit­based employment and 
business contracting; and legisla­
tion that institutes regulatory bod­
ies for investors and local industries 
that are independent, transparent, 
and accountable to the courts.
Second is a need to create spaces 
for, and to support diverse visions 
of, rights and what the exercise of 
rights means [65]. Even within one 
river basin, ideas of resource, subsis­
tence, autonomy, identity, economy, 
and development can differ widely. 
Acknowledging and empowering non­
dominant bio­cultural experiences 
of nature is a move towards peace 
with justice. Importantly, enclosure 
through restructuring resource use 
can have the same impact as enclo­
sure through physical fencing [68]. 
So, seemingly inclusive solutions to 
environmental conflict that involve 
community management of forests, 
payment for ecological services, algo­
rithmic river flow control, or other such 
initiatives should be approached 
thoughtfully and through truly partici­
patory decision­making processes.
Third, while inclusivity is critical, 
the legitimate community of people 
who have rights to participate cannot 
be a foregone assumption in nego­
tiation processes [63]. Creation of 
such a community will involve con­
scientious attention to the diverse 
and more nuanced expressions of 
agency (political, ecological, and 
cultural) that are important in iden­
tification of stakeholders for public 
participation and involvement. An 
organized civil society that acknowl­
edges its own diversity will further 
support a broader representation in 
decision­making processes.
In their popular paper on the 
virtues of mundane science, Kam­
men and Dove themselves state that 
“the major obstacles to develop­
ing sound environmental practices 
are not principally technological, 
though expanding our research 
ef forts in that area is critically im ­
portant. Instead, the primary stum­
bling block is the lack of integrative 
ap proaches to complex systems and 
problems [69, p. 12].” Especially as 
large­scale energy  infrastructure and 
technology is projected to do minate 
energy planning policy in emerging 
economies, we argue that there is 
no time to ignore the pressing and 
yet often overlooked issues of prob­
lem definition, inclusivity, and po ­
wer dynamics. Addressing these 
seemingly mundane, yet fundamen­
tal, challenges may be the radical 
solution our global society needs.
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e are all familiar with 
the textbook moral 
dilemma: A car is driv-
ing on a road when 
a child darts in front 
of it. If the car swerves in one direc-
tion, it will hit a car in the oncoming 
lane. If it swerves in the other direc-
tion, it will hit a tree. If it continues 
forward, it will hit the child. The car is 
travelling too fast to brake. Each deci-
sion may result in death. While the 
scenario is an extreme case, drivers 
make life-and-death decisions on a 
daily basis. To an extent we have laws, 
rules, and etiquette to guide our driv-
ing. In other situations, a driver must 
rely on their internal moral compass. 
But what if a human driver is not mak-
ing the decision, and an autonomous 
machine is? The scenarios present 
difficult choices and weighty deci-
sions for humans, let alone for car 
manufacturers, developers, and engi-
neers who must design machines with 
such decision-making capabilities.
If you believe the car manufactur-
ers, tech titans, and the U.K. govern-
ment, we can expect an exponen tial 
increase in driverless vehicles on 
our roads over the next five years. 
Driverless cars are already being 
tested on U.K. roads. This means 
that, inevitably, algorithms must be 
programmed to make consequen-
tial decisions in a manner that aligns 
with current laws and, where laws 
do not exist, our moral sensibilities. 
The authors of the AI Now report [1] 
state, “AI does not exist in a vacu-
um.” It is deployed in the real world 
and has the potential to cause tan-
gible and lasting impact. The driving 
scenario illustrates the conundrum 
developers face when launching 
software that must be equipped to 
make a moral judgment. Can they be 
expected to accurately pre-program 
moral-based decisions into autono-
mous machines? If so, whose sense 
of morality should prevail? There 
may be ethical dilemmas, lack of 
harmonized views, as well as bias 
that come into play. Programming 
moral standards into algorithms re -
mains one of the thorniest [2] chal-
lenges for AI developers.
Moral standards are transient and 
far from absolute. Moral inclinations 
[3] may be conditioned on cultural 
norms. Cultural norms are neither 
W
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universal nor immutable.  Societal 
values and standards vary over time 
and geography. Acceptance of pre-
marital sex, women in combat, ho -
mosexuality, and bans on slavery 
illustrate the seismic shift in values 
some societies have experienced 
in recent decades. If a software de -
veloper in the U.S. programs an 
autonomous vehicle to prioritize the 
safety of the passenger over animals 
on the road, could the outcome 
of the decision made by the same 
autonomous machine deployed in 
India be considered amoral where 
cows are considered holy and have 
right of way on roads? Should com-
panies developing autonomous 
vehicles prioritize commercial gain 
over a utilitarian concept of safety? 
Research [4] indicates that buyers 
are less likely to purchase a car that 
prioritizes the safety of others over 
the occupants.
Moral decision-making is highly 
subjective and individualized. It 
is contextual, specific to the facts, 
and personalized depending on the 
experience, bias, and understand-
ing of the facts of the person making 
the moral judgments. Individuals 
will react differently to reports that 
a Texan was not indicted for blud-
geoning another man to death. If 
we learn that evidence suggests that 
the victim was raping a female, we 
may alter our position. When we 
learn that the man who committed 
the murder was the father, as was 
the case here, and the female was 
his five-year old daughter, 
the outcome may sit com-
fortably with our own moral 
compass. On the specific 
facts, the act of murder 
was defensible by State law 
[5] and the father called 
911 in an attempt to save 
his daughter’s rapist’s life. 
The death was legally and, 
some may a rgue moral -
ly, justified.
Morality is a nebulous concept. 
It is best evidenced [6] by the reac-
tion of an individual when faced with 
a choice requiring quick action. Such 
decisions are based on our own in -
ternal programming and made in 
split seconds. They are not always 
rational or logical — for example, a 
decision to jump in to save a drown-
ing child at the risk of one’s own 
safety or return to a burning build-
ing to save a family pet. Humans 
are opaque, flawed, and sometimes 
make bad judgments. With hind-
sight, we can analyze actions and 
interrogate after the fact. The truth, 
however, is that morality remains the 
ultimate black box. The same indi-
vidual in the same situation except 
for one variant may make a differ-
ent decision. Given the mutable and 
individualized nature of morality, is 
it feasible that a programmer can 
develop software with acceptably har -
monized moral standards?
Morality is a uniquely human con-
cept. Unlike other life forms, humans 
are considered to possess the sin-
gular capacity to judge their own 
actions and those of others. Helen 
Guldberg [7] writes that humans are 
not born with this ability but are con-
ditioned to consciously make moral 
choices. While scientists have found 
that some animal species exhibit 
signs of a moral system, the concept 
of morality is thought to be a dis-
tinctly human construct, developed 
through social values and codes as 
well as an individual’s experience. 
The conundrum for software devel-
opers is that while AI technologies 
can equal and surpass human no tions 
of computational intelligence (for 
example, Google’s Alpha Go champi-
on), morality remains a solely human 
domain. While machines, in particu-
lar, humanoids [8], may appear to 
possess reflective thoughts, the out-
put is, at least with present technol-
ogies, a result of the data inputted, 
the rules used to train the algori-
thms, supervision, and iteration to 
achieve a desirable outcome.
This is more than an  academic 
debate. Today, AI systems are dep -
loyed in a plethora of everyday deci-
sion-making scenarios, including 
autonomous machines, insurance 
premium settings, and recruitment 
practices. Companies deploying 
algorithms that make consequen-
tial decisions are hiring philoso-
phers and social science majors to 
grapple with these quandaries. It is 
certain that, in the near future, more 
and more of us will be faced with 
the consequences of autonomous 
decision-making machines (trains, 
trucks, cars, buses) in our daily com-
mute or school run. An autonomous 
machine must be equipped to make 
life-and-death decisions in a man-
ner consistent with the law or, in the 
absence of laws, acceptable social 
norms. Adopting an engineer’s 
problem-solving mindset, the solu-
tion would be to test the decision-
making process among a sample 
group, determine the most frequent-
ly selected response, and train the 
algorithm accordingly. There are, 
however, ethical implications with 
imposing someone else’s version of 
morality on another as well as the 
statistical probability that some of 
the time, the algorithm will produce 
an output that does not align with 
our expectations. The algorithms 
will be trained on the individual or 
collective bias of the sample group. 
The issue is that morality is deeply 
The concept of morality is 
thought to be a distinctly human 
construct, developed through 
social values and codes as well 
as an individual’s experience.
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personal. In start-up companies de -
ploying drones, for example, the 
founder’s morals steer influences 
whether to deploy a machine for 
global good (weather, agriculture, or 
rescue missions) or to aid particular 
nation-states’ defense, surveillance, 
or border control strategies. As con-
sumers and as a society, are we pre-
pared for a software developer, or a 
company, to be the guardian of our 
moral sensibility?
AI has the potential to greatly 
improve the human condition. While 
there may be arguments against the 
deployment of certain machines 
and uses of AI technologies, such as 
facial recognition in autonomous 
weapons, the underlying technology 
itself is neutral. Moral considera-
tions must extend before deploy-
ment to the design and development 
of autonomous machines and AI 
techniques. Ethics should be a core 
subject in science, business, and 
engineering course curricula. Stan-
dards, both internal for companies 
developing technologies and exter-
nal for industries where such tech-
nologies are deployed, will assist in 
setting governance frameworks and 
best practice. Data used to train the 
algorithm must be clean, correctly 
labeled, and reflective of a diverse 
and inclusive user base. Robust 
testing must be carried out prior to 
deployment and companies should 
have the processes to demonstrate, 
albeit internally, that the ethical 
implications of algorithmic decisions 
have been sufficiently contemplat-
ed and mitigation steps put in place.
The transitory and sub-
jective nature of moral 
inclinations requires ongo-
ing evaluation [9] and iter-
ation of the algorithmic 
training to ensure that the 
output continues to reso-
nate broadly with societal 
norms. Humans, however, 
are fallible, and morality 
is a human construct that 
is subject to change. Despite an 
engineer’s best efforts to train and 
test an algorithm prior to release, 
there may be edge cases in which 
the outcome affronts our (individual 
and collective) moral principles. As 
a society, we are generally accept-
ing of human error. We are less 
forgiving of technology. When pre-
sented with hard, ethical dilemmas, 
is it (morally) justified for humans 
to demand a higher standard of a 
mere machine?
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he British  philosopher, 
G. E. Moore (1873–
1958) in his seminal 
work Principia Ethi-
ca (1903), wrote that 
when considering what’s good or 
bad, we should begin by asking two 
questions: ought the thing under 
inquiry exist? And, as it concerns an 
action, how ought we act? Although 
“good” in and of itself may well be 
indefinable, asking these questions 
has a common sense ring, especial-
ly when deciding the myriad ethical 
questions that surround new tech-
nology [1]. For example, Western 
nations have universally said “no” 
to germline modifications of the 
human genome, fearing that such 
actions might irreversibly affect the 
human race.1 In other instances, 
the genie escapes before any inter-
national consensus can develop to 
stop it from becoming a reality. In 
1945, atomic bombs decimated 
two Japanese cities killing nearly a 
quarter-million people. Only after 
a long string of hydrogen bomb 
detonations, over a period of near-
ly 20 years, were nuclear weapons 
banned as between the two major 
nuclear powers, the United States 
and the Soviet Union. The ban ex -
pressed a “right action.”
Unlike permanent changes to the 
human genome or the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons, most technolo-
gies do not pose existential threats, 
but nonetheless call for regulation. 
Social media may be in this catego-
ry. By 2019, more than half the pop-
ulation of Western Europe and more 
than a third of the population of the 
Middle East and North Africa will be 
using social networks [4], [5].1 This 
represents a giant step toward actu-
1Article 13 of the Oviedo Convention bans all 
genetic modifications to the human germline. 
Also see, [2]–[3].
alizing an aspiration of the UN’s Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights: 
“a world in which human beings 
shall enjoy freedom of speech.” But, 
as social media serves to transform 
free speech the world over, a perva-
sive infiltration of the information 
highway is underway by individuals 
and entities using bots and human 
agencies to invade our privacy and 
channel extremist, hateful speech 
in propaganda-like campaigns bent 
on undermining democratic insti-
tutions [6].2 Time has come to con-
sider steps that balance privacy 
and speech rights with the right 
to choose leaders without foreign 
interference [7].
Broadly speaking, social media 
has been in existence for thousands 
of years, e.g., letter writing. Although 
the 19th century telegraph permit-
ted two-way communication, its use 
was largely confined to business. It 
wasn’t until the 20th century that 
2Alleged Russian political meddling document-
ed in 27 countries since 2004 [6].
T
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/MTS.2018.2826061
Date of publication: 31 May 2018
Defending Against 
Opaque Algorithmic 
Meddling in 
Free Elections
S
ta
t
io
n
a
r
y
t
r
a
v
e
ll
e
r
/iS
to
C
K
31J U N E  2 0 1 8    ∕      IEEE TEchnology and SocIETy MagazInE
radio and later television allowed 
a communal connection between 
broadcaster and audience. National 
and international regulation quickly 
followed these early wireless suc-
cesses. Nearly simultaneous with 
radio, telephone networks estab-
lished information f low, mainly 
between two parties. Again, regula-
tion followed. But, not until the 21st 
century did social media platforms 
make it possible for billions of people 
to both broadcast and communi-
cate between themselves. Yet, virtu-
ally no regulation exists. Should it, 
when it’s become clear that recent 
elections and democratizing events 
in the Middle East, Europe and the 
U.S., suggest that social media and 
liberal democracy don’t always point 
in the same direction?
Evgeny Morozov, in his 2011 cri-
tique of the Web’s political ramifica-
tions asks, “What if the liberating 
potential of the Internet also con-
tains the seeds of depoliticization 
and thus dedemocratization?” [8]. 
We need look no further than the 
Iranian revolution of 2009, ener-
gized largely by Twitter and Face-
book to protest what many Iranians 
considered a flawed presidential 
election [9]. But, as demonstrators 
messaged via Twitter, the Iranian 
regime also used the Web, flush 
with data, to identify protesters, 
via photos and associated personal 
information. The regime then widely 
disseminated propaganda, which 
when combined with shootings, tear 
gassing and arrests, put the restive 
population into a state of paranoia, 
which resulted in tamping down the 
marches [10].
Unlike quelling incipient revolu-
tions, the 2016 elections in the U.S. 
and the U.K. were seemingly tainted 
by covert operatives, who comman-
deered social media platforms for 
purposes of altering the political 
result in two of the world’s oldest 
democracies. In March 2018, The 
Guardian reported that “The data 
analytics firm that worked with Don-
ald Trump’s election team and the 
winning Brexit campaign harvested 
millions of Facebook profiles of U.S. 
voters, in one of the tech giant’s big-
gest ever data breaches, and used 
them to build a powerful software 
program to predict and influence 
choices at the ballot box” [11]. This 
development has led U.K.’s Prime 
Minister, Theresa May, to call for the 
Information Commissioner to inves-
tigate the circumstances of one of 
the most egregious invasions of per-
sonal privacy in memory, which in 
this case apparently influenced the 
outcome of an election.
Democracies need both a free 
Internet and free speech, and judg-
ing from the election tampering that 
has occurred recently throughout 
Europe and the United States, time 
has come to consider instituting 
standards and global policies. These 
should be backed up by industry 
enforcement mechanisms, using both 
humans and AI, to defend against 
opaque algorithmic invasions of pri-
vacy and fabrication of propagan-
da. Social media platforms might 
begin by promising a robust trans-
parency and accountability, where 
recognized international watchdog 
agencies can identify incidents of 
electoral maladministration, and 
in sure that the aggrieved have an 
opportunity to be heard and to en -
join activities when justified, i.e., to 
stop the infringement of the right to 
choose one’s political destiny with-
out meddling. Yes, social media is a 
fact of life, but ought we act now to 
enforce electoral norms, what G.E. 
Moore likely would have agreed is 
undeniably “good?”
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S
ocial media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) are 
today a regular form of communication used widely 
by individuals and organizations. More recently, so-
cial media are also used by political parties to com-
municate with voters. As a result, political parties 
engage in a new kind of conversation with voters, 
transforming campaigning into something more dy-
namic compared to what it was in the past. This engagement how-
ever varies by society. In some cases political parties simply send 
messages to voters while in others communication is more active. 
The current study provides evidence on the extent to which political 
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parties and candidates adopted and used social media 
tools as part of their campaign in the 2013 presidential 
elections in Cyprus. Interviews with social media offi-
cers of five political parties were conducted with the 
aim of uncovering the frequency and type of social me-
dial usage in the elections. Results reveal that social me-
dia were primarily used for one-way communication 
rather than being a means of discussion and interaction 
between politicians and voters. Most candidates used 
social media merely for dissemination of news, images, 
political messages, and upcoming events. However, all 
parties recognized that the role of social media in presi-
dential elections could be enhanced to allow more inter-
action between candidates and voters.
Social Media Potential
A new type of web technology popularly referred to as 
social media have opened up possibilities for enhanced 
online human-to-human interaction. The use of social 
media is spreading fast, from organizing events to shar-
ing information, and from forming groups to running 
entire political campaigns. Social media allow users not 
only to seek information, but also to interact with others 
through online expression such as posting political 
commentaries on blogs and social network sites and 
sharing multimedia commentary [8].
Political leaders and parties recently began to use 
social networking to achieve political objectives [13]. A 
wide range of factors is attributed to the increasing use 
of social media for online campaigns and online elec-
tioneering both by politicians and by citizens. Pariso-
poulos et al. [14] cluster these factors into two major 
sets, supply driven and demand driven. Supply driven 
factors are those factors that relate to the use of social 
media by politicians, and demand driven factors are 
those that relate to the use of social media by non-politi-
cians for political reasons.
Candidates can adopt many Internet tools for the 
purposes of communicating with constituents and vot-
ers in order to collect donations, foster community, and 
organize events. The available tools include social net-
working sites (SNSs). These are web-based services that 
allow individuals 1) to construct public or semi-public 
profiles within a bounded system, 2) to articulate [27] a 
list of other users with whom they share a connection, 
and 3) to view and traverse their list of connections and 
those made by others within the system [4]. Facebook 
profiles also give candidates a platform to publicize 
their support for a number of existing political groups, 
causes, and other candidates. In addition, they can post 
notes to their supporters and respond to comments on 
their individual web pages or walls [10].
One of the most well-known examples of leveraging 
social media for a campaign is the 2008 American 
presidential election in which President Obama used 
social media to his advantage, posting on Facebook, 
tweeting, and creating YouTube videos that disseminat-
ed his message much faster than any traditional mar-
keting medium. However, globally many politicians 
don’t seem to utilize the potential of social media. 
Khaldarova et al. [7] for example, suggest that Finnish 
politicians do not yet appear to be making that break-
through push in use of online social media. While some 
politicians use online social media tools helpful for 
interaction with citizens, most politicians use social 
media as a dissemination tool rather than as a way to 
engage with voters. In addition, it seems that social media 
is often used as a campaigning tool and then quickly 
abandoned after the elections.
The picture seems to be similar in other countries 
too. A study in [16] showed that the Internet is not being 
used to its maximum potential by Indian politicians. 
Many of the party sites were not interactive nor were they 
adequately updated. Also, not many politicians used 
their sites to disseminate news and photographs to 
potential voters and several sites remained unchanged 
before, during, and after the elections. Johannessen [9] 
has also suggested that Norwegian politicians are still 
uncertain about how to communicate using SNSs and 
what communication through SNSs should mean for 
the political process. Further, according to [14], Greek 
politicians have not acquired a deep understanding of 
Facebook’s potential. Most candidates just upload pro-
motional material or announcements rather than seek-
ing meaningful discussion with their supporters.
More recently, in the U.S. 2016 elections, social media 
seemed to have played a very important role. According 
to Frank Speiser, for example (quoted in [28]), the 
recent election was the “first true social media election.” 
Social media’s role in the election has been bigger than 
ever before [29] and it seems to have carried tremen-
dous influence on the electorate [30]. According to [27], 
35% of people 18 to 29 years old said that social media 
was the most helpful source of information in the 2016 
presidential election. The two main candidates’ use of 
social media differed significantly, according to [32], 
though. Donald Trump’s posts were often focused out-
ward, attacking others rather than talking about himself 
Most politicians use social media  
for short-term dissemination rather 
than long-term engagement.
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or what he would bring to the office of President. Hillary 
Clinton’s approach was more about leveraging the next 
generation, and she occasionally interjected sarcasm 
and humor. Also, Trump’s inflection tended to be sim-
ple and emotional, and Clinton’s approach was far more 
traditional, and included paid Facebook ads that took 
advantage of the large audience and precision targeting 
capabilities to reach donors and voters. Overall, as [31] 
concluded, not only was “[s]ocial media’s influence in 
this presidential election stronger than it has ever 
been,” but it “will shape campaigns for years to come.” 
This study provides evidence for the use of social 
media in the 2013 presidential elections in Cyprus. 
Cyprus is a changing society that is quite developed 
socioeconomically. GDP in 2014 was U.S. $29 670 when 
adjusted by purchasing power parity, a figure that is 
167% of the world’s average [26]. Cyprus has a high 
level of information communication technologies (ICT) 
use –(the percentage of households utilizing a comput-
er, either desktop, portable or handheld, according the 
Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus is 70.3% 
[22]. Of these users, the 93% are frequent users of the 
Internet, and two thirds of Internet users are connected 
with social media networks such as Facebook, Twitter, 
LinkedIn, YouTube, etc. [20]. With this background, the 
aim of this research was to investigate whether social 
media were utilized in Cyprus for the 2013 presidential 
campaign and, if yes, to what extent and in what ways.
Related Work
Social media is a term often used with terms like social 
network sites, social Web, Web 2.0, and user generated 
content (USG) [7], and they are defined as online applica-
tions, platforms, and media, which aim to facilitate inter-
actions, collaboration, and the sharing of content [12]. 
Weber [23] adds that social media is the online place 
where people with common interests can gather to 
share thoughts, comments, and opinions. Whereas in 
traditional media such as newspapers, radio, and televi-
sion, communication is one-way, social media allows 
everyone to publish and to participate in multithread 
conversations online.
Social media comes in many forms [25]: blogs, micro 
blogs (Twitter), social networks (Facebook), media-sharing 
sites (YouTube), social bookmarking and voting sites (Digg, 
Reddit), review sites (Yelp), forums, and virtual worlds 
(Second Life).
According to [6], social media sites exist under the 
conceptual umbrella of Web 2.0. A Web 2.0 application 
is a technology that allows for user-collaboration as well 
as User Generated Content (USG), which focuses on 
individual participation and content creation on Web 2.0 
applications. Web 2.0 technologies are a collection of 
social media by which people actively form, organize, 
edit, integrate, and rate Web content [13]. Web 2.0 includes 
social network sites such as Facebook, which allows 
users to create profiles and establish connections with 
friends and acquaintances on the Internet [17], [18]. 
Other formats such as microblogs and video-sharing are 
also included in Web 2.0. Microblogs such as Twitter 
allow users to post short messages that are published 
online in real time. Video-sharing sites such as YouTube 
enable users to share user-created video and interact 
with other users in an online community. These technol-
ogies support group interaction.
Social Network Sites
According to [23], social networks sites are places where 
people with a common interest or concern come together 
to meet people with similar interests, express themselves 
and vent. What makes SNSs unique is not that they allow 
individuals to meet strangers, but rather that they enable 
users to articulate and make visible their social networks. 
On many of the large SNSs, participants are not necessar-
ily looking to meet new people but they are more interest-
ed in managing relationships by maintaining contacts 
with old friends who are already part of their extended 
social network [12]. Moreover, [9] noted that the most pop-
ular SNSs are those that focus on user-generated content, 
participation, openness, and network effects. Social 
networking is not mainly about technology but about 
covering people’s needs for access to and sharing of 
information, collaboration, and the creation of identity. 
Johannessen [9] also suggests that SNSs should be treat-
ed more as a cultural than as a technological phenome-
non. To gain the benefits of SNSs, owners of information 
need to open their data, think in terms of collaborative 
production of ideas and content, and to share ideas with 
others in order to create better information.
SNSs are now transforming the political background 
of how politicians, governments, and citizens will en -
gage with one another. The game of politics no longer 
belongs wholly to the professionals. Politics is now in 
the hands of ordinary voters, those who know how to 
make the best use this new infrastructure. The medium 
that rose to the forefront of this dispersal of power and 
mobilization of active political engagement in the last 
few years is Facebook.
Social network sites are transforming 
the way politicians, government and 
citizens engage with one another.
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Facebook — Founded in February 2004, Facebook is 
a social utility that helps people communicate more effi-
ciently with others. It is a social networking site that facili-
tates interaction among like-minded people by sharing 
information through the digital mapping of real-world 
social connections. Not only it is the most popular social 
networking site, Facebook is one of the world’s most traf-
ficked Web sites with 1.7 billion active monthly users [21]. 
Facebook users can express themselves politically in var-
ious ways, such as by making online donations, encour-
aging their friends to vote, and posting graphics or status 
updates expressing political attitudes and opinions [8]. 
Facebook is one of the modern communication channels 
that have been used by many politicians to spread their 
ideas, influence opinions, and get voters to vote for them 
in elections. Essentially, Facebook is doing the old jobs 
of the campaigns, only smarter and faster [3].
Twitter — The phenomenon of online social network 
microblogging has become widespread over the last few 
years. The most popular microblogging tool is Twitter, 
which is a real-time information network that connects 
users to the latest stories, ideas, opinions, and news 
about what they find interesting. Twitter focuses on 
small events happening in users’ daily lives and work 
activities, thus enabling them to share updates with 
friends, family, and co-workers [1]. It was launched in 
2006 and it now has approximately 695 million regis-
ters users [21]. At the heart of Twitter are small bursts of 
information called Tweets. Each Tweet is up to 140 
characters long. Users can see photos, videos, and con-
versations directly in Tweets to get the whole story at a 
tweet, and all in one place.
Online Group Membership
The greatest benefit that Facebook has provided to 
political candidates thus far is the means to mobilize 
and organize thousands of supporters [10]. Membership 
in a group provides necessary motivation and incentive 
to be politically informed. Facebook introduced the 
“groups” application in September 2004 as one of its 
basic features. Feezell et al. [24] noted that the applica-
tion allows users to share common interests with each 
other by providing a common space where users can 
meet others interested in a particular topic, spread 
information about that topic, and have public discus-
sions relevant to that topic. With the “Message All Mem-
bers” feature, group administrators can reach out to 
entire membership rolls at any time. They can send out 
messages to members regarding meetings or campaign 
events, creating an actual contact list of voluntary 
supporters, a powerful means to organizing large-
scale political and social movements [19]. Members can 
also invite friends to join a group or forward messages 
from campaigns.
In many ways, the ability for civic participation through 
Facebook can be attributed to the consolidation of in -
formation gathering and transmittance, the wealth of 
information that is easily accessible, and the flexibility 
users have in when information is accessed. In addition, 
online groups allow members to express their opinions 
through posts and to engage on many levels with the 
group discussion and information sharing [24]. The 
group application was one of the earliest and still 
remains one of the most pivotal features contributing to 
the interactive nature of Facebook.
Social Media and Citizens
On the other hand, there are several demand-driven fac-
tors that explain the increasing use of Facebook by citi-
zens for political reasons. Facebook enables citizens to 
engage in meaningful political dialogue with candi-
dates. It also gives amateur activists an easy way to con-
nect with other citizens around the globe and helps 
them push their collective concerns to the top of politi-
cal agendas [2]. Facebook’s lack of geographic boundar-
ies makes it easy for like-minded individuals to form 
large-scale communities, while technological advance-
ments make it possible for nontechnical people to take 
a larger role in organizing and running such communi-
ties [14]. Users can join political groups, download can-
didate applications, and share their political opinions 
through the many communication tools on the site. Fur-
thermore, users can view their friends’ activities and 
comment on friends’ posts, thus engaging in active con-
versation about political issues. Also, Facebook offers 
to its users opportunities to develop civic engagement 
skills with little to no additional time costs while simul-
taneously having access to a potentially large enough 
public to develop civic skills. Finally, Facebook enables 
its users to express themselves politically in various 
ways such as by making online donations, encouraging 
their friends to vote, and posting graphics or status 
updates expressing political attitudes and opinions [8].
Political Marketing and Advertising
Political marketing is about political parties adopting 
marketing principles, concepts, techniques, and strate-
gies to achieve their goals and objectives. According to 
[11], all political parties can apply the technologies or 
Facebook facilitates targeting of 
advertising and marketing through 
political segmentation.
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strategies of marketing, such as market research, mar-
ket segmentation, market orientation, and relationship 
marketing in order to achieve goals and objectives. In 
the same way that businesses market their products 
and services, politicians market themselves in order to 
win elections. SNSs can provide detailed demographic 
information about its users, which maybe the basis of 
market segmentation.
Political advertising includes all means and technolo-
gies required to attract public opinion, and, eventually, 
votes [25]. Facebook helps ease targeting through its 
Social Ads. These ads allow campaigns to segment the 
Facebook community by selecting users based on age, 
gender, education, interests, relationship status, key-
words, and political views.
Background Information
Internet Use in Cyprus
As Figure 1 shows, two in three people in Cyprus (65.3%) 
are frequent users of the Internet [22]. This percentage 
is very high at young ages (96.3% in the 16–24 age 
group and 86.5% in ages 25–34) and decreases with 
age, especially after 45, reaching 30.4% in the age 
group 55–64 and 15.2% in ages 65–74. High income 
individuals use the Internet more frequently (90.3% 
are frequent users compared to 32.1% in the low 
income group), whereas students use the Internet 
more frequently than workers (98.7% vs. 75.3%). A 
lower percentage of unemployed people (66.3%) are 
frequent users of the Internet, and a much lower per-
centage (29.2%) in the retired/
inactive population are fre-
quent users.
Most Popular Internet 
 Activities
According to the same report, 
the most popular Internet activi-
ties among the Cyprus popula-
tion are “Finding Information 
about Goods or Services,” “Send-
ing/Receiving Emails,” “Partici-
pating in Social Networks,” and 
“Reading/Downloading News/
Newspapers/Magazines.” As 
these results suggest, online 
social networking is a popular 
Internet activity, and political 
parties have a significant on -
line presences.
Political Parties and  
Social Media
Political parties as entities also 
have accounts in social media. 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube 
seem to be used more exten-
sively than Flickr and Instagram. 
Among political parties in Cyprus, 
Progressive Party of Working Peo-
ple (AKEL) has the highest num-
ber of likes on Facebook followed 
by Democratic Rally (DISY) and 
Citizens Alliance. On Twitter DISY 
has more followers than AKEL, 
and on YouTube DISY has the 
highest number of views followed 
by Citizens Alliance and AKEL 
(See Table 1).
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65.3
FigurE 1. Internet users in Cyprus. Source: Statistical service of the Republic of Cyprus 
(2014) [22].
TABLE 1. Political parties’ popularity on social media.
Party
Facebook 
(# of Likes)
Twitter (# of 
Followers)
YouTube 
(# of Views) FLICKR
Instagram  
(# of Followers)
aKel 6924 1603 21008 – 114
DIsY 5462 2020 91944 √ –
eDeK 1602 712 6649 – –
DIKO 1874 – – – –
Green Party 233 400 7061 – –
Citizens 
alliance
2487 69 46670 – –
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Methods
In order to explore the uses of social media as online 
campaign tools in 2013 presidential elections in 
Cyprus, people in charge of social media communica-
tion in five political parties were interviewed. The five 
political parties were: Democratic Rally, Democratic 
Party (DIKO), The Movement for Social Democracy 
(EDEK), The Ecological and Environmental Movement 
of Cyprus and the Citizens’ Alliance. DISY is a right-
wing party that is currently the largest by vote in 
Cyprus. In the last parliamentary elections in 2011 it 
won 34.3% of the vote and holds 20 seats in the par-
liament. DIKO is a center-right party that is the third 
by vote, having won 15.8% of the vote in the last elec-
tions and holds 9 seats in the parliament. EDEK is the 
fourth party by vote. It won 9% of the vote and holds 
5 seats. The Ecological and Environmental Movement 
or Cyprus (Green Party) took 2.2% of the vote and has 
one seat in parliament, while the Citizens Alliance did 
not participate in the 2011 parliamentary elections as 
it was founded in 2013. (Note: AKEL, the second polit-
ical party by popular vote, was not included in the 
analysis because, despite efforts by the researchers, 
it was not possible to arrange an interview with a 
party representative.)
Interviews were arranged by phone in the period Sep-
tember–November 2014. Interviews were conducted in 
the participants’ mother language — Greek — and the 
interview schedule was translated from English to Greek 
and then independently back-translated to check the 
wording. Interviews lasted from 30 to 60 minutes and 
were recorded and transcribed [5].
Questions asked related to which social media were 
used; reasons for using social media, their importance 
and benefits; effectiveness for targeting different age 
groups; marketing tactics to mobilize young people; and 
tracking young voters. Results are presented and dis-
cussed in the section that follows.
Findings and Discussion
Table 2 summarizes the responses of the parties’ repre-
sentatives to the questions posed at the interviews. As 
the table shows, all parties use Facebook, three use Twit-
ter, two YouTube, and one Google ads. The fact that 
Facebook is the most used social media platform is prob-
ably not surprising given its high penetration and use.
A number of reasons are mentioned as to why politi-
cal parties use social media. Some have to do with com-
municating more easily (e.g., “offer immediacy,” “offer the 
ability to express political views and opinions online,” 
“uploading promotional materials or political masseges,” 
“interact with the others online”), reaching special age 
groups (“penetrate into age groups that we couldn’t do 
through television”), and cost savings (“they are relatively 
inexpensive”). The benefits from the use of social media 
and their importance are linked to similar reasons, i.e., 
communicating more easily and cheaply, and reaching 
groups that are more difficult to reach with traditional 
media (four out of five party representatives agree with 
this last statement).
Political parties employed a number of tactics to 
mobilize young people. These included using more 
bright colors, having advertisements that have their 
wording adapted for young people on YouTube, and pro-
moting events or statements. The main argument was 
that young people use the Internet more and are con-
vinced differently. According to one respondent: “We use 
different language for young people, more vivid, and 
more bright colors. We also designed some advertise-
ments that played only on YouTube, not TV, because we 
felt this was more effective in reaching young people.”
Only one party acknowledges that social media help 
them track voters; other parties claim that they do not. 
The “tracking” in the case of this party takes the form of 
following voters’ comments and suggestions. As the rep-
resentative of the party specifically stated, “Yes, [we 
track their views] since from there [social media] you 
can interact with the users and comment on activities or 
policies.” One party representative expressed the view 
that tracking voters is illegal and unethical, apparently 
thinking about the practice of following as taking note 
of a voters’ views.
Overall, social media seemed to have been used to a 
significant extent in the 2013 election in Cyprus. There 
does not seem to be significant differences between 
political parties in relation to the reasons for using and 
the benefits of social media. There was a difference in 
how representatives viewed “tracking voters,” even 
though the kind of answers given may suggest that the 
meaning of the word “tracking” may have been under-
stood differently by party representatives. In relation to 
young people, there is evidence that political parties treat 
them differently, acknowledging both young people’s 
familiarity with social media and the fact that the tools 
needed to convince individuals from this group category 
may differ compared to the rest of the electorate.
Because of the exploratory nature of this study and 
the lack of comparative historical data in Cyprus, it is 
not possible to comment in relation to the changes that 
Persuading young people to vote 
for a candidate may be different than 
for the rest of the electorate.
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may have taken place in the last few years and the 
impact of the economic crisis on the use of social media 
in elections. The results of this study may be used as a 
benchmark for comparative studies in the future.
Further Exploration
Increasing Internet access in Cyprus has facilitated the 
use of social media for political purposes. In the 2013 
presidential election campaign, social media were used 
quite extensively for dissemination of news, images, 
political messages, and upcoming events. Some parties 
and candidates had also begun to include newer tech-
nologies into their pages, such as Facebook application 
tools (e.g., group membership), Google, and Facebook 
ads. Even though social media, especially Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube, were widely used, their usage 
involved primarily one-way communication instead of 
also having elements of two-way interaction with voters 
such as engaging in listening, responding to questions, 
or allowing interaction.
Future research in this area could explore the evolv-
ing use of social media for political purposes in Cyprus. 
Specifically, it might be studied how the economic situa-
tion after the 2013 elections may influence the use of 
social media in future elections. Differences between 
social media types and usage levels among political par-
ties could also be analyzed. In addition, future studies 
can also analyze not only frequency of usage but also 
TABLE 2. Summary of interview results.
DISY DIKO EDEK Green Alliance
Which social 
media were used 
for promotion 
strategy
Facebook
Twitter
Google ads
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
Facebook Facebook 
Twitter 
YouTube
Facebook
ads
apps
Reasons for using 
social media
–  penetrate into 
age groups that 
we couldn’t do 
through television
–  they are relatively 
inexpensive
–  offer immediacy
–  the ability to 
express political 
views and 
opinions online
–  interact with the 
others (online 
expression 
through posting)
–  Dissemination 
of positions of 
eDeK
–  see what is 
written about 
eDeK
–  To create online 
presence
–  uploading 
promotional 
materials 
or political 
massages
To directly 
communicate  
with people
Benefits 
for political 
campaigns 
through social 
media
you can locate and 
send your message 
in the age groups 
that you hardly can 
achieve through 
television
the direct 
interaction with 
young people
– no cost
–  divert new 
through social 
media
–  educate young 
people about the 
political reality
–  Direct interaction 
with young 
people
spread their 
campaigns using 
targeted tools and 
demographics
Why social media 
are important 
–  interact with 
anyone, anytime
–  pass his/her 
positions in the 
wider public 
through social 
media
–  Fast information 
spreading political 
messages about 
the political 
parties
Are more efficient 
for targeting 
specific groups 
of voters than 
traditional media
Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Marketing tactic 
to mobilize young 
people 18–29 
years old
–  More bright colors
–  advertisements 
on YouTube
–  advertisement 
wording adapted 
for young people
Having a social 
media page
Promote events or 
statements
Hotspots, free 
Internet
“MPOROUMe” 
method 
Do social media 
help track voters?
To some extent No, it is illegal and 
unethical
No No Not track, grouping 
people
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the content. Finally, the effect of social media on voters 
could also be the focus of analysis.
The use of social media across countries could fur-
ther be compared, with the aim of identifying the fac-
tors that affect their level and type of use. Cultural 
dif ferences between societies and the impact of the eco-
nomic downturn maybe also studied. And, if the chang-
es are in line with the trends observed in the recent 
American elections, social media will be an important 
aspect of electioneering, and related research findings 
would provide important information for academics 
and practitioners.
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T
oday, social media is one of the dominant channels for com-
municating and collaborating among individuals and orga-
nizations. People are using social media as an effective and 
inexpensive way to make friendships with new people and 
to keep in touch with the existing ones [1], [2].
Baruah [3] argued that social media has become an effi-
cient and effective tool of communication in which individ-
uals can share ideas and information, organizations can market their 
services and products, and customers can interact sharing their feedbacks 
and preferences. Hajli [4] introduced social commerce in his study in which 
the levels of interaction over social networks between consumers and busi-
nesses are beneficial.
Another motive to use social media is education. Zaidieh [5] showed that con-
venience, flexibility, and accessibility are the motives behind using social media 
in education; students can easily participate in discussions and share their expe-
riences. Searching for jobs is another motive that has been presented by Black 
and Johnson [6] who showed that employers use social networking sites during 
the recruitment process.
With millions of hours spent on Facebook by the U.S. population, which is 
18 times higher than the next biggest social network [7], Facebook is indeed an 
outstanding communication channel for millions of people. A study targeting 
45 000 people aged 16–64 worldwide showed that Facebook has the largest 
share of social media users, where 82% of the study population has a Facebook 
account, and 42% of them are considered active users [8].
Shi et al. [9] investigated motives that influence users’ intention to keep 
using Facebook; their results showed that keeping in touch with friends, enter-
tainment and information seeking positively influenced users’ satisfaction with 
Facebook. Additionally, Al-Menayes [10] presented entertainment, personal utili-
ty, information seeking, convenience and altruism as the main motives behind 
using social media.
Concerns
Nevertheless, despite Facebook’s enormous popularity, concerns been raised 
previously in the literature.
Privacy
Privacy is one of the major users’ concerns illustrated in the literature [11]. 
Stieger et al. [12] showed that privacy was one of the major reasons that led 
48.3% of Facebook users to quit. Baumer et al. [13] mentioned that users are 
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not comfortable having their own life shown to the pub-
lic. In addition, users stated that Facebook is not con-
cerned about their privacy and did not trust Facebook 
securing their personal information [13]. Similarly, Fox 
and Moreland [14] showed that users did not like being 
unable to hide personal information from their existing 
network. In addition, users adjusted privacy settings 
because they were concerned about their privacy on 
Facebook [15].
Security
Security is another serious concern to Facebook users. 
In their study, Bilge et al. [16] proved how easy it was to 
attack a Facebook profile. Hackers steal identities and 
use them to send a friendship request to users, as a 
result, they gain access to the users personal informa-
tion. For that reason, 69% of Facebook users are wor-
ried about the security of their personal information 
[17]. Another study investigated the reasons for quitting 
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Facebook in Japan and revealed that users left Face-
book mainly because of security concerns, the require-
ments for declaring the real name, and the complexity 
of the Facebook interface [18]. Zheleva and Getoor [19] 
demonstrated how privacy attacks, with a mixture of 
public and private profiles can bypass the security set-
tings in social networks. They also established evidence 
on how surprisingly easy it was to obtain private infor-
mation from friendship links and group memberships 
on Facebook.
Trust
Trust is yet another major concern about Facebook. 
Lankton and McKnight [20] distinguished between inter-
personal trust beliefs, which include integrity, compe-
tence, and benevolence, and technology trust beliefs, 
which include reliability, functionality, and helpfulness. 
In his study, Deuker [11] argued that users did not pro-
vide Facebook with any information that needs protec-
tion, as they did not trust Facebook as a technology. 
Deuker [11] also revealed that users have doubts about 
Facebook privacy settings as well.
Annoying Content
Another dark side of Facebook is annoying content. Fox 
& Moreland [14] for instance, stated that users’ reac-
tions ranged from frustration to shock to revulsion at 
inappropriate content. Shelton and Skalski [21] also 
argued that Facebook includes negative content. Addi-
tionally, Butler [22] mentioned that risks increase with 
users’ posting inappropriate comments on Facebook, 
where bullying can happen through text exchange and 
Facebook posts [23].
Usefulness, Usability, and Enjoyment
Previous research investigated the usefulness of Face-
book as a concern. Among current Facebook users, 
61% have voluntary taken a break from Facebook main-
ly because they believed that using Facebook is a waste 
of time and not useful as it contained too much gossip 
and drama, or they were too busy and not interested 
[24]. Similarly, it was shown that users’ mood was nega-
tively affected after using Facebook and users felt it was 
less useful and a waste of time [25]. Other studies 
reported usability issues with Facebook. Wang Y. et al. 
[26] provided examples concerning usability where 
feedback was not provided by Facebook when posting a 
video; thus a user did not know that she had accidental-
ly posted a video until the next day. Another user could 
not delete a post on Facebook from his phone as he 
expected that the same functionality should operate on 
all platforms [26]. Similarly Morgan [27] mentioned that 
Facebook has major usability issues because of the tar-
geted ads, sponsored status updates, and requests from 
third parties to get Facebook users to register for servic-
es. Li, Snow, and White [28] showed enjoyment as 
another issue and illustrated user views on Facebook 
with a user mentioning that Facebook is no more fun as 
it is all about chatting.
Control
A few studies addressed concerns related to control on 
Facebook. For example, Fox and Moreland [14] men-
tioned that users are not happy that Facebook is con-
trolling their profiles. Facebook users were more 
concerned when the newsfeed option was released 
because they had less control over their information as 
the new option was an easy window for others to access 
their information [29].
So Why Do People Still Use Facebook?
With these investigations of Facebook concerns and 
issues in previous research, a question arises as to why 
people keep using Facebook if such negative percep-
tions and concerns exist?
Forty Facebook users were asked about the reasons 
behind their Facebook use despite concerns. The re -
plies were analyzed using qualitative content analysis 
following the recommendations of [30]. The intention of 
using content analysis was to identify recurring con-
cepts or beliefs of a salient issue within the answers, 
and to support any emergent issue from the replies [30].
Among the 40 respondents, 69% were female and 
31% male. Thirty percent were between 18–24 years 
old, 40% aged 25–34, 20% ages 35–44, and 10% were 
over 44 years old. The respondents’ ethnicity was mainly 
Middle-Eastern 79%, followed by European 9%, Asian 
5%, and 7% other/multi-racial.
In terms of educational level, 61% of the study popu-
lation held a bachelor’s degree followed by 19% Mas-
ter’s degree, 16% high school, and finally 4% were Ph.D. 
degree holders.
Respondents answers were grouped under relevant 
themes and reasons are presented in Table 1. The most 
recurrent reason for continuing to use Facebook related 
to perceiving Facebook as one of the most effective 
channel of communication.
People find justifications for using 
Facebook despite their concerns over 
trust, privacy, and security.
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Connection to Friends and Family
Respondents in this study confirmed their concerns 
about Facebook and provided justifications for using it 
despite the concerns. Most of the respondents stated 
that the main reason of using Facebook despite the 
concerns is to stay connected with their friends and 
family. A respondent stated “I do not like it [Facebook], 
but I am afraid that I will be disconnected from the 
people I know. Facebook is almost the only way to keep 
in touch with friends I have met from different coun-
tries, who I can no longer see in person.” Another 
respondent was quite clear in stating the value of Face-
book as an online, global channel of communication. 
She said
“I like the idea of networking with my relatives 
and friends from all over the world. I [get so much] 
news from Facebook whether it is happy or sad; 
from a new born baby, engagement, wedding, etc. 
No matter what, Facebook is a good medium of 
communication.”
Another respondent confirmed: “Facebook is the 
easiest and fastest channel through which I communi-
cate with my extended family overseas.” Another 
response that was aligned with the previous respons-
es stated,
“I still use it [Facebook] to stay in touch with 
friends and family, especially [since] many of 
them are living in other countries. And like it or 
not, people are not communicating with each 
other as they used to 10 years ago, but they take 
the time to post on Facebook.”
One of the responses compared Facebook to other 
communication platforms:
“The only constant communication way with 
friends and family who are faraway! Mobile num-
bers change so do addresses — Facebook accounts 
rarely change!”
These results align with the findings of Brandtzæg [2] 
who showed that people are using social media to make 
friendships with new people and to keep in touch with 
existing friends.
Education and Study Features
Another important reason for continuing to use Face-
book relates to the features and services it offers, as 
one of the respondents confirmed: “Facebook is per-
haps the most feasible way where I can connect with my 
colleagues instantaneously to discuss and exchange 
study-related matters.” This agrees with Zaidieh [5] who 
illustrated the effectiveness of social media in education 
where students, educators, and administrators can 
effectively communicate.
Commercial Uses
Commercial potential is another Facebook value men-
tioned by respondents: “I have a business page on Face-
book. That is why I need it.” Two other respondents 
concurred: “I have my own page and it is really benefi-
cial,” and “Facebook is the source of my income.” These 
findings agree with Hajli [4] who discussed social com-
merce and how the levels of interaction between con-
sumers in this type of e-commerce are beneficial over 
social networks.
Information Seeking
Considering Facebook as an information-seeking chan-
nel and a news platform was given as another reason for 
continuing to use the platform as stated by a respon-
dent: “Facebook is a very effective channel to follow up 
Table 1. Reasons for using facebook despite 
concerns.
No. Reason
1 effective and convenient channel for communication.
2 Utilitarian values of usage (e.g. study related purposes, 
commercial benefits).
3 information Seeking (e.g., job search, job postings,  
news updates, etc.).
4 Potential loss of friends, connections, or acquaintances.
5 enjoyment. 
6 virtual addiction.
7 nonexistence of a better alternative.
8 Platform to express views and opinions.
9 inability to entirely delete the Facebook account based 
on its terms and conditions of use.
Users cannot truly quit Facebook 
if they cannot permanently delete 
everything about themselves.
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on breaking news and events of interest.” Another response 
that was similarly aligned:
“Facebook is a news source for me. You find out 
about things happening in cities that won’t even 
show on the TV news. Also, Facebook is a place to 
get information, inspirational stuff and recipes. 
Add to that groups which are very useful. You can 
connect with like-minded people and with similar 
background, communities, and nationalities.”
Careers
Facebook value for job related purposes can be clear-
ly seen in a respondent’s comment: “The only reason 
keeps me using Facebook is the fact that many job 
opportunities are posted on it.” Another respondent 
was also clear in asserting the benefits Facebook pro-
vides to users:
“After using Facebook to get a scholarship, and 
getting a lot of money after advertising myself as 
an Arabic teacher for foreigners in Jordan, I do 
not think I will stop using it.”
These results agree with Al-Menayes [10] who 
showed that information seeking, convenience, and 
altruism are among the main motives of using so -
cial media.
Lack of Alternatives
It is evident that users are aware of the benefits of 
Facebook, and some of them even perceive that no 
other social media network can compete with Face-
book today. This was clear in one of the respons-
es: “I will not quit Facebook, not until we have a 
better alternative.”
Fear of Lost Connections and Virtual Addiction
Some respondents indicated that it will be difficult for 
them to leave Facebook. This was due to two reasons: 
First, due to concerns over potential losses:
“I have built a huge social network of relatives and 
friends over the past few years using Facebook. It 
would very hard to stop using it now,”
a respondent acknowledged. Secondly, some respon-
dents mentioned that they cannot leave Facebook 
because they feel they are addicted to it; as illustrated 
by two comments:
“I am addicted to Facebook; it keeps me updated 
with what is going on around the world since I 
rarely watch TV”; and “Facebook is an addiction, 
simply an everyday thing.”
This type of virtual addiction happens to people who 
become too reliant on their online identity as described 
by Modi and Gandhi [31].
Fun
Other responses highlighted the fun factor of Face-
book, where one of the respondents focused particu-
larly on the joy Facebook brings to her life: “I read my 
friends’ posts on Facebook almost every hour. Many 
jokes around. So many funny videos.” This finding 
agrees with Al-Menayes [10] who showed that enter-
tainment is one of the motives for people to use 
so cial media.
Expressing Opinions
Considering Facebook as a platform to express views 
and opinions is another reason for people to keep using 
Facebook that was clearly seen in a respondent comment:
“I consider Facebook as a platform to share my 
opinions and ideas, though sometimes I become 
worried since there is no[t] enough freedom 
where anything that you write can be legally used 
against you.”
This finding agrees with Al-Saggaf [32] who showed 
that users expressed their feelings, shared their thoughts 
and opinions through Facebook.
Inability to Delete Facebook Profile Data
Finally, a respondent stressed out an interesting point 
where she mentioned that she cannot truly quit Face-
book, even if she wanted so, since its terms and condi-
tions of use do not allow the user to permanently delete 
everything about oneself. It is true that stopping the 
account of a person on Facebook will not delete the per-
son’s messages and photos; such information actually 
remains on Facebook servers after account deletion 
[33]. One of the respondents was aware of this fact and 
stated: “How can I really quit Facebook? My account will 
always be there. Facebook will not allow me to delete it 
even if I want to, so that is why I keep using it because it 
will always be there.”
Further Research to Examine  
Cultural Factors Needed
A notable scarcity exists in finding studies which exam-
ine why people keep using Facebook despite their con-
cerns. This research aims to help this problem.
Forty respondents provided reasons why they keep 
using Facebook despite their concerns. The majority of 
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the reasons focused on the fact that Facebook is the 
most convenient means of communication that exists 
today, with great features and values that simply cannot 
be ignored. In addition, they mentioned that Facebook is 
one of the main channels for information seeking. Other 
respondents focused their reasoning on the fear of a 
potential loss of friends, not being able to entirely delete 
Facebook account, the joy Facebook provides to them, 
virtual addiction, the use of Facebook as a platform to 
express opinions, and the non-existence of a better alter-
native as perceived by the respondents.
In this study, the majority of respondents were female 
(70%), and respondents ethnicity is mainly Middle East-
ern. More research is needed to examine the impact of 
culture on user concerns about Facebook with a more 
balanced gender distribution. In addition, further studies 
are needed to understand if users’ concerns about Face-
book could change over time.
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Hijab in Twitter: 
Advocates and Critics
A Content Analysis of Hijab-Related Tweets
O
ne of the disputed topics in Islamic countries is the hi-
jab, a veil that covers the head and chest, which is 
sometimes worn by some Muslim women. This study re-
ports how Twitter users regard the hijab. As part of our 
investigation we collected hijab-related tweets from be-
tween August 28 and September 3, 2015, using NodeXL. 
We programmatically detected tweet languages using 
Language Detection API and categorized contents into eleven topics. Ninety 
percent of all tweets were in Arabic, seven percent in Persian and three per-
cent in Urdu. Anti-extremism and hijab advocates were the most frequently 
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identified topics. Topics related to hijab and corre-
sponding business goals, were infrequent, and rarely 
retweeted. We also calculated the impression to iden-
tify the most influential users, such as religious lead-
ers, news agencies, and journalists.
Utility of Twitter for Investigating  
Social Phenomena
Online social media, such as the micro-blogging site 
Twitter, have become a rich source of real-time data 
representative of online human behaviors [1]. Unless 
the Twitter users mark tweets as private, tweets are 
public, providing information from a broad range of 
people on a variety of topics [2]. For example, Twitter is 
used for sharing information about healthcare, food 
consumption, social events, crisis, political views, sports, 
and culture.
Larsson and Moe [3] utilized online tools and pre-
sented a rationale for data collection and analysis of 
Twitter users, during the 2010 Swedish national elec-
tion. Veenstra et al. [4] investigated Twitter use in citizen 
journalism in the 2011 Wisconsin labor protests. In this 
study, 775 030 tweets revealed differences in mobile 
and non-mobile use. Mobile users, who may have been 
present at the protests, posted fewer URLs overall; how-
ever, when they did post URLs, they were more likely 
to link to traditional news sources and to provide addi-
tional hashtags for context. Over time, all link posting 
declined, as users became better able to convey first-
hand information.
In yet another study, collection of tweets posted from 
all local health departments (LHDs) having a Twitter 
account identified tweets related to the subject of diabe-
tes in 2012 [5]. Using content analysis, the researchers 
grouped the diabetes-related tweets into categories and 
monitored LHDs’ programs and trends. Ceron [6] used 
Twitter to predict Italian 2011 elections, French national 
2012 elections, and the subsequent French legislative 
election. While Internet users are not necessarily repre-
sentative of the whole population of a country’s citizens, 
the Ceron analysis shows a remarkable ability for social 
media to forecast electoral results. In 2014 specific 
samples from the Twitter followers of the Canadian 
Football League led to insights about what motivates 
and satisfies Twitter followers of particular professional 
sport teams [7]. Selim et al., [8] coded and analyzed 
about 5000 tweets of users from Saudi Arabia and the 
United Kingdom, to explore identity motives on Twitter. 
Their findings suggest that Saudi users appeared to 
seek the socio-psychological value of “distinctiveness,” 
whereas British users appeared to seek out “belonging.” 
In research conducted by Abbar et al. [9], the investiga-
tors examined the potential of Twitter to provide insight 
into U.S. dietary choices, by linking the tweeted dining 
experiences of 210 000 users to their interests, demo-
graphics, and social networks. Relating the caloric val-
ues of the foods mentioned in the tweets to state-wide 
obesity rates resulted in a correlation across the (fifty) 
50 continental United States including the District of 
Columbia. The authors built a model to predict county-
wide obesity and diabetes statistics, based on a combi-
nation of demographic variables and food names 
mentioned on Twitter.
Subject of Current Research
A topic of controversy in predominately Islamic coun-
tries surrounds women and the wearing of the hijab. A 
hijab is a veil that covers the head and chest that is 
worn by certain Muslim women beyond the age of 
puberty, in the presence of adult males outside of their 
immediate family, as a form of modest attire. The hijab 
can further denote any head, face, or body covering 
worn by Muslim women that similarly conforms to a cer-
tain standard of modesty [10].
The purpose of this research is to investigate the 
manner in which Twitter is employed in the context of 
issues regarding the use or wearing of hijab. In particu-
lar we endeavored to determine:
1) which segments of the population most tweet 
about matters concerning the wearing of the hijab; 2) 
categories identifying the main topics of veil-related 
tweets; 3) the degree to which Twitter users react to 
hijab commercial advertisement; 4) which groups of 
Twitter users influence the release of veil information.
Methods
The study represented was cross-sectional and descrip-
tive. We sampled messages using the network analysis 
tool NodeXL [11] to collect tweets related to the keyword 
“hijab,” symbolized by the character “ ,” which has 
identical meaning in three languages: Arabic, Persian, 
and Urdu. We used percent encoding, according to 
RFC3986 [12] to supply our search term in NodeXL, as 
it does not support unicode characters as input. This 
resulted in 10 592 tweets, from which irrelevant messag-
es were removed for a population of 6046 tweets for one 
week from August 28 to September 3, 2015. Using Lan-
guage Detection API [13], the language of all tweets was 
detected. Figure 1 illustrates different language engage-
ments compared with populations of people speaking in 
those languages in the world. Populations were extracted 
from Wikipedia [14], [15] and presented in Table 1. 
Excluding Urdu tweets, Arabic and Persian tweets were 
coded into 11 different groups. Each group implies a 
unique topic. These topics are displayed in Table 2. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates frequencies of tweets in each topic.
We identified the most influential users by calculat-
ing impressions [16], meaning the number of Twitter 
48 IEEE TEchnology and SocIETy MagazInE      ∕   J U N E  2 0 1 8
followers who potentially see 
a user’s tweet. When a user 
tweets, these tweets are added 
to the streams of users who fol-
low them, so that the tweet may 
be assumed to be seen and 
read [2]. Impressions were com-
puted per user by adding the 
results of two expressions: 1) 
The first was calculated by mul-
tiplying the number of a user fol -
lowers by the number of tweets 
he/she made; and 2) the second 
was determined by the number 
of followers who followed the 
posts of a specific user and 
retweeted by others. Combining 
topic clustering and impression 
factor, we extracted the top ten 
influential users in each topic 
group. Using different sources, such as their account on 
Twitter and other social networks, such as Facebook, 
Instagram, and the social intelligence platform, Klear 
[17], we identified the user type and classified them into 
four categories: regular users, religious leaders, news 
agencies/journalists, and special purpose users. The lat-
ter refers to accounts created for special purpose, such 
as supporting or criticizing religion.
Results
There were 5412 Arabic and 449 Persian tweets regard-
ing hijab, which means that Arabic tweets were 12 times 
as frequent as Persian tweets. Assuming the ratio of pop-
ulations in the real world, the participation of Arab users 
is found to be three times as frequent as Persian users. 
Persian users tend to retweet news, while Arab users are 
more likely to advocate hijab or anti-extremism. Most of 
the news published by Persian users concerned a law 
voted for by the judiciary-cultural commission of the par-
liament of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which makes it 
illegal for a woman to remove her hijab while driving, 
and if the woman is found in violation of the law punish-
es her by a monetary fine (Figure 3(c)).
The most frequent tweet of Arabic advocates of hijab 
was a motto that says: “Liberty neither means dropping 
hijab, nor offending religion, nor eliminating morality, it 
is promotion of thought, respecting the mind, building a 
beautiful future, and a faith to believe and be proud of 
it.” (Figure 3(a)). Most anti-extremists retweeted a strong 
objection to drawing hijab on the picture of a Syrian 
refugee mother with her child, who drowned at sea (Fig-
ure 3(b) and Figure 4).
We found that fifteen percent (15%) of Arabic tweets 
employed our search term used to determine the 
(a) (b) (c)
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Figure 1. (a) Pie graph showing proportion of Arabic, Persian, and Urdu tweets. (b) 
Proportion of real world population of people speaking in different languages. (c) Bar  
graph showing participation ratio of Arab, Persian and Urdu society.
Table 1. User engagement categorized by language.
Language
Number of 
Tweets
Real World 
Population 
(Million)
Participation 
(Per Million)
Arabic 5412 365 15
Persian 449 90 5
Urdu 185 60 3
Table 2. Topics extracted from tweets.
Topic  
Code
Topic  
Description
T1 Hijab Advocates
T2 Covering the body is more important than covering 
the head
T3 Pictures of incomplete Hijab or Hijab-less women
T4 News
T5 Polling
T6 Hijab does not necessarily mean chastity
T7 Anti-extremism
T8 Hijab Critics
T9 Humors
T10 Advertisement
T11 Porn and misuse of offensive words for advertising
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interaction with users and commercial websites. These 
tweets divided into two groups (i.e., T10 and T11). Fake 
hyperlink is a term we suggest for topics in common. Fol-
lowing the hyperlink provided in the tweet, a website will 
appear that is not related to the 
tweet. While the graph of the 
most frequent topics, T1 and T7, 
was regular, it seems complete-
ly irregular and noisy for T10 
and T11 (Figure 5). This indica-
tes tweets under topics T1 and 
T7 are retweeted or replied to 
by others, while fake hyperlinks 
rarely received engagement from 
users. In other words, marketers 
or robots reproduced fake hy -
perlinks, and then posted (not 
retweeted) these tweets, while 
useful tips are posted by a first 
person and then are retweeted 
by other users. The top ten influential hijab advocates 
were five regular users, two religious leaders, and three 
news agencies/journalists, while the top ten anti-
extremists were five regular users, four news agencies/
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Figure 2. Frequencies of different topics in Arabic and Persian tweets.
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Figure 3. Word clouds of frequent topics. (a) Arabic T1 (Hijab Advocates). (b) Arabic T7 (Anti-extremism). (c) Persian T4 (News).
Original Picture Manipulated Picture
Figure 4. Picture of the Syrian refugee mother with her child drowning in the sea.
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journalists, and one special purpose user (see Table 3). 
According to the statistical results, it became clear that 
the top ten influential users were Arabic-speaking users.
Discussion and Analysis
Hijab is referred to by various names, the most common 
of which are: veil and headscarf. Most Muslims who wear 
the covering call it a hijab ( ). Islam introduced hijab 
to ensure decency and modesty where interactions 
between members of the opposite sex occur. While 
hijab is commonly associated with women, Muslim men 
may also wear a head covering as a show of modesty. 
Critics of the Muslim veiling tradition argue that women 
do not wear the veil by choice, and that they are often 
forced to cover their heads and bodies. In contrast, 
many Muslims argue that the veil symbolizes devotion 
and piety and that veiling is their own choice. To them it 
is a question of religious identity and self-expression. To 
this day, head coverings play a significant role in many 
religions. Christian and Jewish women in some tradi-
tions wear a headscarf as a religious, or cultural prac-
tice, showing a commitment to modesty or piety. Islam 
is known as a religion concerned with community cohe-
sion and moral boundaries, and therefore hijab is a way 
of ensuring that the moral boundaries between unrelat-
ed men and women are respected. In this sense, the 
term hijab encompasses more than a scarf and more 
than a dress code. It is a term that denotes modest 
dressing and modest behavior.
This paper endeavors to provide answers regarding 
whether Twitter users are tweeting about hijab, who 
those users are, and the way such users frame their 
tweets. Although we detected the language of all tweets 
using Language Detection API, the relationships between 
spoken language and written language were found to be 
complex. The translation of written words requires sig-
nificantly different processes compared to 
the translation of spoken words. In fact, 
automated systems, such as Google Trans-
lator and other similar translators are unreli-
able translators of spoken languages. This 
was a significant consideration for choosing 
our particular collection of tweets for analy-
sis regarding the word “hijab” from Arab 
and Iranian tweeters. Additionally the key-
word used “ ” has the same meaning in 
three languages: Arabic, Persian, and Urdu.
Because the number of tweets in Urdu 
was considered too small for analysis, they 
were rejected. This resulted in 5861 tweets 
for one week, August 28 to September 3, 
2015. Obeying Islamic rules, including hijab 
Table 3. Top ten influencing users in group T1 (Hijab advocates) 
and T7 (anti-extremism).
T1 T7
User Type Frequency
Mean 
Impression Frequency
Mean 
Impression
Regular Users 5 7 928 540 5 4 770 645
Religious Leaders 2 7 881 121 0 –
News Agencies and 
Journalists
3 2 495 764 4 2 028 463
Special Purpose 0 – 1 7 254 734
Created with NodeXL (http://nodexl.codeplex.com) Created with NodeXL (http://nodexl.codeplex.com)
T1 (Blue Edges) and T7 (Red Edges) T1 and T7 (Regular) vs. T10 and T11
(Irregular Circles in Bottom Left Corner) 
Figure 5. NodeXL graph of popular topics in Arabic tweets versus unpopular frequent tweets.
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or Islamic dress code, is required in Iran. We believe 
that this is the reason for the news published by Persian 
users concerning the laws of the judiciary cultural com-
mission of the parliament of Islamic Republic of Iran 
regarding the wearing of hijab while driving. The most 
frequent tweet of Arab users regarding hijab was hijab 
advocates’ and Anti-extremists’ tweets.
We call attention to the fact that our study is con-
strained by five obvious limitations. First, we provided 
only a brief snapshot of a period of one week. Second, 
we limited our analysis to Arabic and Persian Twitter 
conversations. Third, messages were interpreted within 
the context of Twitter’s 140 character format. Fourth, a 
significant weakness regarding the word-level analysis, 
is that detecting the use of irony and sarcasm is objec-
tively impossible, as a fuller appreciation of context and 
motivation, among other factors, would be required. 
Fifth, we used the keyword “ ” in the search to cap-
ture conversations about hijab. This could potentially 
contribute to selection bias and failure to identify mes-
sages without this keyword that may have content relat-
ed to hijab.
Advancing Social Media Studies
Hijab has always been a sensitive issue. Our survey con-
firms the existence of Twitter-based conversations 
about hijab use among Arab and Persian users. Find-
ings from Twitter suggest that the number of Arab users 
were more than the number of Persian users in the use 
of Twitter regarding hijab and this is not due to the large 
population of Arabic speaking people. The most popu-
lar topics regarding hijab are hijab advocates’ and anti-
extremists’ tweets. A NodeXL graph implies that users 
rarely retweet advertisements and fake hyperlinks. 
Impression factors indicate that religious leaders, news 
agencies, and journalists are the best known influenc-
ing agents in this area.
We believe that this work can be further expanded to 
examine the outcome of tweeting or reading about 
tweets regarding the hijab. Additionally, it can be 
expanded, for example, to evaluate the effect of partici-
pating in Twitter conversations about other sensitive 
cultural and religious issues in diverse languages. Our 
hope is that our work helps advance social media stud-
ies to identify trends within groups of users, especially 
for better understanding hijab customs and practices, 
where further research might be needed.
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The Social Metaverse 
R
ecent advances in technology are 
rapidly changing the way we interact 
with the physical world around us. 
As a result, our digital footprint and 
digital breadcrumbs are tracked 
and can reveal not just our identity 
but also our location, age, shopping 
preferences, friends, favorite movies, and much more. 
In the worst case, such tracking may lead to hostile en-
tities coming to know your highly sensitive information 
such as credit card numbers, social security identity 
numbers, mother’s maiden name, medical history, 
bank account information, and so on. Social engineer-
ing [1] is one of several related ways that this data be-
comes jeopardized. Furthermore, Internet-connected 
cameras allow consumers, companies, and govern-
ment agencies to record animate and inanimate objects 
in a specific geographic area. Such recordings may be 
stored in cloud-based storage farms, viewed by hu-
mans, or analyzed by machines for various purposes. 
The information can be gathered and interpreted in mul-
tiple ways, such as by surveillance cameras, and can in-
clude activity and location inference as well as aggrega-
tion and pattern detection.
By and large, we are surveilled and sensed in many 
aspects of life. This includes: at home (e.g., smart grid 
energy monitors, ISP/Wi-Fi), while commuting (e.g., EZ-
Pass, Google Traffic/Maps, fitness devices), in public 
spaces (e.g., public safety cameras and sensors, store-
front cameras, webcams, etc.), and at work (company 
firewalls, corporate email, and Internet usage monitor-
ing). In many cases, we are not even aware that such 
recordings and analyses take place and, hence, our pri-
vacy may be in jeopardy in ways we do not anticipate. 
Battle for Privacy
ju
n
g
in
21
9/
iS
TO
C
K
53J U N E  2 0 1 8    ∕      IEEE TEchnology and SocIETy MagazInE
Here we distinguish several types of privacy (derived 
from [2]), including:
 ■ Privacy of personal info: Any information that 
reveals something about physical, medical, physio-
logical, economic, cultural, or social status.
 ■ Privacy of behavior: Any information about habits, 
activities, choices, etc.
 ■ Privacy of communications: Any data and metadata 
relating to personal communications.
Note that sometimes we accept a loss of privacy in 
exchange for security (in the case of security surveil-
lance) or in exchange for useful customization (e.g., 
personalized advertisements). We also, sometimes unwit-
tingly, freely offer up much of our personal informa-
tion. For example, our mobile GPS location and device 
characteristics may be shared ubiquitously, and our 
social media posts may have a surprising reach (e.g., 
150 000+ “friends of friends” [3]). Nowadays, as virtual 
reality (VR) applications increase in popularity and fidelity 
they also threaten to erode our privacy in new ways rang-
ing from knowing how we physically move around to the 
patterns of our neural activities [4].
In this article we focus on technology underpinnings 
that will help VR participants increase the degree of pri-
vacy while immersed in social VR, and builds on our 
past research in privacy and gaming analytics [14], 
[15]. Though coined quite some time ago, we use the 
term metaverse with the same semantics as in Wikipe-
dia [16]: “a collective virtual shared space, created by 
the convergence of virtually enhanced physical reality 
and physically persistent virtual space, including the 
sum of all virtual worlds, augmented reality, and the 
Internet.” We use the term social metaverse to describe 
the above sorts of virtual realities in which a central 
purpose is socialization and interaction with other ava-
tars — including both players and non-player characters 
(NPC’s). Examples of software systems considered 
social metaverses today include: Facebook Spaces, 
AltspaceVR, Sansar, High Fidelity, and many more. 
While the social metaverse may or may not include 
capabilities such as gamification, realistic physics, real-
istic 3D models, user-created content, or in-game econ-
omies, it is the complexity and nuance created by the 
presence of other avatars (human or not) that most 
motivates our work.
Let us define the term “avatar” (or “agent”) as a visible 
character within the social metaverse, constrained by the 
rules of the metaverse. We’ll also use the term “user” (or 
“player”) to connote a human who operates one or more 
avatars. Notably, the social metaverse:
 ■ Is implemented by an engine that provides the com-
putational basis (“rules of the game”) for all aspects 
of the world including physics, appearance, com-
munication, synchronization, etc. The engine is in 
sole control of the consistency and durability of 
the metaverse.
 ■ Hosts avatars who cannot hide from the engine 
itself (if the engine attempts to surveil or analyze 
avatar activities, it may do so) nor can they perform 
actions not offered via metaverse API’s.
 ■ Is sometimes editable in the sense that avatars 
can affect the virtual world (e.g., create or des -
troy objects).
What is also true about the social metaverse is that, 
just like in the real world, those avatars who most skill-
fully use the capabilities of the world in the best way 
possible may experience a competitive or social advan-
tage over others. We do not consider this to be a nefar-
ious “gaming of the system” but simply using it better. 
Avatars, for example, may leverage a metaverse appli-
cation program interface (API) and perform their own 
sort of surveillance and there is no guarantee that their 
actions or intents are ethically sound. For example, in-
metaverse stalking is a dubious — but often allow-
able — kind of interaction with these worlds.1 The 
metaverse will surely be underpinned by data analytics 
(DA) software components and combined with big data 
analytics and machine learning in order to provide the 
developer with insights into how users employ their 
services [4].
The stage, in our opinion, is therefore set for a battle 
for privacy within the social metaverse. While it may 
seem at present that little is at stake, one should note 
that it is possible that a good deal of our future lives 
may play out within these metaverses, including per-
forming productive, meaningful work, exchanging 
important ideas, and using valuable digital currencies.
Motivation and Current Landscape
We have described how the stage is presently set for a 
privacy battle. This section provides more detail and 
some examples to corroborate this view. We also survey 
some of the academic work in this realm.
In the virtual reality metaverses seen in Hollywood 
movies — e.g., “The Matrix” and “Ready Player One” — 
participants often experience a level of fidelity indistin-
guishable from the real world [5]. The antagonists in 
these movies (but sometimes also the protagonists) 
often have special powers gained from their uniqueness 
or some sneaky shortcut. While the hacking of meta-
verse software underpinnings is an interesting field of 
1There are increasing examples of inappropriate user behavior negatively 
affecting service offerings. Toxic players may insult others or threaten to 
“throw” the game or deliberately ruin other gamers’ experiences in cre-
ative ways. In one example, toxic player behavior in the game Overwatch 
has delayed new levels and triggered serious re-thinking of processes for 
user management. (See: [17].) Other major entities in this space are both 
recognizing and starting to address toxicity-related issues. These include: 
Facebook [18], Steam [19], Google [20], and Rockstar Games [21].
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its own [6], we neither consider it further here, nor 
require the presence of malignant insiders in order to 
justify this work. Current problems with identity theft, 
harassment, and more, within Massively Multiplayer 
Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPG’s) further justifies 
our research. Related work on the causes and nature of 
in-game harassment (known as “griefing” in the realm 
of video games) indicates that social dominance orien-
tation (a personality trait characterized by preference of 
hierarchical groups) is a strong predictor of online sexu-
al harassment [7] and that lower-skilled male players are 
more likely to harass female players [8].
In 2014, the hashtag #gamergate mobilized a vast 
gamer campaign of ultimately criminal harassment 
(including threats of violence and rape) targeted at sev-
eral women in the gaming industry. Within the game 
Second Life — an open world social metaverse — abuse 
and harassment were significant enough to warrant 
harassment “primers” by Linden Labs. One such primer 
offered the following advice: “If someone (or something) 
is pushing you or physically assaulting you inworld, sit 
down! Sitting prevents most physical forces from affect-
ing your avatar” [9].
Another type of clear and present threat is that of 
social engineering hacking, a form of trickery that relies 
on human (victim) interactions that create a sense of 
urgency, fear, or other emotions, that lead to the individ-
ual revealing (unwittingly or not) something of value [1]. 
Avatars controlled by nefarious human users can easily 
engage in deceptive and unethical practices such as 
impersonation, white lies, and manipulation. For exam-
ple, through observation over time an individual could 
impersonate a player’s friend to obtain secret or private 
information. Such players might be annoying and, in the 
worst case, could jeopardize both player privacy and 
the pleasure of interacting with the metaverse.
Finally, while the present rapid advances of machine 
learning (ML) in various sectors — such as art, humani-
ties, advertising, and chatbots — is paying dividends, 
there is also a potential darker side. Software-driven ava-
tars — armed with ever-growing training data sets — can 
employ machine learning to nudge human avatars in 
ways that would best serve their purposes. When com-
bined with social engineering this becomes a threat to 
privacy. For example, using in-game observations and 
logging, an ML-backed agent could come to know what 
your tendencies are, what kind of personality you have 
(such as impulsive, introverted, etc.), and what kinds of 
social interactions form the best “nudges” to create par-
ticular outcomes [10]. Furthermore, it will eventually be 
nearly impossible to differentiate between exclusively 
software-driven (e.g., chatbots, gamebots) and human-
driven avatars. Indeed, detecting gamebots using analyt-
ic techniques is an active research field [11], [12].
Privacy Mechanisms in the Metaverse
Before describing some of our approaches to privacy we 
note that in the social metaverse all avatars must “play 
by the rules.” What does this mean? Both the metaverse 
and the avatars are software, but the latter cannot exist 
without the former and the actual implementation 
underpinnings of the metaverse are accessible to ava-
tars only through controlled means. An example of an 
access method into the underpinnings of the metaverse 
might be an API that allows an avatar to ask the meta-
verse for a list of other avatars presently within 100 dis-
tance units. In response the metaverse might return a 
list of avatars along with descriptive metadata such as 
skillset, interests, hometown, etc. Suppose that a direct 
API for listing nearby avatars was not available. It may 
still be possible for avatars to build up a similar capabil-
ity through more primitive capabilities. For example, 
one capability might invoke a “snapshot” feature (to 
capture a rasterized image of the current scene from 
the avatar’s point of view), and then call yet another 
module that picks out and enumerates the avatars in 
snapshots. Table 1 provides a summary.
We envision a new layer of controls that help tighten 
privacy in a metaverse where all avatars are essentially 
empowered by the same capabilities and act within the 
“rules of the game.” Even with this assumption, howev-
er, significantly unethical, bothersome, and threaten-
ing behaviors might nonetheless still emerge. Consider 
that another avatar may: a) watch or follow you inces-
santly, b) monitor you from a distance, or c) harass you 
with its presence or utterances. The next sections 
address our approaches to mitigate these types of 
undesirable interactions.
Mechanisms
In this section we describe the mechanisms we believe 
will be useful in the battle for privacy. We view these as 
fundamental examples of tactics that will help improve 
privacy, but we recognize that other examples exist. 
These mechanisms are implemented in software and 
can exploit the primitives offered by the metaverse 
which we assume will include primitives that help enact 
movement, inventory, observation, and analysis of the 
metaverse. The broad goal of these mechanisms is to 
help ensure privacy while not utterly destroying the ben-
efits of being in the metaverse. For example, while play-
ers could avert all threats to privacy by simply not 
entering a particular metaverse, this solution is too 
extreme to meet our requirements. The mechanisms 
should generally not come at the expense of participa-
tion in the metaverse or at the expense of interactions 
with other agents, objects, virtual storefronts, etc. To 
these ends, we define two important notions: privacy 
plans and confusion:
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 ■ Privacy Plan: A particular set of steps, initiated by 
an avatar, that enacts changes in the social meta-
verse such that the avatar has less risk of privacy 
intrusion when the plan is enacted. A plan can be 
thought of as a sort of program, written over the 
allowable metaverse API, that is carried out over a 
period of time.
 ■ Confusion: Creating a confusing effect in nearby 
agents can be an essential part of an avatar’s priva-
cy plan. Whether or not nearby agents are human or 
non-player characters, a confusion tactic is intended 
to reduce the fidelity of these agents’ knowledge of 
the avatar’s activity, current or future position, pos-
sessions, interests, beliefs, and so on.
Note that in large social metaverses — as in MMOR-
PG’s — there is already a level of “cognitive load” intro-
duced by the mere presence of other characters and 
such loads can ultimately diminish enjoyment of the 
experience [13]. Our work focuses on the more tangible 
and aggressive forms of privacy intrusions such as 
harassment and observation. The remainder of this sec-
tion outlines privacy plans we have designed to help 
maintain privacy within the metaverse. Note that these 
are logical plans, not tied to any particular metaverse 
platform or specific app.
Plan A — Confusion — Creating a Cloud of Clones
In time, a complex metaverse will provide users with 
compelling reasons to want to confuse other avatars in 
their observable region. While interacting with other 
avatars will remain a principle pleasure (and main rai-
son d’etre) of any social metaverse, it is likely that at 
times the sheer annoyance caused by some avatars 
(e.g., malicious strangers or bots), the sheer number of 
observing avatars, and the possibility of harassment or 
stalking (when another avatar simply follows you every-
where, essentially recording your experience) will make 
confusionary tactics attractive. One scenario warranting 
scrutiny is as follows: You are in a part of a metaverse 
that resembles a shopping mall in which many virtual 
(and real) products can be purchased at a multitude of 
storefronts. While each store may record your transac-
tions, you may desire to obscure your movements from 
store-to-store from other avatars who you do not know 
nor trust. Why? For the same reason that an individual 
would not like to be followed shoulder-to-shoulder in a 
real mall while buying personal items, groceries, and 
books. Shopping habits can be highly predictive of 
other personal behaviors. In the metaverse it will be 
even easier to be observed by an annoying or malicious 
agent. Others can steer their avatars near yours, they 
see the view of the world that you do, and by following 
along with your avatar, observing and recording your 
avatars’ interactions with others, store visits, and all 
other interactions that are observable, a detailed set of 
data about your habits can (in theory) be created. In 
another simpler scenario, you may simply be “hanging 
out” in the metaverse nearby a home you have created 
for yourself consisting of a building, a yard, and a lake. 
Here you may simply like to remain free from observa-
tion by peers while you stroll between the parts of your 
property — a reasonable desire indeed.
We refer to one of our privacy plan classes as the 
“cloud of clones” plan. This plan’s purpose is to bathe 
the environment with confusion in order to obfuscate 
user location, activities, beliefs, desires, and/or inten-
tions. In this plan the system creates one or more avatar 
“clones” which have the same or similar appearance to 
that of the user’s avatar. The clones may move about 
Table 1. aspects and responsibilities in the metaverse.
Aspect Metaverse fabric Avatars/players
Observation Can observe and/or log any and all events within the 
metaverse.
Cannot hide from observation by the fabric of the 
metaverse. Can hide or obfuscate activity from other 
avatars in various ways.
Control Controls all aspects of the metaverse including the 
application program interfaces that enable access to 
fundamental metaverse services. 
Cannot perform activities disallowed by the fabric of the 
metaverse. Can potentially create surprising capabilities by 
“programming” them from primitive metaverse capabilities.
Ethics Can put rules in place that help ensure ethical avatar 
behavior but cannot prevent all such behavior without 
reducing overall quality of experience. 
As in the real-world metaverse credibility and reputation 
is tied to behavior but avatars are still free to behave in an 
ethically dubious fashion.
It is necessary to ensure privacy 
without destroying the benefits 
of being in a metaverse. 
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autonomously so that observers get confused and may 
not be able to tell which avatar is under the control of 
the actual human user. When clones are initiated the 
user may specify which behaviors are preferred for 
which subset of clones using command semantics such 
as: a) “assign all clones a behavior that has high ran-
domness and high interaction levels,” b) “assign half of 
the clones the behavior named ‘walk around a house’ 
and the other half of the clones the behavior named 
‘walk in circles.’” Behaviors may have additional config-
urable characteristics (e.g., the circles to be traced out 
might be 5 meters or 10 meters in diameter and/or 
might be centered on a specific location or on a speci-
fied object) and require specification of metadata such 
as: number of clones to spawn, duration of plan, spatial 
configuration, and more. Typically, a clone might closely 
resemble the user’s avatar, but in principle, variants on 
clone rendition might include those that vary visually 
(and randomly) from each other (e.g., all wearing differ-
ent colored virtual shirts or hairstyles). Each clone 
implements its behavior by performing in the meta-
verse, after which the plan terminates.
Figure 1 illustrates this paradigm in simplified form. 
Figure 1 (top panel) shows a stylized view of the meta-
verse in which our hero (avatar B) is near her virtual 
home. Two other avatars are very near to B, but B would 
like increased privacy from them. In Figure 1 (middle 
panel) B chooses, configures and launches the “cloud of 
clones” privacy plan. In Figure 1 (bottom panel) the plan 
executes, during which time the real B avatar eludes 
detection from A and C.
From an in-metaverse observer point of view (say 
Avatar A or C in Figure 1) the sudden emergence of a 
group of nearly identical avatars to the user (B in the fig-
ure) will create confusion. Importantly, the group con-
tains the user B whose intent is to carry on with her 
actions without harassment.
It is desired that the sudden appearance and subse-
quent dispersal of these clones will cause any observers 
to lose track of the original “copy.” During this time 
observers may be doing their best to track and analyze 
the behavior of B, but they would be forced to track all 
clones of B as well. To this end, the collective behavior 
of B and its clones is not as interesting when averaged 
out and it cannot be clear which behavior really typifies 
B’s desires.
There are potential limitations to this approach which 
we continue to explore. For example, we presume that 
other nearby avatars cannot create a defense so as to 
disallow the creation of new clones, or that other ava-
tars cannot (easily) use a method of locking in on a 
particular avatar (the original B) and tracking it pro-
grammatically. This latter possibility could undermine 
the sudden attempt at partial anonymity. To succeed 
over in-metaverse observers who may be identifying and 
tracking Avatar B in their viewports (the view of the 
metaverse seen from their avatar) the user might tempo-
rarily escape into an area in which observers cannot see 
him (e.g., a building or room) and execute the “clone” 
plan from there. So long as the observer does not gain 
visual access again before the clones are created the 
plan should be able to provide anonymity as desired. We 
note here that whether or not another agent could iden-
tify a clone by detecting pseudo-random behavior is an 
open issue. Finally, creating huge numbers of clones has 
effects on both performance and deployment that we do 
not pursue further here.
Plan B — “Private Copy”
While the previous section proposes techniques to con-
fuse surveilling avatars or bots, an alternative provides 
the user with a truly private space where surveillance 
cannot occur. In the current section, we discuss a class 
of privacy preserving plans which we call “Private 
Copy.” In these plans, the user is able to request that a 
private copy of some part of the virtual world be creat-
ed for the temporary exclusive use of that user. The cor-
responding portion of the metaverse in the main fabric 
continues to exist in parallel and other users and ava-
tars may continue to use the main fabric portion 
un affected by the actions of the user in the temporary 
Private Copy. For example, consider a user who desires 
a private virtual shopping experience. The user may 
request a Private Copy of a virtual store or even a por-
tion of a virtual store (e.g., a particular department). For 
example, the store or department may sell personal 
items for which the user does not want to be observed 
A B C
A B C
A B C
Figure 1. A privacy plan (involving clones) playing out over 
time.
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shopping (e.g., virtual underwear, companionship ser-
vices, etc.).
The metaverse will support an API from which the 
aforementioned user may create her space. A user inter-
face supported by the metaverse will allow a user to 
request that the store or the department within the 
store be produced as a Private Copy. The Private Copy 
may either be created using resources on one of the 
metaverse provider’s servers or in the user’s client 
device. A “Private Copy” indicator should be visible to 
remind the user that the current experience is taking 
place in a private copy rather than in the full or other-
wise more widely accessible virtual world. Once these 
steps are taken, the user may shop in the Private Copy 
of the store without worrying that other avatars or bots 
are observing. Back in the metaverse, from which the 
user originally triggered the Private Copy, the user’s ava-
tar might temporarily vanish, or a stand-in “clone” (see 
previous section) could mark the avatar’s continued 
presence. The user interacts with the Private Copy for 
some amount of time, and then exits the Private Copy 
in order to return to the main fabric of the Virtual World. 
Figure 2 illustrates the main aspects.
Modifications to the virtual world itself may or may 
not be carried over from the user’s interaction with the 
Private Copy. For example, the policy for a virtual world 
store may not allow avatars to make lasting changes to 
the environment in the store, and in this case the store 
environment always has the same appearance, accord-
ing to the store provider’s design. In this case, any envi-
ronmental modification or interaction by the user within 
the Private Copy of the store would be necessarily dis-
carded when the user exits the Private Copy. However, 
in some scenarios it may be useful to preserve modifi-
cations resulting from user interaction within the private 
copy. For example, suppose the user requests a Private 
Copy of a park within the virtual world, and then the 
user builds a gazebo in the center of the Private Copy of 
the park. The user enjoys the gazebo privately for some 
time, but then chooses to exit the Private Copy and 
return to the main fabric of the virtual world. At this 
point the system would assess the modifications the 
user made to the Private Copy, and would prompt the 
user to decide whether these changes should be dis-
carded or preserved. If the user chooses to discard the 
changes then the Private Copy resources are freed and 
the user is returned to the (still gazebo-less) park in the 
main fabric of the virtual world. If the user chooses to 
preserve the changes then the system “merges” the 
changes into the main fabric, and thus the gazebo from 
the Private Copy may be added to the main fabric ver-
sion of the park in the virtual world before the Private 
Copy resources are freed. In this case, the user and 
indeed any other avatar or bot will be able to see and to 
interact with the gazebo when present in the park. The 
gazebo would also be present in any future Private Cop-
ies spawned from the park by any user.
The nuances of merging changes from a user’s Private 
Copy into the main fabric may depend on whether other 
avatars were present in the corresponding main fabric 
portion of the virtual world during the Private Copy ses-
sion, and whether those avatars interacted with, modi-
fied, or observed that portion. In particular, it is possible 
for a modification made in a user’s Private Copy to 
Request
• User Requests Private
 Copy (PC) of a Particular
 Part of the Metaverse 
Create
• If the Resources Are Not
 Available the Request Is
 Denied. 
• Otherwise, the
 Metaverse Creates the
 Necessary Resources 
Interact
• User Avatar Is Placed
 Within the PC 
• User Interacts with the
 Environment and
 Objects in the PC
Exit
• User Leaves the PC
• Metaverse Manages
 (e.g., Merges, Ignores,
 etc.) Changes 
Figure 2. The flow of steps for a Private Copy.
Privacy mechanisms that do not 
preserve the continuity of the 
metaverse will not be acceptable 
to the users they intend to protect.
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conflict with a modification which a different user made 
to the main fabric copy of the same portion of the virtual 
world. For example, a user enters a virtual kitchen room 
in which a knife is present on a counter. The user 
requests a Private Copy of the virtual kitchen, and while 
using the private copy the user picks up the knife and 
puts it into a drawer. Meanwhile in the main fabric ver-
sion of the virtual kitchen, a different user picks up the 
same knife and adds it to his item inventory. When the 
first user exits the Private Copy of the virtual kitchen, 
suppose the first user requests his modifications to the 
virtual kitchen be preserved. In this case, the location of 
the knife must be resolved – is the knife in the drawer, or 
is it absent from the kitchen (removed to the item inven-
tory of the second user?) In this case, it seems best to 
discard the first user’s modification (as it was only wit-
nessed by the first user in the Private Copy), and instead 
maintain the second user’s modification. This is because 
the second user would be disturbed if the knife were to 
“disappear” from his item inventory, and also because 
additional avatars who observed the kitchen counter in 
the main fabric would have seen the knife removed by 
the first user. A change in the Private Copy will typically 
not have as many witnesses as the corresponding con-
flicting change in the main fabric. We have examined sev-
eral ways in which conflicts can be resolved. For example 
(and not unlike the paradigms of software version con-
trol), the system may: a) adopt all changes from the copy 
into the main world, b) selectively merge changes from 
the copy into the main world, or c) preserve and merge 
changes from the copy only when they do not conflict 
with corresponding changes made in the main world.
A “Private Copy” plan thus gives the user absolute 
privacy for a limited time in a limited space of the 
user’s choosing. While the user is immersed in the pri-
vate copy, the system fabric guarantees that no other 
avatars or bots will observe the user’s behavior. Of 
course, if the user chooses to merge private copy 
changes to the main fabric, it may be possible for an 
observer to later observe those changes and to deduce 
some part of the user’s behavior. However, if the user 
discards changes made to the private copy, then no 
observable traces will be present in the main fabric, 
and the user’s privacy will be fully maintained. In sum-
mary, we note that spinning up private copies of parts 
of the metaverse for small groups of avatars poses 
some IT-related issues such as scale and deployment, 
which are not detailed further here.
Toward a Framework of Privacy Plans
Once the system is capable of providing the user with a 
variety of privacy plans, it then makes sense to think of 
this set of plans as a privacy framework to be presented 
to the user in a controlled way. For example, the avail-
able privacy plans may be organized into a “Privacy 
Options Menu” that allows easy access to the various 
tools. Table 2 summarizes (in high level detail) several 
proposed privacy plan fundamentals that we have 
Table 2. Various privacy plans.
Name Summary 
Clones The fabric creates a “crowd” of new avatar clones, each identical in appearance to the user’s avatar, in such a  
way as observers are confused and may lose track of the user’s avatar. 
Private Copy Allows at least a portion of the VR world to be spawned as a “Private Copy” which the user exclusively inhabits 
and interacts with, unobserved by others.
Mannequin The fabric replaces the user’s avatar with a single clone of the user which exhibits believable behavior, while the 
user’s true avatar is transported to another place. A mannequin is a type of clone that typically stands-in for a 
user’s avatar whilst the user’s attention is elsewhere.
Lockout Allows a part of the VR world to be ‘walled off’ temporarily for private use; other avatars are temporarily locked 
out and prohibited from entering. For example, a room in a building may be subject to lockout so that a user has 
private use for some time. When the Lockout expires restrictions are lifted and other users are again allowed to 
enter the area and interact with this part of the VR world.
Disguise Allows the avatar to stay in the local area but in a new (e.g. disguised) form. The disguised appearance may be ran-
domly generated by the fabric, or the user may employ an avatar appearance editor to create one or more disguised 
forms for use with this plan. Observers do not easily notice the transformation and therefore become confused.
Teleport The user’s avatar is transported (e.g. instantly) to a new location in the virtual world. The destination may be 
selected by the user, e.g. from a list of destinations or by using a “map” interface.
invisibility The user’s avatar takes an invisible form so that avatars and/or bots cannot detect the presence or actions of  
the user.
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described in previous sections (or variants thereof). 
Though we lack the space to illustrate it, we believe that 
each of these fundamentals admits to a relatively sim-
ple algorithmic plan whose implementation would be 
useful to privacy-seeking avatars. Figure 3(a) shows the 
user’s view of a local area of a virtual world. The privacy 
options menu is available through the user interface – in 
this example a sunglasses “button” appears in the 
upper right hand corner of the user’s view. If the user 
selects this button, the menu of available privacy plans 
is displayed, as shown in Figure 3(b). The user then 
selects a plan, for example the ‘Disguise’ plan. In res -
ponse, the system allows the user to choose the form of 
the disguise, as illustrated in Figure 3(c). Once the user 
has configured the disguise, then the user’s avatar 
takes on the new disguised appearance, and in subse-
quent virtual world interactions the user’s privacy will 
be preserved.
Once multiple privacy preserving tools are organized 
into a framework, it becomes possible to enable richer 
interaction with the available tools. For example, the 
framework may allow the user to select and execute 
multiple privacy plans together in useful ways. Here are 
some examples where a combination of privacy plans 
may provide increasing benefits over a single plan:
1) A user chooses to combine Disguise or Invisibility 
with Teleport such that the user’s avatar vanishes 
from its original location and appears at a second 
location chosen by the user, but at the second loca-
tion the avatar appears disguised or invisible (as pre-
viously chosen by the user). In this way, any avatars 
or bots observing the user at the original location will 
lose track of the user when teleport is engaged, and 
any users or bots at the second location will not “see” 
the user’s true appearance and thus will not be able 
to identify the user’s avatar at the second location.
2) A user chooses to combine the Clones plan with 
Invisibility such that when the additional cloned 
copies of the user’s avatar appear, the user’s true avatar 
simultaneously becomes invisible. Any avatars or 
bots observing the user before this combination of 
plans is executed will not only be confused by the 
appearance of multiple clones of the user, but will be 
guaranteed to lose track of the user’s true avatar due 
to the invisibility effect.
3) A user chooses to combine Private Copy with Tele-
port so that the private copy of a part of the virtual 
world selected by the user is created, and the user is 
then teleported into that private copy. The portion of 
the virtual world selected for Private Copy may be 
quite distant from the user’s starting location in the 
virtual world, for example the user may select this 
portion using a map-like interface, or perhaps select 
it from a list of identifiable locations from a menu. In 
this way, surveilling avatars or bots will merely see 
the user disappear for a time, and they will not see 
the user entering or approaching the location on 
which the private copy will be based.
Figure 4 illustrates a user interface for selection of 
multiple privacy plans in combination. In this example, 
the user begins in a park area of the virtual world, as 
shown in Figure 4(a). The user feels like gambling at a 
casino across town, but does not want to be seen at the 
casino. The user selects the privacy options menu as in 
the previous example, however now the menu allows 
the user to make multiple selections. In this case, the 
user selects both Teleport and Private Copy. Once the 
selection is made, the system allows the user to config-
ure the selected privacy plans. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 4(b) the system may display a map interface and 
may ask the user to select the part of the virtual world 
on which the private copy is based. The user selects the 
casino from the map interface. With configuration com-
plete, the system spawns a private copy of the casino 
and teleports the user into the private copy. The user’s 
new view is illustrated in Figure 4(c). Note that some 
visual indication is given in the user’s view to remind 
the user that he is no longer interacting with the full vir-
tual world, but rather is within a private copy of the casi-
no. The user enjoys gambling at the casino for a time, 
Select Invisible
Mannequin
> Disquise <
Lockout
[Cancel]
Disquise — Choose Form:
Roger Bob Random
?
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3. (a)–(c) A user selects one of multiple available privacy plans from a privacy options menu.
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and then chooses to exit back to the main virtual world. 
As illustrated in Figure 4(d), the system offers to discard 
or preserve changes that the user made to the private 
copy of the casino.
An additional benefit of having a framework of priva-
cy plans is that the system may assist the user in the use 
of the available privacy plans. While it is nice to have a 
rich menu of tools for enhancing privacy, these tools 
won’t have much value if the user doesn’t realize when 
or how the tools should be used. For this reason, the sys-
tem monitors the virtual world to detect situations in 
which a given user’s privacy 
may be in jeopardy, and in this 
case the system alerts the user 
and suggests usage of the 
tools. How can a system detect 
when a user’s privacy is in dan-
ger? Certain user-independent 
event patterns may come into 
play, for example the system 
might recognize that the user is 
within view of a crowd of ava-
tars or bots, even if the user 
does not notice or cannot see 
these observers.
The context of user interac-
tion is another source of infor-
mation that can be used to 
detect when privacy is in jeop-
ardy. For example, the system 
may detect that the user is 
about to begin a privacy-sensi-
tive interaction with the virtual 
world. The user might be enter-
ing a virtual bank, for example, 
or may be starting to shop for 
sensitive items like lingerie at 
which point the system could 
recognize this pattern and sug-
gest the usage of a privacy plan. 
This recommendation may be 
based on the location or type of 
interaction the user is engaged 
in, as well as the relative prox-
imity of other avatars or bots. 
The recommendation could 
also take into account how the 
user has invoked the privacy 
tools in the past. For example, if 
the user has regularly used the 
Lockout Plan in the past, the 
system recommends Lockout 
when it is viable; but if such a 
plan is determined to be not 
viable due to local observers already in the space, then 
the system recommends using a Private Copy Plan.
Deployment
This article has focused on the logical development of pri-
vacy plans. To provide real world context, this section pro-
vides a high level view of a deployment scheme compatible 
with the needs of privacy plans in social (VR) metaverses. 
Figure 5 illustrates that playable metaverses will be served 
from servers over the Internet. Users (embodied as avatars 
in the metaverse) connect from their devices and make use 
[ ] Clones
[ ] Invisible
[X] Teleport
[ ] Lockout
[X] Private Copy
Done
Teleport to Private Copy —
Choose Dest:
Welcome to
Center View Casino
Welcome to
Center View CasinoPrivateCopy
Exit
Returnuing to Main Virtual World –
Discard Private Copy, or
Merge Changes?
Discard Merge
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4. (a)–(d) User selects multiple privacy plans for use in combination.
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Figure 5. IT deployment in context.
61J U N E  2 0 1 8    ∕      IEEE TEchnology and SocIETy MagazInE
of the metaverse engine and the metaverse instance (e.g., 
M1, M2, …) to become a part of the world. Privacy plan 
capabilities, such as the ability to: launch and control a 
plan, monitor a plan, persist a plan, and determine effec-
tiveness of a plan, are functionally coded in a game object 
called Privacy Manager (PM). Such logic is loaded with the 
metaverse and is present in the engine on the server and 
on the clients. For example, if Unity3D is the basis for the 
metaverse, then the PM is a function that may be invoked 
in the scene, available through an API. In Unity each part of 
a metaverse is referred to as a scene, and scenes contain 
instances of game objects such as player and non-player 
avatars as well as scenery such as structures and lighting. 
The implementation of Privacy Plans is compatible with 
Unity’s functional architecture.
Managing User Privacy
This article focuses on approaches and underpinnings 
that will help participants manage user-privacy while 
immersed in virtual reality worlds. A solution is needed 
because the social metaverse features a) large numbers 
of avatars, b) “open” capabilities for moving, acting, and 
interacting, and c) a wide and anonymous user base. 
These characteristics may align to enable nefarious 
within-metaverse tracking and surveilling. This, in turn, 
is likely to be annoying and even dangerous as it may 
compromise user privacy and personal information.
Our system provides various tools and techniques by 
which a VR user may preserve privacy and prevent such 
surveillance by others. The system may, for example:
 ■ Provide a means for a VR user to confuse observers 
with noise and deceptive data.
 ■ Allow the user to become “invisible” to other users 
for some period of time.
 ■ Allow a user to inhabit a private copy of some part 
of the virtual world, so that the user may interact 
with the private copy unseen by others
These techniques will not be perfect but learning how 
to measure their efficacy is important. There are many 
other challenges for successfully deploying such tools, 
and our next steps are to study these in further detail. We 
feel that privacy mechanisms that do not preserve the 
continuity of the metaverse will not likely be acceptable 
to the users they intend to protect. Therefore, many of 
the challenges ahead lay at the intersection of algorithms 
and user experience. The battle has only just begun.
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Hilary Brown
Keeping the  
Lights On
A Comparison of Normal 
Accidents and High Reliability 
Organizations
L
arge technological systems have many 
modes of failure — some mundane, 
others exotic, some with dire consequ­
ences. Failures resulting in death and 
environmental degradation spring ea­
sily to mind: Chernobyl, Bhopal, Deep­
water Horizon. As a large technological 
system, the U.S. electric power infrastructure experi­
enced failures during major Northeast blackouts in 
1965 and 2003, when large areas were left without 
power, and the system frequently experiences both 
large and small blackouts. How should we conceptual­
ize failure in complex technological systems like elec­
tric power?
To answer this question, two frameworks have been 
proposed: normal accidents and high reliability orga­
nizations (HROs). The normal accident framework 
argues that accidents are endemic to complex techno­
logical systems, from analyses combining technolo­
gical, social, and political concerns. Based on in­depth 
organizational studies, the HRO framework concludes 
that certain organizations cope with complex techno­
logical systems in ways that make failure less likely. 
Both frameworks emphasize complexity and technical 
interactions. Both examine how operators, managers, 
and the organizational structures interact with one 
another and with technological systems. Yet, they 
arrive at very different (though not mutually exclusive) 
conclusions: accidents will happen or accidents can 
be avoided.
Power systems engineers and managers strive to 
“keep the lights on” with technological fixes, market 
adjustments, and extreme work schedules to restore 
power quickly. However, with a few exceptions, the 
power systems literature has paid little attention to the 
frameworks of normal accidents or HROs. As a complex 
technological system comprising many organizations 
and vast amounts of equipment, the field of electric 
power could benefit from attention to both perspec­
tives. First, I will examine the two frameworks individu­
ally and compare them, emphasizing any work from the 
literature of these fields using electric power examples 
or case studies. Then, I will look for evidence that either 
framework has been discussed from an engineering 
perspective in the power systems literature. Finally, I 
will postulate ways in which consideration of these 
frameworks would benefit the field of power systems.
Normal Accidents 
and High Reliability Organizations
First of all, what is a normal accident? It is an accident 
that is neither common nor expected, resulting from 
unforeseen interactions among system elements and 
proceeding in an incomprehensible way. The term came 
into wide use with Perrow’s work, Normal Accidents, 
which classified technological systems according to two 
qualities: coupling and complexity [1]. A system is either 
tightly coupled or loosely coupled, depending on how 
interdependent and time­sensitive different parts of the 
system are with respect to one another [1]. According to 
Perrow’s definition, the power grid is tightly coupled 
because electricity must be consumed and produced at 
the same time — it can rarely be cost­effectively stored. 
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The coupling of the power grid is loosened by the substi­
tutability of generation: during times of low demand, the 
electricity generated from hydropower or from coal is 
equivalent. Interactions in a technological system may 
be either linear and therefore more easily comprehensi­
ble and predictable, or nonlinear and complex, in which 
seemingly disconnected parts of the system affect one 
another [1]. Abrupt changes in generation and load in 
one part of the power system affect the frequency of the 
whole system — a disturbance in Atlanta, GA, could 
appear in frequency measurements in Albany, NY. Nor­
mal accidents occur in tightly­coupled systems with 
complex interactions.
Perrow studied nuclear power plants, chemical pro­
cessing facilities, and air traffic control to characterize 
normal accidents [1]. After examining accident reports 
blaming “operator error,” Perrow cautions that “human 
error” is a convenient catch­all for inexplicable acci­
dents and using such phrases may indicate a normal 
accident has occurred [1]. After failures, it is natural to 
fall back on the common engineering technique of add­
ing redundancy to ensure reliability. However, Perrow 
argues that this adds to interactive complexity and 
actually exacerbates the potential for normal accidents 
[1]. He also notes that despite a veneer of safety­con­
sciousness by companies, production pressures usually 
supersede safety considerations and operators are rare­
ly able to protest [1]. Normal accidents are less likely in 
systems with strong employee representation, accord­
ing to Perrow [1].
In a later article, Perrow identifies characteristics of 
“error­avoiding” systems. First, error­avoiding systems 
are experienced with the scale of operation and activity 
during the critical phase [2]. Error­avoiding systems also 
collect information on errors and interact with elites; for 
example, CEOs and Congresspeople make extensive 
use of air travel [2]. On an organizational level, error­
avoiding systems exert control over their members and 
the system environment is dense, with many different 
firms, regulators, and interest groups [2]. Perrow argues 
that the system becomes “error­neutral” or “error­inducing” 
if any of these elements are absent [2].
The postscript to the 1999 edition of Normal Acci-
dents discusses the electric power system and the 
looming Y2K crisis. Perrow explains that “Y2K could be 
the quintessential Normal Accident… small failures to 
read the correct date cannot be fully anticipated, and 
their interactions cannot be imagined; the tight coupling 
of our highly interdependent systems can bring about a 
cascade of failures” [1]. Perrow criticizes the optimism 
of a North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(NERC) report asserting the industry was “ready” to deal 
with Y2K, in the sense of “coping with” rather than avoid­
ing problems [1]. Perrow further disagreed with the report’s 
emphasis on continuing deregulation activities instead 
of addressing Y2K problems [1]. In hindsight, the Y2K 
problem was successfully remediated, despite predic­
tions to the contrary.
Ultimately, Perrow uses the framework of normal 
accidents to argue that complex technological systems 
can never be completely safe. He argues that hazardous 
technological systems with unborn victims, like nuclear 
power, should not be used because the inevitable fail­
ure far outweighs any economic gains.
Proponents of the HRO framework, on the other hand, 
believe certain organizations experience failures less 
often than expected and that technological systems can 
be managed more­or­less safely. After a major accident 
occurs, Roberts notes that solutions may include tech­
nological fixes or bans, but typically less attention is 
devoted to improving the system management [3]. HRO 
researchers explore why certain organizations have 
higher reliability than others; they focus on organiza­
tions that have already achieved high levels of reliability 
and work backwards to determine how. Early HRO case 
studies focused on naval aircraft carriers, air traffic con­
trol, grid operations, and a nuclear power plant [3]–[7].
HRO researchers argue that the framework address­
es a gap in organizational theories based on dichoto­
mies: planning versus trial­and­error, certainty versus 
uncertainty, and hierarchy versus decentralization [4]. 
LaPorte and Consolini believe that HROs, although hier­
archical and planning­oriented, bridge these categories 
by allowing flexibility and decentralized decision mak­
ing in certain situations [4]. HROs use technologies that 
are tightly coupled to the organization (technological 
failure threatens organizational failure), have a strong 
external preference for failure­free operations, and invest 
heavily in reliability improvements [4]. For all HROs, 
the cost of failure is much higher than the value of the 
lessons learned [4].
HROs develop reliability through redundancy, fre­
quent training, emphasizing responsibility, and distribut­
ing decision­making throughout the group hierarchy, all 
of which reduce the impacts of complexity and tight cou­
pling, as defined by Perrow [3]–[6], [8]. For example, con­
tinuous training allows operators to gain experience with 
novel system behaviors and proficiency with complex 
technology [5]. Redundancy reduces the impact of tight 
coupling by responding to time­dependent processes and 
creating multiple paths for success [5]. HROs try to 
replace indirect information sources (complexity) with 
many direct information sources [5]. Through all 
these actions, HROs develop a “culture of reliability,” 
described by Roberts as including interpersonal responsi­
bility, person­centeredness, strong feelings of credibility, 
an emphasis on creativity, and being helpful and support­
ive [3], [6]. Because using total failure to learn is not 
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possible, HROs complete immediate investigations of 
small incidents and quickly discuss lessons learned [4].
Through their interactions, the people in an HRO cre­
ate a “collective mind,” a concept to describe the ways 
in which the conscious attention of many individuals is 
linked together into a structure of social cognition [7]. 
This increases reliability in three ways [7]: 1) connecting 
across time by bringing knowledge forward from previ­
ous parts of a process, 2) incorporating more and more 
tasks into the framework of cognition, and 3) connect­
ing new and old employees, allowing bi­directional 
learning, as experienced employees interact with new 
employees who see the system with a fresh perspective. 
Using “collective mind,” Weick and Roberts argue that a 
complex cognitive structure is the only way to compre­
hend the complexity of a large technological system, 
since no individual can grasp it [7].
Some of the first studies to develop the concept of 
HROs examined power systems, specifically that of 
Pacific Gas and Electric. In [5], Roberts examines how 
training helps operators cope with varied system condi­
tions. Grid operators at Pacific Gas and Electric train 
using recent issues from actual operations, while the 
nuclear plant operators spend one week per month 
training, allowing them to stay up­to­date with unique 
and/or dangerous conditions [5]. At Pacific Gas and 
Electric, Roberts noticed frequent training, redundancy, 
and distributed decision­making, which were then used 
to generally describe HROs.
About ten years later, during the electricity market 
restructuring in California, HRO researchers revisited 
Pacific Gas and Electric. They witnessed what is now 
commonly called the California Electricity (or Energy) 
Crisis. Schulman and his co­authors pose the following 
question in their studies: how do technical systems with 
many players maintain reliability [9]? They argue that 
electricity restructuring is a good test case for two rea­
sons [9]: 1) reliability should be undermined based on 
early research, and 2) it challenges whether complexity 
and tight coupling cause failure. The authors argue that, 
despite rolling blackouts and the declaration of bank­
ruptcy by Pacific Gas and Electric, “the lights by and 
large actually stayed on — and reliably stayed on” [9].
I disagree with the authors’ assessment of this point. 
The utilities and operators struggled valiantly during the 
crisis and achieved impressive results. However, Schul­
man et al. understate the impacts. Weare explains that:
 ■ [t]he lights flickered throughout the crisis… In 2000, 
electricity was turned off to customers with special 
interruptible contracts on 13 other days. During 
2001, “load shedding” occurred on 31 days. On nine 
of these days customers experienced involuntary 
rolling blackouts for a total of 42 hours of outages. 
During these nine outages, California experienced 
an average shortfall of… enough energy to power 
over 450,000 households. On the worst day, Janu­
ary 18, the equivalent of almost one million house­
holds lost electricity [10].
This description does not meet the basic expecta­
tions of “high reliability.”
Schulman and his co­authors coin the phrase “high 
reliability network” to describe the constellation of utili­
ties, generation owners, and the independent system 
operator [9]. Unlike HROs, the authors show that high 
reliability networks engage in trial­and­error, based on 
reliability standards and actual operating conditions, 
and follow rules of thumb to ensure that the system’s 
performance remains within the specified requirements 
[9], [11]. Roe writes that “[r]eliability here lies in resil-
ience — the ability of managers to respond in ways that 
buffer or accept variance in inputs and then act to coun­
ter the variance in order to produce output fluctuations 
at manageable levels” (emphasis added) [11]. Unfortu­
nately, reliability and resilience, though related, are not 
the same. (Reference [12] has an extended discussion 
on different definitions of resilience.)
In summary, the HRO framework claims that orga­
nizations can be designed to compensate for human 
fallibility and technological failures. The normal acci­
dent framework claims that reliability cannot be guar­
anteed due to fundamental system characteristics. 
These frameworks are frequently compared to one 
another, since both examine failures in complex sys­
tems. Rosa summarizes three major contradictions 
between the HRO framework and the normal accident 
framework. The latter expects infrequent, but “nor­
mal,” accidents while the former expects virtually acci­
dent­free operation [13]. Both frameworks predict 
some accidents; the question is how to define “infre­
quent,” which neither framework specifies [13]. The 
normal accident framework posits that redundancy is 
a cause of failure, while the HRO framework argues 
that redundancy decreases accidents [13]. The normal 
accident framework rests on asymmetrical social and 
political power structures and the HRO framework 
focuses on a culture of reliability [13]. To Rosa, the 
two frameworks are “blindfolded observers feeling dif­
ferent parts of an elephant” [13], where the elephant 
High Reliability Organizations  
can be designed to compensate  
for human fallibility and  
techno logical failures.
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represents complete understanding of failures in com­
plex technological systems.
In his 1993 book, Sagan uses both frameworks to 
examine nuclear missile defense. He argues that, super­
ficially, the nuclear missile defense system seems to 
support the HRO framework since accidental nuclear 
war has not yet occurred [14]. Upon detailed inspection, 
Sagan determined that several incidents seemed more 
consistent with normal accidents. Instead of learning 
from mistakes, as predicted by the HRO framework, the 
people involved in these incidents attempted to simulta­
neously cover them up and spin the facts to support the 
continued development of weapons systems [14]. Fur­
thermore, he identifies challenges to organizational 
learning cited by the HRO framework: ambiguous feed­
back, political considerations, accurate reporting, and 
secrecy. These “other” concerns dominated safety con­
siderations after incidents, according to Sagan, and pre­
vented military organizations from learning from 
failures of the nuclear missile system.
Sagan’s characterization of the HRO framework 
inspired a debate in the Journal of Contingencies and 
Crisis Management, including articles from LaPorte, 
Perrow, and Sagan [2], [8], [15], [16]. LaPorte disagreed 
with Sagan’s assessment of HROs as “optimistic” and 
agreed with Perrow that avoiding failure cannot be guar­
anteed. Perrow’s response accused the HRO research­
ers of failing to critically engage with the organizations 
that they observe and wrote that “no one can be against 
clear safety goals, learning, experience, and so on” [2]. 
Perrow argued that Sagan’s greatest contribution was to 
emphasize the role played by group interests in acci­
dents. In response, LaPorte and Rochlin asserted that 
the HRO framework is a study of organizations under 
trying conditions — not a theory of accidents — and to 
directly compare it to the normal accident framework is 
fruitless [15]. Finally, Sagan closed the debate by calling 
for focus on the political aspects of accidents and orga­
nizations [16]. He specifically argued for more research 
on redundancy [16]: when it creates common­mode fail­
ures, when it decreases component reliability, and when 
organizational redundancy is equivalent to engineering 
redundancy (argued by Roberts in [6]).
To summarize, HRO researchers see a complementary 
role for each framework, while normal accident research­
ers tend to see little of interest in the in­depth organiza­
tional studies supporting HRO research. We have seen 
from this discussion that HRO researchers focus on the 
organizational structure of the organization, while normal 
accident researchers focus on the underlying characteris­
tics of the technological system. We cannot ignore the 
underlying technology, but we also need to know the role 
that organizations play in enabling or avoiding failures. 
Normal accident researchers emphasize political and 
social power relationships, while HRO researchers empha­
size cooperation. Both frameworks are useful, because 
they explore different, yet important, elements of human 
behavior and complex technological systems.
Electric Power Systems as Complex 
Technological Systems
The power grid has always been a large aggregate of 
equipment and organizations, as described by Hughes 
[17], [18]. In the U.S., there are more than 19 000 indi­
vidual generators rated larger than 1 MW in more than 
7000 power plant facilities [19]. The high voltage trans­
mission system comprises more than 640 000 miles of 
lines, while the distribution system has more than 
6.3 million miles of lines [19]. On the organizational 
side, deregulation created a plethora of players by dis­
mantling many vertically­integrated monopolies and 
opening opportunities for competition. As a complex 
system regulated for reliability, electric power systems 
offer an interesting case study for both the normal acci­
dent framework and the HRO framework. As discussed 
in the previous section, both Perrow and HRO research­
ers (Roberts and Schulman) have devoted attention to 
electric power systems. Now, the ways both frameworks 
have been taken up in electric power systems literature 
will be discussed.
In 2001, a workshop on critical infrastructure and 
interdisciplinary research convened in Washington, DC. 
In the first session, Perrow admitted that his fears about 
Y2K did not come to pass, explaining that the world was 
“less interactively complex and tightly coupled than 
some of us… thought it would be” [20]. Perrow is con­
cerned that increased centralization through mergers 
and/or market control is being used to deal with com­
plex interdependencies [20], though, in previous work, 
he argued that only organizations with rigid hierarchy 
and strong discipline could deal with complex and tight­
ly coupled systems [1]. In his presentation, Perrow 
focused on the need for collaboration because limited 
communication and increased centralization will lead to 
more failures as the world becomes more complex and 
tightly coupled [20].
Peerenboom described different types of interdepen­
dency and failure, giving more explanatory power to 
interdependency (coupling), something he previously 
described in [21]. Interdependency can be physical, 
where the material output of one infrastructure system 
is used by another [22], such as using electricity to 
extract coal to generate electricity. Interdependencies 
can also be “cyber” (electronic information and control 
systems) or geographic (infrastructure is co­located 
without connections) [22]. Finally, Peerenboom defines 
logical interdependency to capture other coupling, e.g. 
financial markets [22].
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Peerenboom distinguishes between cascading, esca­
lating, and common cause failures between infrastruc­
tures. In his representation, cascading failures are those 
in which a disruption in one infrastructure causes fail­
ures in another, while escalating failures are those for 
which a disruption in one infrastructure exacerbates an 
independent disruption in another [22]. This differs from 
the more narrow definition of a cascading failure within 
the electric power system research community: “a 
sequence of dependent failures of individual compo­
nents that successively weakens the power system” [23]. 
Common cause failures occur when two or more infra­
structures are disrupted simultaneously, by a severe 
storm for example [22]. Peerenboom, like Perrow, called 
for cross­disciplinary collaboration, a call continued in 
[24], which apparently includes those who study normal 
accidents or HROs through the generic qualifier of 
“social scientists.”
A 2004 opinion piece argued that the electric power 
system has a lot to learn from air traffic control [25]; 
one of the authors participated in the aforementioned 
critical infrastructure workshop [26]. Air traffic control is 
a darling of both frameworks. From the normal accident 
framework, the authors recognize that operations and 
investigations into failure must be located in separate 
agencies [25], presumably to reduce political and social 
pressures. They also propose that national coordination 
is needed, although local and regional actions dominate 
[25]. Consistent with the HRO framework, the authors 
suggest transforming panicked responses when things 
go wrong into incident investigations and research and 
development for new tools [25]. The authors also note 
the need for comprehensive data monitoring and real­
time interpretation [25], helping to create a big­picture 
view of the system. Although the authors do not men­
tion either framework, it is clear that their suggestions 
for changes in the electric power system were inspired 
by case studies and findings from both frameworks.
In a 2006 conference paper, Hines et al. examined 
large blackouts in the United States to test the assump­
tion that blackout frequency (adjusted for demand 
growth) should decrease due to engineering and policy 
changes made after each large blackout since the late 
1960s [27]. The authors argue that “[t]he U.S. air traffic 
control system provides precedent for a large, complex 
system undergoing a significant decrease in risk follow­
ing appropriate engineering and policy actions” [27]. 
Using data from 1984 to 2000, the authors note that 
“human error” accounts for 11% of all reported distur­
bances [27]. (Recall Perrow’s warning about this label). 
Excluding outages caused by weather, the authors found 
that the frequency of large blackouts is not decreasing, 
speculating that the possible increase is caused by 
under­investment in transmission and a lack of mandatory, 
enforceable rules for reliability [27]. They also note that 
the protection system, which isolates stressed equip­
ment to avoid damage to the individual component, tends 
to cause cascading failures at the system level rather 
than control them [27].
In a 2009 journal article, the same group of authors 
found that blackout frequency: 1) has not decreased with 
time, 2) changes seasonally, and 3) increases during 
times of peak use [28]. Furthermore, the size of the 
blackout follows a power law probability distribution (as 
shown by other researchers) and is not correlated with 
restoration time [28]. They recommend doubling the 
operators during peak use times and focusing mitigation 
on both large and small outages [28]. Although Hines et 
al. do not acknowledge either normal accidents or HROs, 
their findings and policy recommendations could have 
benefited from such attention. Whether organizational 
redundancy (adding more operators during peak use 
times) will actually help is an open question. HRO re ­
searchers believe that such redundancy is important, 
while normal accident researchers are unconvinced. A 
footnote seems to acknowledge this, noting that “most 
electric utilities, and other system operators, increase 
operations staff during peak periods and daytime hours” 
[28]. Why has the blackout risk during peak hours per­
sisted even though utilities use increased organizational 
redundancy? The normal accident framework would sug­
gest that it is because the electric grid is more tightly 
coupled as load increases. The HRO framework might 
suggest ways in which organizational redundancy is not 
actually fulfilling its desired function through “mindless­
ness” or limited cooperation [29].
In 2011, a group of power system researchers investi­
gated the “complex systems aspects of blackout risk 
and mitigation” [30]. By focusing on the frequency distri­
bution of different sized blackouts, the authors argue 
that components cannot be assumed to be independent 
[30]. If independence was a valid assumption, the prob­
ability of large blackouts would show an exponential 
decay; instead, it follows a power law distribution [30], 
[31]. The authors claim that this property of the blackout 
frequency distribution supports Perrow’s description of 
When systems have self-organizing 
criticality, actions designed to mitigate 
problems may actually increase the 
likelihood of large disruptions.
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interactive complexity and that large disruptions are 
seemingly intrinsic to large infrastructure systems [30]. 
They then describe self­organizing criticality as a prop­
erty of complex systems, where the nonlinear system 
dynamics in the presence of perturbations actually 
make the average system state more susceptible to 
large disturbances [30]. When systems have self­orga­
nizing criticality, actions designed to mitigate problems 
may actually increase the likelihood of large disruptions 
[30]. This paper reinforced ideas central to the normal 
accident framework with engineering theory, such as 
independence and self­organizing criticality.
The same authors (Dobson, Carreras, and Newman) 
and their collaborators (Lynch and Ren) continued 
exploring the probability distribution of blackouts in 
[32]–[34], focusing on the influence of different network 
assumptions. These papers used engineering analysis 
to answer questions relevant to both frameworks: how 
do redundancy and scale change the likelihood of black­
outs? The researchers model the evolution of the power 
system considering policy (system upgrades) and soci­
etal changes (load growth and the corresponding power 
supply growth) [32]–[34]. This model demonstrates how 
the power system self­organizes to its critical point — 
serving increased load stresses the system and system 
upgrades responding to that stress, in turn, allow for 
more load to be served, keeping the network near its 
critical point [32], [33].
The researchers examined three different approach­
es to line upgrades to evaluate their impact on blackout 
probability: 1) upgrade as lines approach their loading 
limits [32], 2) upgrade lines involved in a cascading out­
age after the outage [32], [33], and 3) upgrade when 
lines violate the N­1 criterion [33]. The power grid is 
designed to operate so it satisfies the “N­1” criterion, 
meaning that the grid should remain fully operational 
when any one major piece of equipment suffers an out­
age. To satisfy this criterion, lines cannot be loaded to 
capacity; it provides a pseudo­redundancy, with spare 
capacity shared over multiple lines. Comparing the first 
two approaches, no difference in the likelihood of large 
blackouts was found [32]. The second approach showed 
greater grid utilization, while the third reduced the num­
ber of small outages [33]. None of the approaches yield­
ed a lower probability of large blackouts than the others 
[32], [33]. Furthermore, the researchers found that 
increasing the lines’ reliability (mathematically equiva­
lent to decreasing the margin), actually increased the 
probability of larger blackouts [32]. Defining outage risk 
using probability and cost, the risk of large blackouts 
was shown to increase with grid size [34]. This paper is 
noteworthy because it tested the normal accident 
framework against the engineering heuristic that larger 
grids reduce outages, concluding that bigger is better 
only until a threshold at which the risk of smaller black­
outs is balanced by that of larger blackouts [34].
In their 2012 article, Mazur and Metcalfe analyzed 
three different power grids in the U.S. to determine 
whether grid size determines reliability [35]. Proponents 
of the normal accident framework would expect bene­
fits from increased integration to be outweighed by the 
increased risk of catastrophic failure. The authors ulti­
mately found no relationship between grid size and reli­
ability, finding that the normal accident framework does 
not accurately predict performance of the electric power 
system [35]. However, their study only examined data 
from 2007 to 2010, excluding the 2003 Blackout. Nor­
mal accidents happen “infrequently,” with relevant time 
intervals typically measured in decades, so studies 
using only three years of reliability data cannot make 
claims either for or against the framework. Based on 
22 years of historical outage data, Dobson, Carreras, 
and Newman characterized the probability of blackouts 
for the Eastern and Western interconnections [36]. The 
study results used historic data to confirm the power 
law distribution mentioned previously [30], supporting 
the normal accident framework.
Despite the clear applicability of both the normal 
accident framework and the HRO framework, relatively 
few groups of power systems engineers have adopted 
ideas from either. As described, most work uses either 
framework to analyze blackouts, specifically large or 
cascading blackouts. I will now postulate on some spe­
cific areas where both frameworks could be applied and 
discuss how the results from or questions inspired by 
either framework would be useful. I will focus on cas­
cading blackouts, digital relays for protection and con­
trol, and cybersecurity.
In the post­event analysis of the U.S. 2003 Northeast 
Blackout, investigators traced paths of failure that were 
unclear to operators during the event, who instead saw 
baffling interactions and an incomprehensible evolution 
of problems — hallmarks of normal accidents. The final 
report on the blackout cited “inadequate system under­
standing … situational awareness … [and] diagnostic 
support” as causes of the cascading blackout [37]. It 
also said that “[m]any of the institutional problems arise 
not because NERC is an inadequate or ineffective orga­
nization, but rather because it has no structural inde­
pendence from the industry it represents and has no 
authority to develop strong reliability standards and to 
enforce compliance” [37]. This recalls Perrow’s argu­
ment that the regulator must be independent of the 
industry it regulates to reduce normal accidents. Engi­
neers can examine the role that redundancy played: did 
it contribute to the blackout or did it help keep the grid 
energized? The HRO framework could help companies 
learn about management strategies — which companies 
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responded well to the unfolding events and which exac­
erbated the problem? The report cited above focuses on 
violations of voluntary reliability standards rather than 
delving into the company culture(s) responsible for 
those violations [37].
Digital relays for protection and control offer another 
fascinating comparison of normal accidents and HROs. 
In substation design, most protection and control sys­
tems are fully redundant. Yet, relay misoperations per­
sist and are most commonly caused by 1) incorrect 
settings, logic, or design error, 2) relay failure or malfunc­
tion, and 3) communication failure [38]. The dominant 
relaying philosophy is to isolate stressed equip ment 
and protect it from damage. The authors in [27] believe 
relays should be set considering the cost of an outage 
to the system, rather than only the cost of the protected 
component. Considering the system implications of iso­
lating equipment may allow transmission lines to be 
overloaded, but prevent a cascading outage. Are group 
interests at play in protecting equipment at the expense 
of the system?
The authors in [39] argue that the most troublesome 
relay misoperations are “hidden failures” and believe that 
changing relays from an “OR” selection to a voting sys­
tem would help reduce misoperations [39]. However, with 
misoperations spread between design, equipment, and 
communication, it is fair to say that the fundamental rea­
sons for persistent misoperations have not yet been iden­
tified. Is the problem in the protection philosophy, as 
argued in [39]? Or is it with the management and engi­
neering design of the system? The normal accident 
framework could help identify whether tradeoffs between 
redundancy and complexity are causing problems in this 
application. The HRO framework could help to identify 
management issues and offer advice on how to change.
In the arena of cybersecurity, the number of vulnera­
bilities is countless [40], partially due to complexity and 
tight coupling. Even so, many vulnerabilities are known 
[41]–[43] and cyberattacks are already common in power 
systems [44]. How much effort should be taken to pro­
tect the power system from these? Some researchers 
promote “resiliency” as the best way to deal with cyber­
security issues. Resiliency is nothing but the ability to 
bounce back from failure(s) quickly. Can the HRO frame­
work teach us something about resiliency and how 
organizational design can promote it? Normal accident 
researchers may suggest how to manage the political 
and social issues surrounding cybersecurity violations.
Making Progress in Understanding Failure
Overall, the power systems literature has relatively few 
mentions of insights to be gained from either the nor­
mal accident or HRO frameworks. This absence indicates 
an area where progress could be made in understanding 
failures. Studies of cascading blackouts illustrate ways in 
which both frameworks would aid analysis. Similar stud­
ies of other power systems topics, like digital relays and 
cybersecurity, could also benefit from attention to both 
frameworks. From the normal accident framework, engi­
neers can determine the point where benefits from 
redundancy are offset by increased complexity and 
closely examine hierarchical power structures and mar­
ket pressures to determine whether any of these ele­
ments are undermining their quest for reliability. From 
the HRO framework, engineers can acknowledge that 
sometimes the fix is not a fancy new technology, but 
rather changing organizational culture. None of this will 
be easy, but if we want to have trustworthy complex 
technological systems, then we must know why they fail 
and how (or whether) those failures can be avoided.
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I
nternet of Things (IoT) devices possess net-
work capabilities and contain at least a part 
of the application logic, i.e., they have the 
ability to perform Transmission Control Proto-
col/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) communica-
tions on their own, and can process some of 
the sensor data. The IoT thus refers to the net-
work of physical objects embedded with electronics, 
software, sensors and connectivity to enable objects to 
exchange data with the manufacturer, operator, and/or 
other connected devices. At the start of this decade, 
there were an estimated 12.5 billion IoT devices, almost 
twice as much as the world’s population of 6.8 billion 
people [1]. The number of IoT devices is expected to 
grow rapidly in coming years.
These technological changes have tremendous impli-
cations for decentralized production control in manufac-
turing, and are expected to trigger a fourth industrial 
revolution, following the steam engine, the conveyor 
belt, and the computer revolution. IoT devices will have 
a transformational effect on the lives of everyday con-
sumers, too. Australia’s largest telecommunications 
company, Telstra, says the average Australian house-
hold in 2017 had 13 Internet connected devices and 
that by 2021 a typical home will have over 30. It’s pre-
dicted that the collective value of the smart home mar-
ket in Australia will be greater than AU$1billion annually 
by 2021 [2]. As the IoT technology becomes embedded 
in televisions, webcams, smoke alarms, fitness trackers, 
climate-control systems, lightbulbs and more, it has the 
potential to save money and time, help people stay fit, 
healthy, and safe, and enable effortless communication 
with friends and family. There are important security 
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and privacy implications for consumers [3], however; 
many Internet-connected devices have poor in-built 
security measures [4] and can reveal private data and 
information that may harm or embarrass consumers [5]. 
A 2015 inquiry into data retention by the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) [6] 
mentioned “privacy” nearly 400 times. It said that priva-
cy and security concerns “are closely related, as the 
potential for security breaches has significant ramifica-
tions for the proportionality and privacy risks associated 
with the proposed scheme.”
IoT Consumer Research: Scenario,  
Test, Evaluate, Propose
In this article, we examine the security and privacy impli-
cations of selected IoT devices, building on previous 
work [7] in this area. Our specific contributions are as 
follows: First, we developed hypothetical scenarios of 
household IoT usage. We then tested the security and 
privacy vulnerabilities of several of these devices, sub-
jecting them to hostile targeting under laboratory con-
ditions. Next, we invited IoT suppliers, consumers, 
insurers, and regulators to evaluate our results at a 
workshop. Finally, after examining their reactions and 
discussing their expectations, we proposed possible 
approaches to help mitigate the identified risks. We also 
identified a research trajectory that would begin a new 
four-step cycle of Scenario-Test-Evaluate-Propose. We 
wish to emphasize that the workshop phase of our 
research cycle is as critical as the other phases, and not 
merely an afterthought. It is this phase that enables us 
to engage with consumers and understand the contexts 
in which they use their devices. In doing so, we are in a 
better position to construct realistic scenarios to guide 
our laboratory testing.
Scenarios
We created four scenarios in which people are likely to 
use IoT devices. Our aim was to identify products they 
would purchase so that we could evaluate their vulnera-
bility under laboratory conditions. All the characters and 
locations are fictitious, but the scenarios are extremely 
realistic, and constructed on the basis of direct engage-
ment with consumer advocates.
In the first scenario, the consumer is Tuan, a mid-
career private investigator who lives by herself in a 
regional town in Australia, regularly drives to Melbourne 
and flies to Sydney to meet with clients. Most of her 
work involves insurance fraud although she is often 
asked to track cheating spouses. Because she travels 
quite a bit, and meets a lot of unusual people in her line 
of work, Tuan is worried about leaving her home unat-
tended. Knowing the benefits of surveillance tools, she 
believes that installing IoT devices would offer some 
peace of mind. As a sole occupier who desires home 
security, Tuan buys three IoT devices:
1) a Belkin motion sensor to detect movements inside 
her house;
2) TP-Link indoor and outdoor motion sensor cam-
eras; and
3) A Nest smoke alarm to send alerts to her smartphone 
in case of fire.
In the second scenario, the IoT device users are Joe 
and Lorna Jones, an elderly couple who live in the inner 
city. Lorna is a bit hard of hearing, wears a pacemaker, 
and has respiratory difficulties. She is not a regular user 
of the Internet. Joe has some mobility problems and 
relies on his medical-alert device when he’s away from 
home. Lorna was playing bowls (lawn bowling) the last 
time he had a fall, and it took hours before he could get 
help. Their son, Geoffrey, who lives with his family on 
the Gold Coast 100-km away, wants a way to monitor 
his parents’ welfare more thoroughly than checking in 
on Skype every couple of days. He has installed a num-
ber of IoT devices in their home to allow him to keep a 
virtual eye on Joe and Lorna’s health and wellbeing. 
These devices are:
1) Blipcare blood pressure monitor, which sends read-
ings to the web for Geoffrey to check;
2) Withings weighing scale;
3) Withings sleep monitor;
4) Awair air quality monitor; and
5) Netatmo weather station.
In the third scenario, Suresh and Veda Singh live in 
Sydney’s suburbs. They know they have to cool their 
west-facing house in summer. Although they’ve trained 
their three growing children to moderate their electricity 
usage, it still feels like they’re in a losing battle against 
the large electricity bill that arrives every quarter. While 
shopping for smart devices intended for use around the 
home, they also bought an interactive doll for their 
youngest child. The cute doll has a microphone that “lis-
tens” to the child, and replies in a manner similar to 
Apple’s Siri. Their purchases included:
1) a mix of LIFX and Phillips Hue light bulbs for 
remote-control lighting;
2) a TP-Link power switch to control their applianc-
es; and
3) A Hello Barbie talking doll.
In the fourth scenario, a trendy young city couple place 
a high priority on their social life. Eddie and Jenny like 
to listen to music in every room of their home, includ-
ing on their rooftop terrace. They also spend a lot of time 
on their mobile devices, and subscribe to the major mov-
ie-streaming services. Jenny likes watching the latest 
movies while Eddie prefers playing computer games. Both 
have busy professional lives and often work nights and on 
weekends. They have bought the following devices:
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1) Smart TV with Google Chromecast, which plays games 
and streams videos;
2) Triby portable speaker;
3) Amazon Echo voice-activated assistant;
4) HP Envy smart printer; and
5) Pixstar photo frame, which automatically syncs photos 
with their Facebook accounts.
Testing
We selected a number of devices based on the above 
scenarios as well as on product availability and popular-
ity in Australia, and carried out detailed tests on each 
(as well as its supplied mobile app and data server). 
These tests ranged from the simple (capturing wireless 
transmissions from the device to evaluating the con-
tents of the communication) to the complex (making 
the device communicate to a fake server, and over-
whelming the device with fake query messages). We 
automated the process in a laboratory to make it easier 
to reproduce and compare results.
The IoT devices were connected to a home gateway 
router either through Wi-Fi or via direct connection with 
an Ethernet cable. The applications for the IoT devices 
were downloaded onto an Android tablet, which was 
connected to the same router. Checks were performed 
from a laptop running a digital testing platform called 
Kali Linux, which was on the same network as the 
IoT devices.
Using this setup, we ran basic computerized scripts 
and penetration testing tools to assess the safety and 
security performance of each IoT device.
The devices tested were:
 ■ Cameras (TP-Link, Belkin, Dlink, Samsung, Canary, 
Netatmo and Nest Drop).
 ■ Motion sensor (Belkin).
 ■ Smoke alarm (Nest).
 ■ Medical device (Withings sleep monitor, Withings 
weighing scale).
 ■ Air quality monitor (Awair, Netatmo weather station).
 ■ Light bulbs (Phillips Hue and LIFX).
 ■ Power switches (Belkin and TP-Link).
 ■ Talking doll (Hello Barbie).
 ■ Photo frame (Pixstar).
 ■ Printer (HP Envy).
 ■ Controller (Samsung SmartThings).
 ■ Voice assistant (Amazon Echo).
 ■ Smart TV with Google Chromecast.
 ■ Speaker (Triby portable speaker).
The Results section lists full tables of results showing 
how each device performed in each category. The 
results of our tests were consistent and alarming. Every 
device we tested showed some form of vulnerability in 
integrity, access control, or reflection capabilities. Many 
were susceptible to attack in a number of ways. The 
Phillips Hue light bulb and Belkin switch had notably 
poor security. But there was some good news. Devices 
such as the Amazon Echo, Hello Barbie, Nest Drop 
Cam, and Withings sleep monitor were relatively secure 
in terms of confidentiality. The Echo, in particular, was a 
top-rated device in security with encrypted communica-
tion channels and almost all of its ports closed to out-
side attack. A vivid illustration of these vulnerabilities 
can be gained by applying them to our four scenarios.
In the first scenario, a former target of Tuan’s investi-
gation would be able to sit in a car outside her house 
and deduce her Wi-Fi network password using freely 
available software. He would then place a cheap battery-
powered device beneath her letterbox. This device con-
nects with her home wireless network, capturing all of 
the information being transmitted by her IoT devices. 
This information is then sent back to his laptop, which 
he monitors from his home. Essentially, his device is 
performing a “man-in-the-middle” attack on Tuan’s 
motion sensor and camera — both of which send out 
information that is not encrypted. This makes it quite 
simple to see video and read motion-sensor information 
from Tuan’s devices on his laptop at home. He would 
therefore know when Tuan’s devices have been inactive 
for a few hours. Surmising that Tuan is away, perhaps in 
Melbourne or Sydney, he drives back to his parking spot 
in the street outside Tuan’s home. He uses a denial-of-
service attack on Tuan’s motion sensor, cameras, and 
smoke alarm by bombarding them with a large number 
of requests. Unable to cope, these devices simply shut 
down. This ensures that she will never get the smoke 
alert from her IoT alarm — even though her home has 
been physically set alight.
In the second scenario, a criminal buys a list of email 
addresses of people who have recently registered IoT 
products. One of these belongs to Joe and Lorna Jones. 
The criminal sends them an email that contains a link 
to an app that promises technology customers help with 
their finances. The app, however, has embedded mal-
ware that scouts for IoT devices. Lorna is not sure what 
the email is about but thinks it sounds interesting. With-
out thinking, she manages to download the app. The 
malware immediately disables the Joneses’ firewall and 
enables port forwarding, making them vulnerable to 
security breaches. Now the criminal is in control. His 
malware finds unencrypted messages from their weigh-
ing scales, enabling him to deduce their names, ages, 
gender, height and weight. From this, he can start hatch-
ing a plan for someone else in his criminal syndicate to 
steal the Joneses’ identity and take their social security 
benefits. He can also use Joe and Lorna’s IoT devices to 
reflect and amplify attacks on other Internet-connected 
devices. Whenever he likes, he can use the open ports 
on the Joneses’ Withings sleep monitor, Awair air 
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quality monitor, and Netatmo weather station and use 
them as part of a network of compromised devices to 
launch massive cyber-attacks. Note, however, that in 
general, health monitoring IoT devices do not tend to 
have many security problems. Although the Awair air 
quality monitor could stop functioning if it’s forced to 
deal with a large amount of Internet traffic, it encrypts 
all data sent to the server.
In the third scenario, an opportunistic neighbor sees 
the Singhs as a potential soft burglary target. He uses a 
remote device to deliver malware that snoops on local 
Wi-Fi traffic. The Singhs’ IoT devices, especially their 
power switch and lights, provide a good indication of 
their presence in, or absence from, their home. More 
importantly, the neighbor can alter the state of the 
devices. The Phillips Hue light bulbs do not send 
encrypted information, so he can turn them on or off 
and change their color and brightness. The LIFX bulbs 
have encrypted messages but they can be decrypted 
with little effort. The TP-Link power switch also uses 
encrypted data but has a very weak key; it can be bro-
ken easily. Under certain conditions, the Hello Barbie 
doll enables outsiders to listen in on conversations 
while the doll’s talk button is pushed.
In the fourth scenario, a cyber-stalker uses a pass-
word-cracking tool to gain access to Eddie and Jenny’s 
Wi-Fi network. Like many others, they have not changed 
the default username or password (“admin”) on most of 
their devices. Once in, the stalker can use simple 
request functions to get information on what videos and 
games they play through Google Chromecast — she 
might even be able to post a threatening text or video 
on their television screen. She knows their printer is 
particularly vulnerable. Using the basic Internet Print-
ing Protocol, she can see any documents they have 
scanned recently or might even print a threatening or 
obscene message on the device. Although most of 
Eddie and Jenny’s devices are relatively safe compared 
with other IoTs tested, the HP Envy printer is an excep-
tion. It has poor security protection, with many open 
ports that are not protected by a password, allowing an 
attacker easy access. It also allows an attacker to print 
documents or stop others from printing entirely.
Evaluate
We invited IoT suppliers, consumers, insurers, and regu-
lators to evaluate our results at a workshop. In this sec-
tion, we discuss their reactions and expectations.
A frequent theme among attendees was that con-
sumer expectations must survive a transition to the digi-
tal age. Most consumers of smart-home IoT devices will 
not scrutinize manufacturers’ license agreements, and 
they cannot be expected to as the agreements are fre-
quently complex and unlikely to be enforced. They 
assume that manufacturers or service providers will 
supply any software updates necessary to continue run-
ning their applications. Similarly, consumers expect that 
a smart-home device placed on their home network will 
not create a backdoor to other devices in their home. 
More generally, they expect that technical security is 
someone else’s responsibility.
We believe this expectation is reasonable in light of 
consumers’ experiences with non-IoT products. Car buy-
ers, for instance, are only required to ensure that their 
cars are locked, perhaps parked in a secure garage, and 
regularly serviced in line with the manufacturer’s speci-
fications. They are not expected to also be automotive 
engineers, mechanics or locksmiths. And yet, the ques-
tion persists: how much education is required for a con-
sumer to know that their IoT devices are “safe”? It’s 
possible to foresee the use of a security “star rating” for 
IoT devices — similar to energy- or water-efficiency rat-
ings on household appliances — that may allow con-
sumers to make informed purchasing decisions. Such a 
ratings scheme might enable market forces to decide 
how important the security and safety of IoT devices are 
to consumers [8].
Such a scheme is not without complexity of its own. 
Security ratings, after all, cannot be static, since securi-
ty threats evolve continuously. The implications of a low 
security star rating may be unclear to consumers.
Further, the issue of data ownership and its sharing 
remains murky [9]. Consumers may expect their service 
providers will not on-sell data generated by their smart-
home IoT devices, for example, despite some license 
agreements allowing just that. Any ratings system, and 
improvements to consumer decision making, need to 
take this into account.
For manufacturers, a major gap exists between con-
sumers’ expectations that IoT devices will be kept up-
to-date with near-invisible software “patching” and the 
current reality that many devices simply cannot be 
updated. While smartphones can be patched with regu-
lar updates, the firmware in many IoT devices cannot be 
patched due to small memory capacity, lack of a man-
agement system, the transient nature of network con-
nectivity, or some other issue. In the cases where 
devices can be updated, the technical demands re -
quired to make this happen are beyond the ability of 
most consumers.
Furthermore, in a world of disarticulated production, 
it is simply not clear who is most responsible for a secu-
rity shortfall: is it the company that designs the device, 
or the one that supplies component software? Or is it 
the company that supplies the network in which the 
device is embedded?
Further, manufacturers often focus on price competi-
tiveness rather than security, especially because 
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development costs in this area are high. They are more 
likely to move quickly to the next, more advanced ver-
sion of their models because that is where the greatest 
profit lies. The performance of previous models is not 
likely to concern them, particularly once they’re out of 
warranty. Manufacturers are also aware that consumers 
who own webcams and digital video recorders used in 
DDoS attacks do not personally know the victims, and 
are not likely to pay too much attention to security fea-
tures. In such cases, security is something that affects 
people who are not involved in the transaction between 
buyer and seller — an “externality” in economic terms.
Insurers should reconsider their approach to manufac-
turers and consumers of IoT devices. The cyber insurance 
market is said to be worth $3 billion to $4 billion per year, 
and is growing at 60 percent annually [10]. Companies 
that sell IoT devices may need to be insured against the 
possibility that their products may cause harm to their 
customers, or others. Effective policy is needed to ensure 
businesses that produce devices unfit for purpose, or that 
are repeatedly hacked, cannot continue to do so. A busi-
ness that is compromised, but has taken reasonable 
steps to resolve the issue — and shows no negligence — 
should be able to claim on its insurance.
Recently IoT devices have also been made available 
for extremely intimate and sexual applications with 
devices enabling remote logging and control [11], even 
incorporating cameras. In this context other security 
researchers have identified significant flaws in the 
implementation of connectivity, privacy, and data man-
agement, which they argue is through the poor choice 
of source code reused from public repositories [12]. In 
one case privacy protections in the U.S. meant that cus-
tomers could receive compensation for breaches of 
their usage data after a court finding that the breach 
had not been disclosed to customers.
In this context the potential for serious sexual 
assault leaves device manufacturers clearly open to 
adverse judgement and reputational damage even if 
perpetrators of such crimes are difficult to identify 
and pursue.
For these and other reasons, there may be no feasi-
ble market based solution to the issue of poor IoT secu-
rity, meaning the onus may fall on regulators.
Proposal
Resolution of the security risks identified in our study is 
hampered by the siloed nature of regulation that is now 
becoming more broadly applicable due to the expan-
sion of communications and forming the IoT. Functions 
and objects are the responsibility of discrete govern-
ment departments and regulatory agencies, but the 
agencies now find themselves potentially responsible 
for new areas. Further exacerbating this problem is that 
regulatory standards and benchmarks that apply in one 
jurisdiction do not necessarily apply within another.
Medical, traffic control, and building management 
systems, cameras, light bulbs and cars with driver-assist 
features use an increasing number of IoT devices, yet 
are regulated by separate government departments. In 
Australia for example, the Therapeutic Goods Adminis-
tration within the Department of Health regulates medi-
cal devices, whereas the Australian Communications 
and Media Authority regulates telecommunications, 
broadcasting, radio communications, and the Internet, 
and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commis-
sion regulates consumer safety and fair trade. Regulat-
ing IoT devices will involve input from elements within 
each of these entities, and complexity is only likely to 
increase over time. The Australian government Depart-
ment of Infrastructure and Regional Development regu-
lates vehicle safety, and may require real-time access to 
data feeds from vehicles using IoT devices. As driver-
assistance technologies develop in cars, the need for 
cross-departmental attention will increase. As in Austra-
lia, today’s regulatory agencies across the world were 
created to respond to the rise of earlier technologies. 
The coming IoT revolution will require new regulatory 
expertise that cuts across the current set of agencies.
We therefore propose a more coordinated and ex -
hortative approach to regulation. Manufacturers will 
need to be encouraged to build security at the design 
phase. A “security by default” attitude would see con-
sumers having to deliberately disable rather than delib-
erately enable security features. A mechanism may 
need to be found to coordinate software updates 
among third-party vendors, and to facilitate the coordi-
nated disclosure of vulnerabilities. Here, a role may be 
found for national cybersecurity agencies, such as the 
Australian Cyber Security Centre, to coordinate the 
security knowledge-sharing of developers, manufactur-
ers, and service providers.
Bodies and services that may have been exempt in 
the past from regulation may also come under future 
scrutiny due to the evolving need for consumer and 
community protection. Because of the serious threat to 
infrastructure, it is conceivable that governments may in 
the future require Internet service provider networks to 
comply with network security standards or meet perfor-
mance benchmarks. Devices provided by manufactur-
ers or Internet service providers to perform network 
boundary roles, such as home gateways, could be 
expected to come under higher levels of requirements. 
This would mean devices shipped with default pass-
words, for example, could become a thing of the past.
Further research along the lines of the STEP model is 
needed in order to continue to shed light on the bur-
geoning field of IoT devices.
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Results
Based on the major threats we identified, Figures 1-4 
show how each IoT device performed in the four cate-
gories — confidentiality, integrity and authentication, 
access control, and the ability to withstand reflec-
tive attacks.
From this, we gave each device an overall rating for 
each category. If a device passed a test it was rated 
“good” (represented by green “A” boxes in the tables); 
if it failed it was “poor” (red “C” boxes). If it did not 
pass the test but the attack was unsuccessful, it was 
rated as average (yellow “B” boxes). The grey boxes 
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Figure 1. Confidentiality rating.
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show when a particular attribute could not be tested 
or assessed.
Note these tests were performed at a point in time 
and may have been improved or further deteriorated 
since the date of testing in April 2017.
Confidentiality Rating
Confidentially is a measure of the security of data run-
ning between the IoT device, the router, and our server.
Our tests show whether the communications sent 
and received were encrypted (the most difficult to read), 
encoded (hard but not impossible), or plain text (easiest 
to hack).
Figure 1 shows how each device performed in confi-
dentiality testing.
 ■ Most of the devices had fairly secure communica-
tions in two channels (device to server and user app 
to server) but were vulnerable when they communi-
cated with their user app.
 ■ Five of the devices — the Phillips Hue light bulb, Bel-
kin switch and motion sensor, HP Envy printer, and 
TP-Link camera — sent data in plain text rather than 
encrypted code. This would make it relatively simple 
for hackers to deduce when a user is at home, based 
on whether the power switch is on or off, or when the 
light bulb was last used, for example.
 ■ The TP-Link camera was particularly susceptible to 
attack. Not only might an attacker view any video and 
audio footage based on reassembled data, the default 
authentication password “admin” was easily decoded.
Integrity Rating
We checked the integrity and authentication of each de -
vice by setting up a fake server to “listen” on the port 
used by the real server. This technique is known as a 
“man in the middle attack.”
Using a number of methods, this fake server commu-
nicated with each device to see if it could be authenti-
cated. We also tested to see if the devices could be 
controlled by outside influences.
Figure 2 shows how each device performed in integri-
ty testing.
 ■ These results show that all of the IoT devices were 
vulnerable to an attack through the Domain Name 
System (DNS) protocol. This means that at tackers 
could hijack the system and impersonate the legiti-
mate server of the IoT device. They would be pro-
tected, however, through proper authentication.
 ■ The two light bulbs that were tested communicated 
with the fake server, which is a concern.
Access Control Rating
We tested to see if any ports on a device were “open,” 
allowing the port to be exploited by attackers. Based on 
this, we launched a password-guessing attack to see if 
they were protected by strong security protocols.
Each device was also checked to see how much traf-
fic any open ports could handle before they were 
brought down in a DDoS attack.
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Figure 2. Integrity and authentication.
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Figure 3 below shows how each 
device performed in the access 
control testing.
 ■  Almost all of the devices had 
some form of open-port vulnera-
bility. This would enable intrud-
ers to communicate with or gain 
access to the devices.
 ■  Both the Belkin Smart Cam and 
HP Envy printer exposed a wide 
range of open ports.
 ■  Disturbingly, both the HP printer 
and DLink camera had no pro-
tection for remote access.
 ■  The last three columns show 
that most of the devices were 
susceptible to at least one form 
of DDoS attack.
Reflection Attack Rating
We evaluated all of the devices in 
their ability to “reflect” traffic and 
overload a victim’s network, forcing 
it to shut down.
“Amplification” is a type of re -
flection attack [13]. In this case, 
the reflection is achieved by gain-
ing a response from an innocent 
IoT device to a spoofed IP address 
(a victim machine or server). Dur-
ing an amplification attack, an at -
tacker sends a query with a forg ed 
IP address (the victim’s) to the re -
flec tor (the IoT device), pro mp t -
ing it to reply to that ad dress with 
a response. With numerous fake 
queries being sent out, and with 
several IoT devices replying si -
multaneously, the victim’s net-
work is overwhelmed by the sheer 
number of responses it’s asked 
to make.
Figure 4 below shows how each 
device performed.
 ■  Most of the devices were unable 
to withstand an ICMP reflec-
tion attack.
 ■  All devices, except the LIFX 
light bulb, were susceptible 
to ref lec t ing some form of 
attack.
 ■  The Samsung Smart Cam was 
vulnerable across a number of 
protocols.
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Figure 3. Access control.
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Current Generation of IoT Devices  
Vulnerable to Attack
Consumer products connected to the Internet will soon 
become commonplace in homes and businesses, and 
will offer customers many productivity and lifestyle 
benefits. Our study, however, suggests that the cur-
rent generation of IoT devices is vulnerable to attack in 
a number of ways. It is a complex problem, and there 
don’t appear to be any “single bullet” solutions to make 
IoT devices safer or more secure. We hope this article 
sets the platform for a dialogue between consumers, 
suppliers, regulators, and insurers of IoT devices to 
develop appropriate methods to tackle the problem.
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The Conundrum and  
the Potential of Pervasive 
Computing Solutions
P
ervasive and mobile computing tech-
nologies can make our everyday living 
environments and our cities “smart”, 
i.e., capable of reaching awareness of 
physical and social processes and of 
dynamically affecting them in a pur-
poseful way [1]. This is already happen-
ing, e.g., in the form of digital traffic signs that suggest in 
real-time the best traffic directions or the availability of 
parking spots, and also in the form of location-based so-
cial networks that inform us about noteworthy events. 
Soon we expect that the pervasive diffusion of sensing, 
actuation, and computing will allow our urban environ-
ment to fully self-regulate in autonomy most of its pro-
cesses, and to guide and support our everyday activities.
It is generally acknowledged that living in a smart 
environment makes us smarter by increasing our over-
all levels of awareness of ongoing urban activities [2]. 
Also, by supporting and facilitating our customary activ-
ities (e.g., driving, finding information, and goods), liv-
ing in a smart environment can make life much more 
pleasant and less stressful, and also make the environ-
ment more sustainable.
However, the evolution of smart environments also 
carries potential risks for individuals and for society 
as a whole. In particular, if most of our everyday acti -
vities can be automated, we could be tempted to 
increasingly delegate the governance of such acti-
vities, and the governance of the whole city, to the 
algorithmic engines of the smart city infrastructure. 
Thus, rather than taking advantage of the augmented 
capabilities of perception and participation enabled 
by the technologies, we could end up losing critical 
attention, abandoning individual decision making for 
relying on collective computational governance of 
our activity, losing awareness of environmental and 
social processes, and ultimately lose power and be -
come dumb [3].
81J U N E  2 0 1 8    ∕      IEEE TEchnology and SocIETy MagazInE
In this article we elaborate on the key concepts of 
algorithmic governance in smart cities, discussing its 
likely increasing role in the future. Without any intention 
of dramatizing or of embracing dystopian visions, we 
intend to outline some specific problems that could 
potentially occur in future smart cities, and eventually 
analyze some key directions to prevent or mitigate — 
also with the fundamental support of pervasive comput-
ing technologies — these potential problems and 
possibly turn them into advantages.
Smart Cities: From Citizen Support to 
Algorithmic Governance
Algorithmic governance, in general terms, concerns 
empowering software to take decisions and to autono-
mously — i.e., without human supervision — regulate 
some aspects of our everyday human activities or some 
aspect of the society, according to some algorithmically 
defined policies [4]–[6].
We are already subject to algorithmic governance in 
a variety of different aspects of our personal and social 
lives. Google search dictates what information we find 
on the Internet, as we typically accept the suggestions 
appearing on the first page. Facebook news feed algo-
rithms dictates what are the relevant posts to show us, 
and given that young people rely on Facebook as the 
primary source of news, this implies that they have fully 
delegated to Facebook the activity of seeking and filter-
ing information [7].
Moving from the individual to the societal sphere, exam-
ples of algorithmic governance can be found in trading, 
where most of decisions (and thus the oscillations of 
markets and our finances) now rely on complex agent-
based decision making; or in the pricing strategies of air-
lines that rely on complex analysis of travel trends.
In the area or urban management, some early exam-
ples of algorithmic governance can be found in traffic 
management (e.g., traffic lights that adaptively their fre-
quency depending on the sensed traffic flow), public 
transport (e.g., to adapt bus schedule and routes to 
meet the transport demand in real time), and energy 
management (e.g., to automatically tune energy pricing 
depending on the instantaneous balance between sup-
ply and demand).
Current examples of algorithmic governance for 
smart cities still rely on rather limited capabilities of 
sensing and actuating. However, the increasing spread 
of pervasive computing and Internet of things (IoT) tech-
nologies will soon make it possible to sense at incredi-
ble levels of detail every single event happening in every 
corner of a city, and to trigger flexible actions to affect 
the state of things via a variety of actuators, robots, and 
autonomous vehicles [1]. The assessed mid-term future 
for urban mobility is the one in which citizens and mer-
chandise will be carried to any desired destination via 
myriads of self-driving vehicles, globally orchestrating 
their movements and routes with each other and with 
the urban street infrastructure. Similarly, the flow of 
pedestrians will be somehow steered (via digital signag-
es or apps on wearable devices) and orchestrated so as 
to avoid dangerous situations [8].
Pushing the vision forward, we can imagine that the 
entire management of cities will be soon governed and 
actuated in an automatic, unsupervised way. For instan-
ce, this can include the management of waste collection 
(which also includes the possibility to make citizens 
individually accountable for what they produce as 
waste), decisions on new urbanization, and manage-
ment of roads and other infrastructure (e.g., by automat-
ically deciding which roads and traffic lights to replace 
depending on their actual state and available budget).
In general, living in a smart environment and being 
made part of its awareness can potentially make us 
smarter. That is, it can notably increase our perception 
and social capabilities [2], and our ability to under-
stand situations and react to them. In addition, allow-
ing our everyday urban lives to be governed by some 
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automated software systems promises to notably in -
crease our quality of life. In fact, it will relieve us from 
a number of boring physical and mental activities, and 
enable us to do much more interesting things that, say, 
driving and having to decide on a route to a destina-
tion. In other words, it will make it possible to satisfy 
needs at the highest levels of the Maslow pyramid [9]. 
However, as we will elaborate in the following, algorith-
mic governance also comes with a number of potential 
dangers, and raises the risk of actually making us “dumb-
er” rather than smarter.
Possible Perils of Algorithmic Governance
The primary source of all peril related to algorithmic gov-
ernance is that, very often, software and algorithms are 
designed as “black boxes” with little understanding of 
how they actually work. This lack of understanding not 
only involves the final users (i.e., in case of smart cities, 
all citizens) but quite often also the stakeholders (e.g., 
municipalities and decision makers), and the develop-
ers, if they do not care enough to understand how these 
algorithms operate and have a discussion with designers 
and stakeholders.
This limited understanding of algorithms, from what 
we can see so far, does not prevent people from relying 
on them for various activities. For instance, people fully 
rely on Google’s search results, even without knowing 
anything about its underlying PageRank algorithms. This 
is the key difference between algorithms and other class-
es of technologies: we are using them and relying on 
their judgement and suggestions without knowing the 
reasons we are being suggested something. In Smart Cit-
ies, a pervasive environment governed by algorithms will 
make us apparently smarter in our capabilities, but to 
some extent will also make us “dumber” in that our 
actions will no longer be conscious. For instance, roam-
ing in an unknown city with a paper map enables us to 
absorb the basic fabric of the city and, on this basis, to 
consciously decide what route to take. Conversely, roam-
ing with a GPS navigator does not require knowing any-
thing about the city structure, and we are willing to 
accept route suggestions without investigating further the 
reason a certain route has been selected. In other words, 
our notion of “dumber” here is in the sense of potentially 
losing the ability to make good judgements in some situ-
ations, reducing discernment, and lazily deferring to the 
algorithm. The overreliance on algorithms, which are 
capable (unlike other technologies) of making judge-
ments or decisions on our behalf, without our question-
ing or thinking them through, will make us increasingly 
depend on the algorithms in our everyday life, instead of 
depending on human rationale and our own reasoning.
One might say that the above issue will not cause 
any trouble because algorithms will be developed to 
serve citizens, for their own good and in accord with 
rules and policies of the municipality, and that such 
rules will be made transparent. Yet, as we elaborate in 
the following: 1) decisions made by algorithms may be 
biased and have inaccurate information; 2) there is risk 
that someone manage to make intentional misuse of 
algorithms without no one noticing; 3) politics and deci-
sion makers themselves may end up having little clue as 
to the actual working of algorithms, thus losing power.
With regard to the first issue, we normally trust the 
developers of the technologies we use, knowing that 
societal norms, regulations, and reputation largely help 
to protect that trust. However, intentional or (more 
often) unintentional bias, errors, or incomplete informa-
tion, can subtly hide in algorithms, along with biases in 
behavior due to values (right or wrong) that developers 
or creators of the technology might have. This issue 
could be exacerbated by the increasing influence and 
role of technology in daily decision-making. For exam-
ple, bias can creep into a machine learning algorithm 
[10] due to wrong or inadequate datasets, rather than 
any malice on the part of the developers (e.g., a system 
that is racially biased against people with black-sound-
ing names when judging potential for crime, or software 
that could not do face recognition well for people with 
dark skin, or unfair judgments on insurance or loans, all 
due to issues with data used in training the algorithms). 
Also, what is a “normal person” or “normal behavior” is 
often contextual and hard to define — which can influ-
ence default settings in software [11], e.g., gender bias 
in default character profiles in some games, or some-
one struggling to read a critical alert message in a non-
native language, or what an algorithm portrays as 
“normal looking.”
Algorithms also could have incomplete information 
in decision-making or lack knowledge of exceptional 
cases even if developers do endeavor to be comprehen-
sive. In some cases, even if tempted to doubt the algo-
rithm, profitability in following the algorithm’s decision 
can be high, but not necessarily by virtue of how good 
the algorithm is. For instance, with smart algorithms 
performing sentencing, or the “robotization of justice” 
[12], by deciding against an algorithm’s position for guilt, 
one personally takes on the responsibility for a possible 
second offense. In any case, even if the thought that 
algorithms can do better than humans is becoming prev-
alent, and despite the recent breakthroughs in deep 
learning, for neural networks to achieve the computa-
tional level of a human brain, neural networks still need 
far more power [13].
With regard to the second issue, independently of the 
reliability and trustability of algorithms, there is an issue 
of who is devoted to managing such algorithms and 
of how we can trust those people to manage them. For 
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instance, developers could be influenced by imperatives 
from (e.g., an abusive) government, when developing 
technology. If there is a problem with the current gov-
ernment, algorithmic technology could be intentionally 
misused, hiding behind the “veil of sophistication.” In 
particular, if algorithms are left to their own devices to 
govern Smart Cities, the more complex conundrum is 
what algorithmic government models for Smart Cities 
should look like to prevent or mitigate voluntary or unin-
tended abuses. Who will be in charge of deciding which 
algorithms to run? If politics are in charge of deciding 
the rules governing a city, who will be in charge of devel-
oping algorithms and to check that they are adhering to 
the rules? Who will tune the parameters for the algo-
rithms and how? What about the possibility of instan-
tiating multiple algorithms, and that such algorithms 
become antagonistic [14], i.e., conflicting with each 
other? What does an objective function for governance 
models look like? What does a termination condition for 
algorithmic governance models look like? Who will be 
responsible for bugs? For algorithms governing safety 
critical situations [31], such questions are already press-
ing, and this problem will be dramatically exacerbated 
in the future. Just think at the use of artificial intelli-
gence (AI) and autonomous decisions in weaponry [15]. 
Hinton, in [13], also argued that there is not only a need 
to tame AI research, but also to improve political sys-
tems so that AI is not misused.
Strictly related, algorithms governing our cities may 
also be involved in decisions involving ethical or moral 
dilemmas. For instance, a human driver who managed 
to swerve her car in time to avoid killing several pedes-
trians while sacrificing herself might be lauded, but a 
self-driving car that killed its driver even while saving 
pedestrians might worry passengers [16]. Self-driving 
cars could reduce the need to learn driving, and so 
fewer people might end up knowing how to drive. This 
could be a problem in situations where such a skill is 
indeed needed. But moral algorithms that make human-
accepted judgments are problematic. For example, an 
algorithm that behaves in a utilitarian manner could 
benefit society as a whole, but could hurt individuals, 
and therefore might not be accepted.
With regard to the third issue, the risk that politicians 
and governments lose control over algorithms, can lead 
to an “algocracy.” The term “algocracy,” contrasts with 
“democracy,” and literally means that the power (“kra-
tos” in greece) lies with the algorithms rather than with 
the people (“demos” in Greece). To some extent, it may 
appear we are already living in a partial algocracy, given 
that algorithmic decisions already affect some of our 
civil life. For instance, when applying for a visa for some 
countries, based on some business rules, applicants 
with a certain type of passport will receive immediate 
clearance, whereas others will be pushed to the next 
level of scrutiny. These procedures treat people differ-
ently based on the settings and semantics of algo-
rithms. Yet until the settings and the semantic of such 
algorithms are perfectly compliant with legislation and 
rules, the power still resides with the government and, 
ultimately, in a democratic system, with the people who 
voted for them.
However, given that algorithms can be difficult to 
implement, configure, and fully understand, the risk 
exists that governments end up relying on algorithms 
they do not fully understand without being capable of 
effectively verifying the adherence of the algorithms to 
the existing laws. Thus, we may end up implicitly delegat-
ing decisional power to the algorithms, or to the group of 
people devoted to designing and developing them.
Algorithms in future societies and cities will serve 
the same role that civil law and urban regulations, 
respectively, serve in today’s democratic systems. 
Accordingly, new political procedures need to be put in 
place to regulate which code is installed. The responsi-
bility for (technical) code verification and (juridical) 
semantic verification needs to be clearly defined. Most 
importantly, to avoid having algorithmic governance 
degenerate into algocracy, it is necessary for citizens, 
politicians, and decision makers to become capable of 
understanding and harnessing the complexity of algo-
rithms and their configuration.
How to Deal with the Problems
Let us now analyze what solutions, possibly enabled 
by the same pervasive computing technologies that 
cause them, can be envisioned to attack the identi-
fied problems.
Data Access Control
Algorithmic governance in Smart Cities is enabled by 
the availability of large amounts of data, making it pos-
sible for algorithms to understand what is happening 
and act accordingly. In this context, the dense and per-
vasive collection, processing, and dissemination of data 
in the midst of people’s private lives, while useful for 
offering a range of sophisticated and personalized ser-
vices that provide utility to users, necessarily gives rise 
to certain privacy and algorithmic concerns.
From the privacy viewpoint, the pervasive collection 
of information exacerbates existing issues associated 
with privacy in data handling. In fact, such details can 
be used to algorithmically construct a virtual biography 
of our activities, revealing private behavior and lifestyle 
patterns. Disclosure of this type of analysis or informa-
tion gives rise to the notion of behavioral privacy [17] 
which is distinctly different from traditional identity 
privacy. The possession of such detailed personal 
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information about an individual may confer power over 
that individual, resulting in potential misuse by govern-
ments, corporations, or other individuals. For example, 
households are being equipped with smart meters to 
act as providers of temporally detailed energy consump-
tion reports. The utility companies use the data to bet-
ter estimate domestic power consumption leading to 
optimized distribution. However, as shown in [18], sever-
al unintended and sensitive inferences such as occupan -
cy and lifestyle patterns of the occupants can be made 
from the data. Accordingly, we need configurable priva-
cy-preserving tools that afford users fine-grained control 
over how their personal information is shared.
From the algorithmic viewpoint, it is of fundamental 
importance for users to understand the type of personal 
information being used by algorithms to make deci-
sions, and how such information is used. In addition, in 
cases where the user understands that such information 
is not correct, is biased, or is not appropriately used 
(and thus leads to incorrect algorithmic behaviors), the 
user can exploit the above-mentioned configurable pri-
vacy-preserving tools to adjust the usage of information 
by algorithms. For instance, consider an automated 
home heating system that self-regulates based on the 
life patterns of inhabitants (and bills accordingly), and a 
person who was constrained at home for 15 days due to 
a bad winter flu. When such person eventually goes 
back to work, he should be able to “see” if the heating 
system is still acting on the basis of the wrong assump-
tion that he is at home with a flu. The risk, otherwise, is 
to lazily (and stupidly) accept paying more for heating.
For both concerns, pervasive computing technolo-
gies can potentially enable users to access the appropri-
ate sensors (e.g., wirelessly via their mobile phones), 
and see what data they have produced, and how they 
have used what algorithms.
Algorithmic Guardians
If today algorithms affect what we can view online, 
tomorrow they will modify our physical reality at home 
or in a Smart City, and — as stated earlier — will do that 
in personalized way. However, even if we are offered the 
possibility of seeing what data is being used and by 
what algorithms, the resulting personalization process 
might not be transparent or comprehensible, and it 
could be hard to understand and interpret, especially 
for non-data-literate users.
Besides the problem of understanding personaliza-
tion, another issue that may arise concerns the fact that 
personalization might not always serve the users’ inter-
est, but rather the interests of the algorithms’ creator. 
There is usually an interest gap between you, theuser, 
and the third party that paid for the algorithms to priori-
tize something for you. This can lead to conflicts and 
obtrusive personalization. Different digital environments 
serve different interests and thus capture different areas 
of preferences. Algorithms generalize and simplify, as 
they continuously filter out details that are considered 
irrelevant or useless. In many cases, algorithms use 
other people’s data to fill in missing bits and pieces.
Today our algorithmic selves are beyond our control 
and can leave us vulnerable. A possible solution could be 
to have software tools and algorithms that are on our side 
and under our control — algorithmic guardians — capa-
ble of somehow protecting us from undesirable behavior 
on the part of third party algorithms. We envision algorith-
mic guardians as far more evolved instances of current 
personal assistants such Siri, Watson, etc., that, thanks to 
wearable and advanced human-computer interactions 
models enabled by pervasive computing, will be always 
and easily accessible for interaction. Our digital guardian 
will protect us from algorithmic manipulation that 
restricts personal freedom and will make sure that we are 
not stuck on repeating behavioral loops or virtual echo-
chambers. It will create an adaptive information interface 
that is fresh and relevant. Furthermore, guardians will 
support us in controlling our personal data flows and 
deciding who can access our digital trails. For instance, 
with reference to the home heating example in the Data 
Access Control section above, our personal guardian 
should be able to alert us that the heating systems is still 
acting as if we still had the flu, should help us correct 
such behavior.
Our digital guardian does not need to be intelligent 
in the same way as humans. It needs to be smart in 
relation to the environments it inhabits — in relation to 
the other algorithms it encounters. In any case, even if 
algorithmic guardians (unlike third party algorithms) are 
user-owned and are totally under our own control, being 
able to understand how they work will be a priority to 
make them fully trustworthy. This issue, which applies 
to all algorithms that will govern our life — is elaborated 
in the next section.
Democracy Through Grey-Box Code for Algocracy
Algorithms are created by a handful of people or, in a 
probable near future, by other algorithms that are creat-
ed by an even smaller number of people. This raises an 
enormous challenge for our democracies.
In the spirit of “freedom of information,” publishing 
the algorithms towards citizens seems like an obvious 
thing to do. However, this doesn’t make a lot of sense if 
the overwhelming majority of the citizens cannot even 
read them. In today’s democracy, civil law is also pro-
duced by a handful of specialists and to use it, we rely 
on lawyers. Nevertheless, the civil code can be consult-
ed by anyone who is willing to make the mental effort of 
digging through some heavy prose. With the current 
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literacy level of the general public in computer science, 
however, there is no analogue whatsoever for public 
understanding of algorithms. If rules and regulations 
were to be expressed in code, only a tiny fraction of today’s 
society would be able to read them.
There is compulsory need, for both citizens and gover-
nors, be able to code the rules that govern the algocracy in 
a format that is understandable to policy makers and to 
the public. We also need to make sure that we will be able 
to understand whether the code is actually serving the 
purposes it has been built for, or if it is instead bugged or 
hacked. In this regard, we envision three key require-
ments: better programming languages, inspectability of 
code, and users’ computing literacy.
Concerning programming languages, we emphasize 
that future algorithmic governance for Smart Cities 
needs to be inherently distributed and mobile. Accord-
ingly, programming for Smart Cities will require much 
better programming languages than currently used for 
distributed programming where, for instance, there is lit-
tle support for the verification of the current behavior of 
programs. This is confirmed by the tremendous amount 
of middleware that exists to cover the programs’ short-
comings. Yet these middleware programs do not in -
tegrate well with the host language of the code [19]. 
Powerful languages that allow complex distributed code 
to be written in a “clean” way (such as AmbientTalk [20]) 
have not yet made it to the mainstream. What makes a 
“good” language for this job? An important yardstick for 
measuring the quality of a language can be found in 
Brooks’ paper on complexity in software engineering 
[21]. Today’s programming languages put far too much 
emphasis on the accidental complexity of a distributed 
system. Languages that allow a distributed programmer 
to only focus on the essential complexity are still being 
researched at this time.
For inspectability, algorithms are often referred to as 
“black boxes” in that it is not apparent to the casual 
observer exactly how the algorithm works. Tomorrow’s 
intelligent environments and algocracies should be 
based on “grey box” systems that citizens can read and 
tweak along various “levels” of participation. Just like 
there is a distinction between a constitution and normal 
laws, distinctions have to be made between various lev-
els of code so that some code can be easily tweaked by 
direct democratic processes (à la WikiPedia), whereas 
other code is proverbially carved in stone. In other 
words, the code that runs the algocracy needs to be 
exposed in a “grey box” fashion, where different shades 
of grey will probably be needed. For instance, in the 
area of pervasive computing and the Internet of Things, 
approaches to user-level programming for configuration 
of smart environments, based on simple and under-
standable “if this then that” rules (see e.g., www.ifttt.com), 
and hiding more mundane programming details, go in 
that direction of a “grey box” approach.
In a broader perspective, societal engagement would 
also include building “institutions and tools that put the 
society in-the-loop of algorithmic systems, and allows us 
to program, debug, and monitor the algorithmic social 
contract between humans and governance algorithms” 
[22]. The need for transparency, accountability, and 
explainability for the increasingly prevalent AI “black-
boxes” has been noted in [23], where a layered model 
involving technical, ethical, legal, and social aspects 
needs to be taken into account.
In parallel with the development of an understandable 
“gray box” approach to programming, we need to solve 
one of the main factors hampering efforts for a healthy 
algocracy. This is the need for citizens to have at least a 
basic literacy in computing, and — if they are not able to 
program — they should be capable of judging the actions 
and the quality of the programs that govern them (at least 
when exposed in their “gray box” form). Unfortunately, 
computer science as a basic scientific field is absent in the 
high school systems of most countries. A notable excep-
tion is the U.K. where “Computing” is part of the high 
school curriculum since 2015. Even for people who will 
never program in their entire lives, a good basic under-
standing of what is programming, and what is an algo-
rithm, is necessary for being a citizen in the algocracy!
Humans in the Loop and the Wisdom of Many
An algorithm is weightless and only worth the weight 
people put in it, so that some degree of safety from the 
potential dangers of algorithmic governance can come 
from the “wisdom of the crowd.” There is a need for 
users to be able to provide feedback to the system in a 
forum, or through a mechanism for collectively com-
menting on the algorithm’s performance, so that prob-
lems can be identified and signaled. The same pervasive 
sensing technologies that feed the algorithms with data 
can be exploited by users to monitor the environment 
and signal (and share information about) problems 
caused by existing Smart City algorithms. For instance, 
the fact that home heating systems are biased so that 
they do not meet user needs and only act towards some 
municipality goals, can be discovered by a multitude of 
users (or by their algorithmic guardians) by accessing 
sensor and actuator data. Eventually the users can then 
make the facts emerge to global awareness. Indeed, it 
should be a general goal for governments (at all levels, 
from national to municipal), whenever they start relying 
on algorithms to control cities and make decisions on 
our behalf, to involve human citizens in the loop at the 
highest levels of the participation ladder [3], i.e., as part-
ners, in delegating authority, and as co-managers of the 
system or algorithm.
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A different possible form of the wisdom of the crowd 
can be the wisdom of the crowd of algorithms, enabled 
by the existence of a plurality of algorithms and systems 
devoted to govern the same concern. In essence, human 
decisions might be based on some aggregation of the 
inputs of a number of preferably independent algo-
rithms. That is, we can take the principle of the “wisdom 
of the many” to systems. However, when algorithms deal 
with ethical choices, the involvement of humans may 
become necessary. Should there be no time to involve 
a human in the decision-making, one can consider that 
some algorithmic decisions are premade by a human in 
advance so that human accountability is retained, and 
automatically adapted to the specific context once these 
decisions have to become actions.
Lastly, when there are systematic failures, there 
needs to be a way to “pull the plug.” When an algorithm 
it is found to deliver unfavorable outcomes or cause 
problems, humans must be able to stop using the sys-
tem. As a simple example, a user (as it is already 
indeed the case in our homes) should always be able to 
turn off an automatic home heating system and operate 
the system manually. The mechanism for control over 
these systems, and the way to turn them off, needs to 
be obvious [24]. However, for critical systems, the look 
and feel of the control switches needs to be different, 
so that unintentional, potentially fatal, mistakes are not 
made. As related in [24], control-room operators in a 
nuclear power plant found that similar-looking knobs 
could lead to a disastrous outcome, hence beer-keg 
handles were placed over them. Putting humans in ulti-
mate control of algorithms would seem sensible, but is 
not without its own issues. For example, a human can-
not simply switch off an autonomous vehicle when s/he 
thinks it is not performing up to its requirements — 
there needs to be a way to deliver control back to 
humans safely, and once in control, for humans to safe-
ly control the algorithm.
From Context-Awareness to Context- 
Control-Awareness
Pervasive computing technologies enable algorithms to 
make decisions that are context-aware, i.e., adapted to 
the context in which they operate (the already men-
tioned personalization being a specific form of context-
awareness). Context-awareness has been studied since 
the 1990s in the area of pervasive computing [25], [26]. 
The last decade has seen dramatic progress in automat-
ic recognition of context (including place — outdoors 
and indoors, human activity, habit, preference, and avail-
able energy and resources, etc.) and the self-adaptation 
of pervasive computing devices to the learned context.
Given the possible perils of algorithmic governance, 
one possible research direction is “context-control-aware” 
systems. That is, algorithms that can override control are 
not given full access for adapting the devices under their 
influence but are, instead, given a shared access control 
with a network of socially connected devices, with hu -
mans as co-decision makers, for shared governance [27]. 
This allows pervasive computing systems to be more “con-
siderate,” as they are not only aware of their contexts (and 
input to the systems), but also of how their influence and 
control (and the output of the systems) can bring unintend-
ed consequences. Such shared control should also 
account for safety, security, and privacy that — although 
extensively researched so far mostly in a separate silo — 
have yet to be integrated in context-control-aware systems 
for safer smart environments.
The issue of control (also related to the previously 
mentioned issue of “pulling the plug”) involves that of 
making Smart Cities and environments really usable. This 
alludes to Steve Krug’s attributes of usability of an inter-
face [28]: useful, learnable, memorable, desirable, and 
delightful. In particular, the studied contexts in context-
control-aware computing for Smart Cities and environ-
ments should also be provided with interfaces allowing 
citizens and end users to voice any discomfort and dis-
pleasure with the systems. This would enable higher lev-
els of interactivity with the governing algorithms, and 
enable these systems to, e.g., “reverse action,” “pull 
back,” and activate “dumb mode” when required. We 
need Smart Cities to not just be “efficient.” We also need 
to make it possible for citizens to be more interactive with 
the governing of cities, and vice versa [29].
There is a need for balance between a system that is 
too obtrusive to be useful, in which the user is too often 
involved, and a system that is too autonomous so that 
algorithmic regulation becomes real. A question is, can 
an algorithm be designed to compute this balance? 
Can an algorithm “solve” the problem of algorithmic 
dominance or governance, or of being context-aware, 
in cluding an algorithm being aware of itself being too 
controlling? This is where potentially the pervasive com-
puting community, in a close collaboration with other 
fields in this truly complex multidisciplinary issue, can 
contribute a solution.
Protecting the Individual Citizen  
from the Algorithm
The obvious advantage of the increasing availability of 
pervasive computing infrastructures is that they will 
make our lives much easier. However, this evolution 
also carries potential risks for individuals and for soci-
ety as a whole. By blindly accepting the deployment of 
algorithms that run our society, we could become a 
“dumber” society or even lose control. In this context, 
“algocracy” may be nontrivial to reconcile with democ-
racy. Dealing with these issues will require deploying a 
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system of societal apparatuses to protect the individual 
citizen against the running code and/or against poten-
tially malicious use by individuals of the data that is col-
lected and produced by that code.
In this article, we have explored five avenues. 1) 
First, there is the obvious attention to data access con-
trol. Beside traditional privacy and security concerns, 
the notion of behavioral privacy will be equally impor-
tant, as it will be the possibility for understanding how 
the exploitation of our personal data affects algorithms’ 
behavior. 2) Part of the solution may be to proactively 
chaperone the ongoing activities of the algocracy with 
“algorithmic guardians” that can represent and defend 
us in the algorithmic world. 3) A less trivial challenge 
lies in making citizens aware of the code that runs their 
algocracy, and empowering them in novel democratic 
procedures that will be used to manage that code. 4) 
We should never give up the possibility for humans to 
“pull the plug” or to insist on the wisdom of a crowd of 
(preferably independent) algorithms. 5) Finally, context 
awareness could be used to “sandbox” the power of cer-
tain algorithms in certain contexts and to provide the 
meta technology to activate and deactivate the sand-
boxing based on a citizen’s expression of discomfort.
We agree with [30] that ethical considerations must 
be central to new algorithms we will create in the future.
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ocial media (SM) us ­
age is increasing 
across the globe. Of 
the 7.6 billion people 
populating earth, 4 
billion are believed to be Internet 
users. Over 3 billion are SM users, 
representing over 40% global pen­
etration [1], [2].
In this issue of IEEE Technology 
and Society Magazine, we contem­
plate SM; we can postulate effects on 
political, economic, socio­cultural, 
technological, legal, and environmen­
tal (PESTLE) factors. We reviewed 
how social networking sites (SNS) 
are channels used to socio­politically 
raise awareness and mobilize people 
during elections. We reviewed opin­
ions shared by females who face 
strict gender segregation rules.
We brought special focus to the 
Middle East, the  transcontinental 
region with an estimated 130 mil­
lion active SM users (up almost 40% 
from 2017) and 164 million Inter­
net users (or 65% penetration) [1], 
[2]. Our authors confirmed findings 
from previous studies [3]: SM users 
in the Middle East describe a lack of 
freedom of expression, and worry 
about legal consequences when 
creating and sharing content. Some 
users can face fines and prison 
sentences if posts are interpreted 
as critical or insulting, or if photo­
graphs or videos of others are post­
ed without consent [4].
Some clerics, or others in author­
ity in this region, have blamed SM for 
uprisings. Therefore, some govern­
ments block, restrict, or prohibit pop­
ular sites and services. Yet, SM are 
not the causes of discontent or disaf­
fection. SM are channels of commu­
nication. Discontent and disaffection 
are upstream, flowing downstream 
into many various tributaries for 
communication; tributaries can be 
online and offline channels.
Yet, undeniably, SM continue to 
prove powerful. Communication is 
a formidable tool for empowerment. 
Citizens can use SM to communi­
cate to influence large audiences, 
to build group identity and unity, 
and to expose abuses. SM can give 
voice to the voiceless. People can 
become empowered.
In an interconnected world, the 
autocratic will continue to face chal­
lenges with the digital. Savvy users 
persist to find methods to bypass 
communication suppression, much 
like the 46% of survey respondents 
in Arab regions reporting multiple 
accounts on a single SNS platform [5].
With all the suppression efforts 
aimed at avoiding political instabil­
ity, perhaps the autocratic misjudge 
the empowerment borne through 
SM. Particularly, because empower­
ment/civic participation is believed 
to be one of the four necessary con­
ditions required to achieve sustain­
able political stability [6].
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